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Abstract 
Background 
The costs of improving surveillance systems in resource-poor settings are largely 
unknown. Though several communicable disease surveillance systems have been 
evaluated, they rarely provide precise evidence to facilitate decision making or support 
appeals to increase and sustain surveillance system investments.  This thesis seeks to 
empirically test the potential benefit of a novel evaluation approach, which assesses 
both cost and performance of surveillance. 
 
Methods   
The thesis and PhD research compromises four components: 1) a structured literature 
review to describe and examine evaluation methods of communicable disease 
surveillance systems; 2) an application of the ingredients costing approach to 
retrospectively determine meningitis surveillance costs in Chad in 2012; 3) a work-
process analysis structured evaluation and identification of performance gaps through 
interviews at health facilities and at each administrative level across seven districts in 
southern Chad; and 4) an estimation of the costs to upgrading and  implementing a 
more sensitive system to assess the long term impact of the newly introduced 
serogroup A meningococcal conjugate vaccine in Chad.  
 
Results  
The literature review highlighted the necessity of granular evaluation methods in low-
resource settings where surveillance data at supra-peripheral levels are less reliable. In 
Chad, optimal surveillance was severely hampered by limited resources. Only four 
percent of probable meningitis cases had a known outcome. Missing and unreliable 
data affected case detection; in three of the districts, zero meningitis cases were 
reported during 2012. In the other four districts, reported cases varied between 11 and 
149 per 100,000 populations.  The total costs of meningitis surveillance in Chad were 
estimated at US$ 393,000, equivalent to US$ 0.03 per capita. The work-process analytic 
3 
 
approach was used to detail an upgrading plan of resources and inputs and a 123% 
incremental increase in annual costs was estimated as needed to upgrade meningitis 
surveillance to an optimal standard. Sentinel district case-based surveillance was 
recommended as the most feasible and sustainable strategy.  
 
Conclusion 
The systematic approach for assessing performance gaps and the associated costs 
provided rich data that stakeholders found useful for policy and programme change. 
This approach underscores the benefit of understanding specific contexts in order to 
yield the most relevant and meaningful evidence for surveillance system strengthening.  
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Useful Terminology  
Active case detection  Health staff reach out to the community and systematically screen 
the population to find cases of meningitis. 
Aggregated reports Aggregate data gives a quick summary of the magnitude of the 
problem but are not detailed enough to enable case tracking. 
Aggregate reports summarise the total number of cases of several 
reportable diseases reported on one disease surveillance report 
form.  
Attack rate Number of new cases of a specified condition in a population at the 
start of an epidemic period (1).  
Case definition The clinical criteria used to screen an individual for a suspected 
disease or health related event; used when determining whether 
someone is a suspected, potential or confirmed case during an 
outbreak.  
Case-fatality rate  Also called death-to case ratio or case-fatality ratio. Defined as the 
number of new cases who die from a specific condition in a given 
time interval (1). 
Case reports Reports that provide details of individual cases of persons with a 
suspected reportable disease. Often used for diseases that 1) require 
urgent public health action or, 2) are subject to accelerated disease 
control goals or, 3) during suspected outbreaks of epidemic-prone 
diseases.  
Carriage  
(of meningococci) 
Colonisation of meningococci microorganism to the mucosal surface 
of the human nasopharynx. Carriage is an immunising event 
associated with meningococcal disease incidence and protective 
immunity against the organism (2). 
Communicable disease An illness due to a specific infectious agent or its toxic products that 
arises through transmission of that agent or its products from an 
infected person, animal or inanimate reservoir to a susceptible host; 
either directly or indirectly through an intermediate plant or animal 
host, vector or the inanimate environment (3). 
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Endemic disease The constant presence of a disease or infectious agent within a given 
geographic area or population group. It may also refer to the usual 
prevalence of a given disease with such area or group.  
Epidemiology Study of health and illness of populations and the application of 
findings to improve local and community health (4). 
Expanded Programme 
on Immunisation 
A WHO programme established in 1974 to develop and expand 
immunisation programmes throughout the world. 
Health system All organisations, people and actions whose primary intent is to 
promote, restore or maintain health (5).  
Health system 
strengthening 
Building capacity in critical components of health system to achieve 
more equitable and sustained improvements across health services 
and health outcomes (5). 
Hyper-endemic disease  A disease that is constantly present at a high incidence and/or 
prevalence rate and affects all groups equally. 
Incidence rate Number of new cases per population at risk of a specified condition 
in a given time (1). 
International Health 
Regulations (2005) 
Internationally upon agreed rules aimed to prevent, protect against, 
control and provide a public health response to the international 
spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted 
to public health risk. 
Logic model Also referred to as an analytic or casual framework. A diagram that 
depicts the inter relationships among population characteristics, 
intervention components and future outcomes.  Used in programme 
planning to assist in designing, implementing, and evaluating 
effective interventions (4). 
Line list A convenient means for consolidating data acquired from case 
investigation forms on a number of cases of the same disease; it 
includes more detail than an aggregated report.  
MenAfriCar An international consortium that aims to increase understanding of 
how meningococcal infections are transmitted in Africa, and to 
document the impact of a new meningococcal conjugate vaccine on 
transmission of the infection (6).  
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MenAfriNet A regional meningitis surveillance network to evaluate the impact 
of MenAfriVac®  introduction in the African meningitis belt (7). 
Operational standard 
[for a disease 
surveillance system] 
The comprehensive set of surveillance activities that comply with 
international standards and local guidelines, customised to a 
countries circumstances. This can be graphically depicted with a 
logic model. 
Plan of action National strategic plan based on the findings of an assessment. 
Contains planned programme activities and targeted objectives over 
a specified time period. Should be monitored to ensure timely 
implementation of activities, efficient and rational use of available 
resources (8).  
Reportable  diseases Also referred to as notifiable diseases. A disease considered to be of 
great public health importance to a particular country or sub-region. 
These diseases are legally mandated to be reported to authoritative 
health officials upon diagnosis.  
Surveillance  
[public health] 
The ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of 
outcome-specific data for use in the planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of public health practice (9). 
System  A set of elements or components that work together in relationships 
for the overall objectives/vision of the whole (10). 
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1 Introduction   
 
Early detection is fundamental to containing and controlling emerging, re-emerging, 
and novel infectious diseases (11). To ensure global health security, the world must 
predict, monitor, and quickly respond to human and animal disease occurrences (12). 
An unfortunate illustration of the threat of re-emerging diseases can be seen in the 2014 
Ebola virus disease (Ebola) outbreak in West Africa. This tragic event provided a 
painful reminder that outbreaks know no boundaries and that improving public health 
systems is critical to mitigate future global health security risks (13). 
 
Scientific commentaries have attributed many factors to the cause of the Ebola 
epidemic, including: high movement across porous and uncontrolled borders, critical 
shortage of health care workers due to existing shortfalls, ignorance and misconception 
of the disease within the population due to a lack of health education programmes, 
inadequate financing for health systems, poor or disjointed communication and 
information systems, and inexperienced leadership (14, 15). The equivocal concept, 
‘fragile health system’, was used to contain all the deficiencies in the health system that 
prevented early detection of the disease and led to a delayed coordinated effort to 
contain what became an international emergency (16). 
 
Historically, public health surveillance systems (PHSS) have been the vessel used to 
detect disease events, trigger interventions to prevent transmission, and reduce 
morbidity and mortality (17). Public health surveillance is widely considered the 
cornerstone function of public health practice and is classically defined as the “ongoing 
systematic collection, analysis, interpretation and dissemination of health data for the 
planning, implementation and evaluation of public health action” (1). Essentially, an 
effective surveillance system should provide epidemiologic intelligence that prompts 
and informs public health action.  
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In high-income countries in Europe, North America, Australia, and some parts of Asia, 
surveillance systems have progressively evolved from monitoring infectious diseases 
and cataloguing epidemics to examining interactions among biological, social, 
psychological, and environmental factors in order to support health promotion, inform 
intervention programmes, and guide prevention efforts of non-communicable disease 
and mental illness (18). However, despite these impressive advances and the ensuing 
societal benefits enjoyed by richer nations, surveillance systems in low-income 
countries remain a neglected and strained public health function and the continuing 
challenge is to create effective systems that combat communicable diseases.   
 
Amid the many functions of public health surveillance, detecting epidemics and 
monitoring changes in communicable diseases are critical to health protection in low-
income countries where emerging pathogens are most likely to occur (12). Today, too 
few low- and middle-income countries have a functioning and effective surveillance 
and response infrastructure, which includes the local capacity to perform core public 
health functions.  Persisting factors, such as an insufficient and inadequately skilled 
workforce, suggests that it is unlikely to change unless a deliberate, capacity-focused 
strengthening programme is initiated on a global scale (19).  In sub-Saharan Africa, 
where human and animal health are inextricably linked, an effective surveillance and 
response system must include a network of animal and human health community 
sources, which feed into a national early warning and outbreak surveillance response 
system (15). It must also harness the resources and collaboration of national, regional, 
and international stakeholders and policy makers to ensure the development and 
success of customised effective intervention measures. 
 
In the wake of the Ebola tragedy and other global health scares, the international 
community is now placing greater scrutiny on the use of donor aid and funding for 
sustainable health systems in under-resourced countries and regions of the world (5).  
While this fresh refocus on health infrastructure is encouraging, one must be wary of 
the international proclivity towards hurried reactions and often unhelpful solutions 
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(20). This PhD intends to promote a different solution: that sustainable changes to 
disease surveillance systems are products of steady and systematic assessment, review, 
and then precise repair of system parts and processes. 
 
The research problem for this thesis was conceived from first-hand observations of 
disease surveillance in rural African health communities as well as experiences working 
with intermediate and high levels of staff in ministries of health (MoHs) and 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to budget, plan, and evaluate 
surveillance programmes. These settings often require operational assessments and 
programme evaluation. Local health workers frequently present international 
consultants with system obstacles that prevent successful surveillance processes.  Many 
times the consultants convey these messages to the health ministries and donor 
agencies, but in many cases the response is unsatisfactory and no programmatic change 
or resource redirection occurs. From a top-down perspective, the information 
discovered through these assessments rarely provides evidence that can be used to 
determine what part of the system should be prioritised and which resources are 
needed the most. Most surveillance system evaluations that I have reviewed provide 
descriptions of the problem and demand more resources without explaining where 
exactly these resources should be allocated.  It is understandable that MoHs and donor 
agencies would be hesitant to invest more resources without a clear understanding of 
how and where it would be used.  In this thesis, I will examine the existing frameworks 
and guidance for evaluating surveillance systems and the type of information 
generated by their use.  My research builds upon existing methods of surveillance 
evaluation and explores the usefulness of including a cost assessment. The aim is to 
design evaluations that produce better evidence to advocate for adequate resources to 
improve and support surveillance programmes.  
 
In the 2010 book Principles and Practice of Public Health Surveillance, the US Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) surveillance pioneer, Dr. Stephen Thacker, argues for a growing 
appreciation of higher standards for surveillance practice, which can be assured 
22 
 
through frequent quality evaluations of PHSS. He compellingly adds that once the 
concept of ‘data for decision making’ is prioritised and successfully translated, public 
health surveillance will be recognised at a higher level of importance (1).  The 
importance of sustainable and effective surveillance systems is also inherent in the  
World Health Organisation’s (WHO) International Health Regulations (2005) ([IHR 
(2005]) and regional-specific strategies.  These policies urge countries to meet the 
challenge of generating data to improve their own disease monitoring and response 
policies, predict health-related adverse events, and inform interventions and 
programmes to improve the health of communities and countries.  
 
This thesis is grounded in the belief and shared commitment in data for decision-
making and sustainable surveillance systems, and presents one way to achieve these 
goals. The work presented in this thesis aims to shift the emphasis of the global 
discussion from why surveillance systems fail to what can make them succeed as well as to 
highlight the benefit of local led remedies to scientifically defined problems. My core 
belief is that finding the best evidence-for-advocacy is critical to equip the valuable 
individuals who are the first line of defence in detection and control of epidemic-prone 
diseases.  
 
Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is divided into 10 chapters. Chapter 1 contains an introduction to the global 
state of PHSS, and underscores the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) context and the 
opportunity to better align evaluation findings with programme planning and 
advocacy activities.  Chapter 2 provides a background to the main themes of the PhD: 
1) Public health surveillance of communicable diseases (also referred to as 
communicable disease surveillance system [CDSS]), 2) communicable disease 
surveillance systems in SSA, 3) the research context of meningococcal disease and 
Chad, and 4) the costs of communicable disease surveillance systems.  
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Chapter 3 presents a critical review of the empirical literature of surveillance 
performance evaluations. The review identifies the methods and recommendations of 
the studies and highlights methodological gaps in the existing work.  The findings of 
the review informs one of the aims of the thesis: the development of a process-centred 
evaluation approach for optimizing surveillance in low-income countries in an 
economical and sustainable way.  
 
Chapter 4 further presents the aims, objectives and conceptual framework of the thesis. 
Chapter 5 begins with an introduction of the work process analysis (WPA) framework 
as a useful and systematic CDSS evaluation approach and demonstrates its application 
in the Chad meningitis surveillance evaluation study. This chapter also provides an 
overview of the general methods for the evaluation study.  
 
Chapters 6 thru 9 describe the results for the Chad meningitis surveillance evaluation 
study.  Chapter 6 explains the Chad meningitis and integrated disease surveillance 
system using the WPA tools to analyse and organise the information. Chapter 7 
presents the results of the performance assessment. The surveillance-related cost 
estimates are presented in Chapter 8.  Chapter 9 concludes the results with a 
presentation of the incremental costs to achieve recommended upgraded system 
components for optimal surveillance in Chad.   
 
Chapter 10 provides a summary of the research findings and compares them to findings 
in the existing literature. An empirical validation of the WPA approach is also 
presented in this chapter, which concludes with discussions on strengths and 
weaknesses, reflections on potential applications of the thesis findings, and insights for 
further study and research.  
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2 Background   
 
This introductory chapter contains background information on the field of public health 
surveillance of communicable diseases and is essential to the understanding of 
systematic practices, which my research seeks to improve. Section 2.1 explains the 
objectives of the basic surveillance strategies used to collect epidemic-prone population 
health data and other notifiable diseases, and summarises the frameworks and 
guidelines widely used to evaluate CDSS. Section 2.2 provides an overview on the 
history of epidemic prone and emerging disease surveillance in sub-Saharan Africa and 
explains the regional strategy used to implement surveillance. In section 2.3, the study 
specific context of meningococcal disease in Chad is described. Lastly, section 2.4 
explains the key costs concepts related to CDSS and discusses issues identified in the 
literature, which are specifically associated to collecting costs in low-income countries.   
2.1 Background to evaluation of public health surveillance  
2.1.1 The concept of disease surveillance for public health practice 
“Surveillance, when applied to a disease means the continued watchfulness over the distribution 
and trends of incidence through the systematic collection, consolidation, and evaluation of 
morbidity and mortality reports and other relevant data.  Intrinsic in the concept is the regular 
dissemination of the basic data and interpretation to all who have contributed and all others who 
need to know.” (21) 
-  Alexander Langmuir (1963) 
 
The crude functions of observing, recording, and collecting facts and then analysing 
and interpreting them to inform corrective actions was observed as early as in the 17th 
century in the Western world (22). William Farr first noted in the 19th century that 
natural laws govern occurrence of disease and codified the public health functions of 
collecting, evaluating and reporting relevant health-related facts by person, place, and 
time (23). Surveillance as a practice applied to public health detection and control of 
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disease, however, is a relatively new field. Former CDC Chief Epidemiologist, 
Alexander Langmuir is often credited with establishing modern day surveillance 
practices and distinguishing the concept of surveillance as a separate activity from 
disease control activity or epidemiologic research. His 1963 definition (quoted at the top 
of this section) provided the systematic components of surveillance, i.e. ‘ongoing’,’ 
systematic’, ‘data collection’, ‘mortality, morbidity and other relevant data’, ‘data 
analysis’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘dissemination’(18).  Since the 1968 World Health 
Assembly first recognised surveillance as an essential function of public health practice, 
contributions to Langmuir’s definition continue to refine and nuance the concept of 
surveillance, particularly in regards to its purpose.  There has been a shift from a 
singular disease control function to a fundamental and integral function of public 
health systems used to inform public health action (such as disease control activities), 
planning, implementation and evaluation of practice (18). Today, the widely accepted 
definition of public health surveillance is: “The ongoing systematic collection, analysis, 
and interpretation of outcome-specific [health] data for use in the planning, 
implementation, and evaluation of public health practice [and action]” (9, 18). Data 
which feed surveillance systems are collected from an array of sources, and include 
clinical and laboratory diagnosis, vaccination status, mortality, and other pertinent 
information needed to understand disease characteristics within a population (24).  
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Figure 2.1 “Fathers” of modern public health surveillance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Langmuir (and several others after him) ardently separated the practice of surveillance 
from the research and programmes that surveillance information informs. The purposes 
of public health surveillance systems can be summarised into four areas: (1) To assess 
health status and trends of a population; (2) To prioritize public health needs and 
allocate resources for planning; (3) To assess programme effectiveness and; (4) To 
stimulate basic, applied, and operational research (18). The uses of public health 
surveillance data  are listed below (22) 
 Estimate the magnitude of a problem 
 Determine geographic distribution of illness 
 Show the natural history (historical trend) of a disease 
 Detect epidemics/define a [health] problem 
 Generate hypotheses, stimulate research 
 Evaluate programmes  and control measures 
 Detect changes in health practices and behaviour 
 Facilitate planning 
Alexander Langmuir (1910 -1993) 
Founder of CDC Epidemiologic 
Intelligence Service 
 
William Farr (1807-1883) 
Medical statistics pioneer  
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Public health surveillance has evolved from monitoring contacts of persons with 
communicable diseases, such as small pox, to a breadth of other conditions, such as 
those listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Examples of conditions for which surveillance is used 
Communicable diseases 
Chronic disease (e.g. cancer, malnutrition) 
Occupational injuries 
Other injuries 
Intentional injuries (e.g. suicide, homicide) 
Unintentional injuries (e.g. falls) 
Health effects of toxic exposures 
Personal health practices (e.g. smoking, sexual behaviour, drug use, alcohol) 
 
The IHR (2005) aims to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health 
response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and 
restricted to public health risks (25).  These newly revised regulations have pushed 
surveillance to become more comprehensive and collaborative on a global scale, adding 
a degree of complexity to its functionality and uses.  Surveillance must interface with 
novel public health methods and technology, balance coverage and intensity with 
resources, and respond rapidly and collaboratively to rapid global changes, which may 
constitute a threat to human health.  
 
More developed countries are able to fluidly navigate between and in concert with 
multiple sources of data, various activities and functions, and tailored response 
abilities. The sophisticated picture of surveillance illustrated in Figure 2.2 provides an 
all hazards approach to public health surveillance, which reflects the IHR (2005) 
obligations, but is arguably built on the shoulders of well-functioning CDSS as well as 
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other systems, such as a stable government, an organized healthcare structure, and an 
established and accepted classification system for disease and illness (22).   
 
In contrast, conventional surveillance based on communicable and epidemic-prone 
diseases are still represented in their most basic form in low-income countries, which 
cradle the world’s burden of communicable diseases.  The model presented in Figure 
2.2 is what is currently regarded as the optimum for producing epidemiologic 
intelligence and protecting health populations. For many low-income countries this is a 
lofty, but desirous goal—the first step is strengthening communicable disease 
surveillance to gather useful information for early warning and rapid control of 
epidemics and for the monitoring of endemic communicable diseases (26).  As 
developing countries modernize, many are already experiencing epidemiological 
transition in disease burden from infectious (e.g. diarrhoeal disease, meningitis, 
pneumonia) to chronic ailments (e.g. heart disease, stroke, cancer). These shifts 
inevitably require established CDSS to evolve and expand in order to provide data that 
addresses new questions about national public health. 
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Figure 2.2 Overview of all hazard public health surveillance and response functions 
 
Source: World Health Organisation (27)  
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2.1.2 Types of communicable disease surveillance   
Communicable disease surveillance (CDS) is essential to every public health system. 
Though it represents just one type of surveillance area, it is essential in African and 
other low-income contexts where infectious and epidemic-prone diseases 
overwhelmingly represent national priority diseases.  In these settings CDS is often 
used interchangeably with PHS. CDS can encompass multiple parallel disease systems 
(the vertical approach) or take an integrated approach where multiple diseases are 
monitored under one system with similar structures, processes, and personnel (the 
horizontal approach) (18).  CDS is essential for detecting and responding quickly to 
health threats, especially in low-income countries where emerging disease threats can 
be exacerbated by poor health systems and slow or inexistent response efforts. 
 
National surveillance programmes identify priority diseases and adverse health events 
that significantly impact the health of their population. An appropriate surveillance 
strategy and accompanying surveillance activities are implemented based on the 
specific disease attributes and control programme objectives. Disease control objectives 
can be linked to national, regional or global goals and have one (or more) of three 
outcomes: 1) to keep the disease/event under control in the population, 2) to eliminate 
the disease/event from the population, or 3) to eradicate the disease/event from the 
population. Table 2.2 defines these concepts in the context of surveillance and national 
communicable disease control programmes. Surveillance activities are generally 
classified under three types of surveillance: active, passive, and sentinel surveillance. 
 
Passive Surveillance 
Passive surveillance is performed through a data reporting hierarchy and depends on 
the cooperation of health providers or stakeholders (e.g. health facilities, laboratories, 
hospitals, private clinics, community organizations, NGOs). This method is also 
referred to as routine surveillance. Almost every country in the world has a national, 
passive public health surveillance system to monitor and track local notifiable (i.e. 
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reportable) diseases. Passive surveillance is efficient, relatively inexpensive and 
requires fewer resources.  However, it can be difficult ensuring complete and timely 
data of high quality; especially in resource-constrained settings. 
 
Table 2.2 Definitions of control, elimination, and eradication of infectious diseases 
Control  The reduction of disease incidence, prevalence, morbidity or mortality 
to a locally acceptable level as a result of deliberate efforts; continued 
intervention measures are required to maintain the reduction. Example: 
diarrhoeal diseases, diphtheria, pertussis 
Elimination Reduction to zero of the incidence of a specified disease in a defined 
geographical area as a result of deliberate efforts; continued 
intervention measures are required. Example: neonatal tetanus. 
Eradication Permanent reduction to zero of the worldwide incidence of infection 
caused by a specific agent as a result of deliberate efforts; intervention 
measures are no longer needed and also the complete interruption of 
transmission and the extinction of the causative agent so that it no 
longer exists in the environment. Example: smallpox. 
Source: CDC (28)  
 
Passive surveillance is usually employed through weekly and monthly reporting so that 
specific disease indicators and trends can be captured—this is referred to as indicator-
based surveillance (IBS).  But it can also function through event-based surveillance 
(EBS), which is the organised and rapid capture of information about events that are a 
potential risk to public health. This includes rumours and other ad-hoc reports 
transmitted through formal (i.e. established routine reporting systems) and informal 
channels (i.e. media, health workers and nongovernmental organisations reports) (27). 
The breadth and diversity of sources allow EBS to detect rare and high-impact 
outbreaks or emerging or novel diseases. 
 
EBS should be implemented through integration with IBS and should not be a parallel 
system as it enhances and extends the reach of traditional surveillance. EBS uses 
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unstructured descriptions and reports for data collection and relies on careful analysis 
of information by epidemiologists or other qualified health scientists. 
 
Sentinel surveillance  
A sentinel surveillance system is used to collect intensive, high-quality data about a 
particular disease or condition that cannot be obtained through a passive system.  A 
limited number of reporting units (e.g. health workers or health facilities) are selected 
based on the general criteria that, 1) the site is willing to participate, 2) there is a high 
probability of encountering cases, 3) there is access to good laboratory facilities, and 4) 
there are qualified and experienced staff who can identify and report on the disease. 
This method is often employed through a network of large hospitals to collect high 
quality data and understand characteristics of less common diseases and causative 
organisms, for instance invasive bacterial disease, such as caused by meningococcus. 
Active surveillance 
Active surveillance makes up for the shortcomings of passive surveillance, and is most 
useful when the disease programme objective includes identification of all cases. This 
method is defined as a special effort to collect data and confirm diagnoses. In practice, 
active surveillance attempts to identify cases by designated surveillance officials 
visiting health facilities and checking disease registers and medical records to see if a 
suspected case was missed and even speaking with health staff. This method also 
includes active searching for cases and contacts of cases (i.e. door-to door searching). 
Once the case is found, surveillance staff must investigate it and document clinical, 
epidemiological, and laboratory data.   
 
Active surveillance is expensive and requires the alert participation of health 
stakeholders.  Due to its resource intensity, this method is usually reserved for 
outbreaks to locate unreported cases or as a regular strategy for diseases that are 
targeted for elimination or eradication. It should complement but not replace passive 
surveillance. One example of active surveillance is the case-based surveillance (CBS) 
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strategy. CBS is used to collect data on each individual (i.e. suspected case) using a 
unique form to collect epidemiological information and capture microbiological 
information. Case-based data is used for immediate response and, as appropriate, case 
investigation and control measures (29).  This strategy is used for the surveillance of 
acute flaccid paralysis for poliomyelitis eradication. CBS details of every suspected case 
are meticulously captured and sent with a stool sample. CBS allows for a very sensitive 
surveillance system, which aims to detect every case of polio and to interrupt poliovirus 
transmission through vaccination intervention. Table 2.3 provides a comparison of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the three surveillance types. 
 
Table 2.3 Comparison of surveillance types 
 Type of surveillance 
Passive surveillance Sentinel surveillance Active surveillance 
Population 
under 
surveillance 
Entire country Cases seen and treated at 
selected health facilities 
All cases attending selected 
health facilities 
Outcome 
measures 
- Cases and deaths 
- Incidence rates 
- Epidemiological 
trends 
- Cases and deaths in 
selected health facilities 
- Cases and deaths in health 
facilities 
- Full case investigation 
details of each case 
Advantages - Less expensive than 
other strategies 
- Covers a wider area 
- High quality clinical, 
epidemiological and 
diagnostic data 
- Signal trends/ monitors 
disease burden of 
selected population 
- Improves timeliness and 
accuracy of case reporting 
- Directs eradication and 
elimination programmes  
- Rapid detection of 
outbreaks through close 
laboratory linkages 
- Enables timely action  
Disadvantages - Reporting is rarely 
complete and timely 
- Burden on health 
staff 
- Cannot be used to 
calculate incidence 
- Not representative 
- Ineffective for detecting 
rare diseases 
- Resource –intensive 
- Requires dedicated staff, 
transport, management 
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Early warning and response function of CDS 
CDS is most valuable when it can produce a rapid response to health issues.  The 
overarching objective of the system is that IBS and EBS work complementary to trigger 
the appropriate authorities as early as possible to respond to public health events. The 
Early Warning and Response (EWAR) functionality is a key requirement of the IHR 
(2005) and requires multiple diverse data services, an available workforce, existing 
community network, and most importantly the ability to minimize the negative health 
consequences under an acute public health event (27). 
 
2.1.3 Guidelines for evaluation of PHSS 
To ensure that health programmes are using quality health information to make 
decisions, there must be a quality surveillance systems in place (30). Evaluation of 
surveillance systems should be completed to determine whether the purposes of the 
surveillance system are met (1) and regularly assessed to ensure that appropriate and 
meaningful data is being captured for public health action and policy development. 
This section summarises the current guidelines for evaluating public health and 
communicable disease surveillance systems. 
 
CDC’s Updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems (31) 
The CDC’s ‘Updated guidelines’ was published in 2001 to supplement the 1988 
foundational version and identify the essential elements and attributes of an effective 
PHSS. Though not explicitly stated, the intended audience could be programme 
evaluators of US surveillance systems. This is assumed because examples provided 
throughout the document focus on the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System 
and experiences of US state and local health departments.  The guide summarises two 
main steps of evaluating PHSS by 1) describing the objective and elements of the system 
and 2) assessing performance according to key attributes (32). The report identifies six 
tasks that must be accomplished to satisfy these steps (Figure 2.3).  
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The guidelines also include the nine system attributes defined in Table 2.4. These 
attributes represent surveillance system characteristics that contribute directly to the 
system’s ability to achieve its specific objectives (1). Each attribute is described and 
general methods for collecting these from surveillance programme participants are 
suggested. The guidelines conclude with the recommendation that all PHSS be 
evaluated periodically and state that as technology and practice evolve, so should the 
guidelines for evaluating surveillance systems. 
 
Figure 2.3 Tasks for evaluating public health surveillance systems 
 
    Source: CDC (31)
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Table 2.4 CDC recommended attributes for evaluating the performance of PHSS1 
Attribute Description Selection of suggested evaluation 
measures and methods 
Acceptability  Willingness of relevant entities 
to participate in PHSS2 
 Assessment of  entity (individual or 
organization) participation rate 
 Completion and timeliness of 
reporting forms 
Data Quality  The completeness and validity of 
the data recorded in the PHSS 
 Calculating the percentage of 
“unknown” or “blank” response 
items on surveillance forms 
 Comparison of data values recorded 
vs. true values 
Flexibility  Ability of the PHSS to be 
adaptive and accommodating to 
changing information (e.g. new 
health related event) and needs 
with little resources. 
 Usually evaluated retrospectively 
 Subjective assessment of effort 
needed to change or retrofit a 
component of a system  
Predictive value 
positive  
(PVP or PPV) 
 The proportion of reported cases 
that actually have the health-
related event under surveillance 
 Review of case investigation forms 
 Review of external data to confirm 
cases (e.g. registries, medical 
records, death certificates) 
Representativeness  Accurate PHSS description of  
the occurrences over time and its 
population distribution by place 
and person 
 Compare the characteristics of 
reported events to all such actual 
events 
 Calculate rates of health-related 
events in population (could include 
high risk or target populations) and 
use to measure trends over time 
(denominator source must be 
consistent) 
Sensitivity  Proportion of cases of a disease 
(or other health-related event) 
detected by surveillance system 
(i.e. cases-suspected vs. 
confirmed/missed cases) 
 Estimate the proportion of total 
number of cases in the pop under 
surveillance being detected by the 
system 
                                                        
1 Communicable Disease Surveillance System 
2 Can refer to a specific CDSS or entire PHSS 
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Attribute Description Selection of suggested evaluation 
measures and methods 
 The ability to detect outbreaks 
and monitor changes in the 
number of cases over time 
Simplicity  The degree of ease in operating 
the PHSS while still meeting its 
objectives (Closely related to 
acceptance, timeliness, and the 
amount of resources required to 
operate the system.) 
 Amount and type of data needed to 
identify health condition 
 Amount and type of data required 
on surveillance form 
 Number of organizations or persons 
involved 
 Data management including time 
spent on transferring, entering, and 
storing data 
Stability  Reliability and availability of the 
PHSS 
 Measures of costs involved with 
systems computer 
 Percentage of time the system is 
operating fully 
 Comparing the outcomes of the 
system with its stated purpose and 
objectives 
Timeliness  The speed between steps in a 
PHSS 
 The interval between the onset of a 
health-related event and it being 
reported to the public health entity 
Responsable for institution control 
measures 
Usefulness 1 Surveillance system contributes to the 
prevention, control, and discovery  of 
adverse health-related events, 
including an improved understanding 
of the implications of such events 
 Review objectives of the system and 
consider the system’s effect on 
policy decisions and disease control 
programmes 
 Survey key persons who use data 
from the system on the usefulness of 
the system 
Source: Adapted from CDC’s Updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems (31). 
                                                        
1 Usefulness is not listed as an original attribute, but more as an indicator of surveillance system 
performance which is reliant on the other attributes.  However, this is often assessed in PHSS 
evaluations 
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WHO’s Communicable disease surveillance and response systems: Guide to monitoring 
and evaluating (8) 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) guidelines for monitoring and evaluating 
(M&E) CDSS were published five years after the updated CDC guidelines in 2006, and 
were developed to support implementation of surveillance system strengthening 
activities. The guide makes mention of the IHR (2005) (released just one year prior to 
this guide) and its commitment to global security. The guide underscores the regulation 
requirement for all Member States to put in place an effective surveillance and response 
system. Communicable disease surveillance is selected as the mechanism to evaluate 
the impact of disease prevention and control projects.  The structured activities 
proposed to strengthen national CDSS activities include:  
 Assessment of communicable disease risks to identify major public health 
threats. 
 Prioritisation of public health threats to ensure that surveillance is limited to the 
important public health events. 
 Assessment of existing systems to review strengths, weaknesses, and 
opportunities for strengthening the systems. 
 Development of a strategic plan of action based on the findings of the 
assessment.  
 Implementation of activities planned to strengthen the systems. 
 Monitoring progress in implementation of planned activities, the evolution and 
performance of the surveillance system. 
 Evaluating outcomes and overall impact of the surveillance system.  
 
The primary intended users are listed as Ministry of Health staff implementing 
surveillance and response systems.  Beyond a description of the concepts for M&E of 
CDSS, the guidelines underscore indicators as tools for M&E and provide a list of 
sample indicators. 
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When describing the components of surveillance and response systems for M&E, the 
WHO introduces a new conceptual framework for measuring effectiveness of CDSS 
around priority diseases. The framework components include the CDC quality 
attributes, along with an expanded list of core and support functions delineated by 
McNabb et al. (33), and finally what they call surveillance ‘structural components’. Each 
of these components are defined and expanded upon in the guidelines with 
worksheets, examples, and suggested indicators provided throughout the document. 
Each component is illustrated in Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4 Conceptual framework of surveillance and response systems for 
communicable disease 
      
    
  
  
 
 
  
  
    
      
      
 
Source: Overview of the WHO framework for monitoring and evaluating surveillance and response systems for communicable diseases (34)  
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2.2 Background to communicable disease surveillance in Sub-
Saharan Africa  
2.2.1 The need for stronger disease surveillance of emerging and epidemic 
prone infectious diseases   
Novel and re-emerging infectious diseases typically make headlines because they 
conjure scenes of devastating past epidemics, like the bubonic plague and the Spanish 
flu. The equally daunting reality is that many communicable diseases have serious 
impact on societies and economies and interfere with many aspects of daily life (35). 
Frightening diseases like Ebola, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS 
CoV), SARS and even the pandemic H1N1 have impacted high and middle-income 
countries very differently than low-income countries. In high-income countries 
established and sensitive health systems, cutting edge technology, and an ever-ready 
bioterrorism response unit can squelch a killer epidemic.  Contrastingly, sub-Saharan 
African countries are perpetually vulnerable to sudden unknown disease occurrences, 
due to chronic shortages of doctors, medicine, health facilities, and medical equipment. 
These challenges are exacerbated in countries, which suffer from persistent economic 
constraints, civil war and conflict, and overwhelming poverty and disease (36, 37). Such 
disparities can be illustrated by the recent Ebola epidemic where the shortage of beds 
and facilities in West Africa to accommodate over 25,000 cases starkly contrasts the 
response to four imported cases in the U.S., such as the allocation of six billion dollars 
for the creation of 35 Ebola Centres (37).  
 
Notably, SSA has made great strides in combating epidemic prone diseases, primarily 
from standing on the shoulders of public health triumphs, such as smallpox eradication 
and tangible progress of goals towards the eradication or elimination of poliomyelitis, 
dracunculiasis (guinea worm disease), measles and leprosy (38). One lesson that has 
proved effective is the combined strategy of enhancing population immunity through 
routine immunisation programmes and supplemental immunisation activities, 
alongside strengthening epidemiological surveillance (i.e. clinical and laboratory). This 
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strategy has led to a reduction in the global incidence of polio by 99% since 1988 (38, 
39). Stronger coordination between EPI and surveillance also produced an 88% decrease 
in measles mortality in Africa in only 12 years (40). Other gains include significant 
decreases in meningitis epidemic response time due to faster identification of 
circulating serotypes for appropriate vaccine development and the establishment of a 
sophisticated polio laboratory network, which provides genetic tracking of viruses (41). 
In addition, the war on Guinea worm continues to takes steps to being the second 
disease eradicated and has seen transmission interrupted in 17 out of 21 originally 
endemic countries (42).   These successes have also brought to light the value of 
continuous commitment of financial and technical support from local and international 
stakeholders.  The aforementioned achievements have been the products of the targeted 
strategies implemented through the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, WHO African 
Region (AFRO) Paediatric Bacterial Meningitis Surveillance Network, and the Guinea 
Worm Eradication Programme, respectively. These initiatives are global partnerships, 
often spearheaded by CDC, the WHO, and the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF). 
 
Still, the disparity in the ability to prevent, control, and respond to infectious disease 
outbreaks remains between SSA countries and much of the rest of the world. Many SSA 
countries continue to struggle with executing basic surveillance activities . Failures in 
timely case detection, underreported cases, and opaque reporting to the international 
community, have resulted in uncontained spread of too many diseases. These activities 
ought to be buttressed by knowledgeable and watchful clinicians and well-equipped 
laboratories. Countries must firstly comply with the IHR mandate to develop functional 
early warning disease systems to combat innumerable preventable deaths due to 
outbreaks (25, 43). Countries also require widespread laboratory policy reforms to 
bolster quality assurance and training directives, and expand capacity and funding 
beyond disease-specific programmes —this could greatly decrease response efforts for 
disease outbreak crises (41).  
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The tried and true formula of strong routine immunisation plus enhanced surveillance 
must be decisively executed to see continued progress of disease control.  The next 
section discusses the WHO-African Regional office solution to the second half of this 
equation: a systematic approach to disease surveillance in SSA.  
 
2.2.2 Integrated disease surveillance and response strategy 
In an effort to confront the challenges of limited resources in SSA, the integrated disease 
surveillance and response (IDSR) strategy was developed by the WHO-African Region 
in 1998. IDSR is a strategy for developing and implementing comprehensive and 
efficient public health surveillance and response systems in SSA (44, 45). The specific 
objectives are listed in Table 2.5. The IDSR strategy is used in surveillance of priority 
diseases as recommended by the WHO and selected by each country; this usually 
includes epidemic prone diseases and diseases marked for elimination and eradication 
(see Table 2.6).  
 
This holistic, shared resource approach focuses on strengthening surveillance from 
district to regional to national levels, and has improved data collection, reporting, 
analysis and monitoring as well as strengthened the use of data for decision-making 
across all health levels (46). Additionally, IDSR provides a platform for countries to 
implement the IHR (2005) (47). IDSR implementation has contributed towards strides in 
sufficient immunisation coverage and attainment of global disease elimination and 
eradication goals by improving surveillance at the peripheral and district health levels 
through continuous investment in human capital and equipment (48). Of the 46 
countries in the WHO African region (AFRO), 43 are implementing IDSR guidelines to 
improve their abilities to detect, confirm, and respond to high priority communicable 
and non-communicable diseases (43). 
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Table 2.5 Specific objectives of IDSR 
1. Strengthen the capacity of countries to conduct effective surveillance 
2. Integrate multiple surveillance systems for efficient use of resources 
3. Improve the use of information to facilitate evidence-based response  
4. Improve the flow of surveillance information between and within health 
jurisdiction levels 
5. Strengthen laboratory capacity and involvement   
6. Increase involvement of clinicians in surveillance system 
7. Emphasize community participation, including event based surveillance 
8. Use data thresholds to trigger epidemiological investigations 
Source: WHO/ CDC (45) 
 
The key feature of IDSR is that it is an integrated system.  This means that all the 
surveillance activities are coordinated and streamlined, rather than separated and 
duplicated for different diseases.  Integration includes the horizontal management of 
methods, software, data collection forms, standards and case definitions in order to 
prevent inconsistencies and standardise reporting of information by designated focal 
points at every health level. Integrating disease training, supervision, and feedback, 
which practically cuts down on the amount of trips and funds used to support such 
activities, efficiently uses resources.  This also allows for the hiring of specific personnel 
and materials (e.g. vehicles, computers,) to perform exclusive surveillance-related 
activities (45). 
 
Core activities and functions of a surveillance system 
The IDSR guidelines provide a general reference for surveillance activities and 
functions for national public health management officials, relevant clinicians, health 
facility managers, partners, and community officers. The eight steps for completing the 
IDSR public health functions are listed below:  
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Step 1 – Identify cases and events 
Step 2 – Report suspected cases or conditions to the next health level 
Step 3 – Analyse and interpret data for trends 
Step 4 – Investigate and confirm suspected cases, outbreaks or events 
Step 5 – Prepare for response to potential outbreak  
Step 6 – Respond  
Step 7 – Provide feedback on outcomes to all levels that provided data 
Step 8 – Evaluate to assess and improve the effectiveness of the system 
 
Several of these activities occur across jurisdictional health levels (i.e. community, 
health facility/peripheral, intermediate, national) and others occur at specific levels 
only. The integrated system also includes laboratory services at some levels. IDSR has a 
specific focus on strengthening the intermediate or district level.   
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Table 2.6 Priority diseases, conditions and events for IDSR, 2010 
Epidemic prone diseases Disease targeted for 
eradication or elimination 
Other major disease, events or 
conditions of public health importance 
Acute haemorrhagic fever 
syndrome*  
Anthrax Chikungunya  
Cholera  
Dengue  
Diarrhoea with blood 
(Shigella)  
Measles  
Meningococcal meningitis 
Plague  
SARI**  
Typhoid fever  
Yellow fever  
 
*Ebola, Marburg, Rift Valley, 
Lassa, Crimean Congo, West 
Nile Fever 
 
 **National programmes may 
wish to add Influenza-like 
illnesses to their priority 
disease list 
Buruli ulcer  
Dracunculiasis  
Leprosy  
Lymphatic filariasis  
Neonatal tetanus  
Noma  
Onchocerciasis  
Poliomyelitis*  
 
*Disease specified by IHR (2005) 
for immediate notification 
Acute viral hepatitis  
Adverse events following immunisation 
(AEFI) 
Diabetes mellitus  
Diarrhoea with dehydration in children 
under 5 years of age  
 
HIV/AIDS (new cases)/Hypertension  
Injuries (Road traffic Accidents)  
Malaria  
Malnutrition in children under 5 years of 
age  
Maternal deaths  
Mental health  
Epilepsy  
Rabies  
Severe pneumonia in children under 5 
years of age  
 
Sexually transmitted infections  
Trachoma  
Trypanosomiasis  
Tuberculosis 
Diseases or events of international concern, 
as specified by the IHR 
Human influenza due to a new subtype  
SARS 
Smallpox 
Any public health event of international or national concern (infectious, 
zoonotic, food borne, chemical, radio nuclear, or due to unknown 
condition.)  
Source: WHO-AFRO (49)  
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2.3 Research context of meningitis and Chad 
This section contains background information on meningococcal meningitis with 
special attention given to the disease in sub-Saharan Africa. It also presents a brief 
overview to Chad and the rationale for selecting this disease and this country as the 
case study of my PhD research. The information summarised in this section is 
important to understanding methods and resources needed for meningitis surveillance.   
 
2.3.1 Meningococcal meningitis 
While several agents can cause meningitis, including, bacteria, protozoa, viruses and 
fungi, meningococcal disease specifically refers to any illness caused by the gram-
negative bacterium Neisseria meningitidis (also called the meningococcus) (50). The two 
primary clinical outcomes of meningococcal disease are meningococcal meningitis (one 
form of bacterial meningitis) and meningococcal septicaemia (meningococcaemia). 
Meningococcal disease generally occurs 1–10 days after exposure and presents as 
meningitis in more than 50% of cases (51). Meningococcal meningitis is clinically 
defined as an inflammation of the brain and spinal cord meninges, and requires 
immediate hospitalisation. It is the only form of bacterial meningitis that causes 
epidemics. The case-fatality rate of meningococcal disease is 9% to 12%, even with 
treatment; in resource poor countries fatality rates can reach 50% (52, 53). As many as 
20% of survivors have permanent sequelae, such as hearing loss, neurologic damage, or 
limb amputation (54). Meningococcal septicaemia can be more severe with a fatality 
rate of 20%  to  40% depending on timeliness of and access to treatment (53, 55) 
Epidemiology 
Six serogroups of N. meningitidis are known to cause life threatening disease (A, B, C, 
W, X and Y). Figure 2.5 depicts the serogroup distribution and predominant strains by 
world region. 
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Figure 2.5 Worldwide distribution of major meningococcal serogroups 
 
Sub-Saharan African meningitis belt indicated by the dark shaded area.  
Source: Harrison, LE et al (56) 
 
Though epidemics can occur in any part of the world, the highest burden of this disease 
is in Africa, where epidemic and endemic rates are several times higher than those in 
industrialised nations. Serogroup A is the dominant strain Responsable for the 
recurring meningitis epidemics in Africa during the last century (2). Additionally, 
serogroups X, Y, and W emerge sporadically and have caused several African outbreaks 
in the last decade (56-60). Serogroups B and C are repeatedly Responsable for outbreaks 
in several industrialized nations. Table 2.7 explains the characteristics of each serogroup 
(61). 
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Table 2.7 Characteristics of disease due to meningococcal serogroups 
Serogroup Characteristics 
A Most prevalent serogroup in SSA and China 
Leading cause of epidemic meningitis worldwide 
Monovalent conjugate vaccine available  
B Major cause of endemic meningitis in Europe and the Americas 
Vaccines commerially available in several countries; will be introduced in the UK 
routine immunisation programme for infants in 2015 
C Major cause of endemic meningitis in Europe and the Americas 
Peaks of disease in adolescents and young adults 
Conjugate MenC vaccinewas adopted into the UK immunisation schedule in 1999 
Polysacharde vaccines are still mostly used in SSA 
Y Infrequent worldwide 
Emerged in the US in mid 1990s  
Conjugate and polysaccharide  tetravalet vaccines (A, C, Y, W) available 
W Worldwide, some epidemics in SSA 
Associated with Hajj pilgrimage in 2000 and 2001  
Conjugate and polysaccharide  tetravalet vaccines (A, C, Y, W) available 
X Infrequent worldwide 
Cause of local outbreaks in parts of SSA 
No vaccine is yet available to protect against serogroup X 
 
 
In 2012 the global burden of invasive meningococcal disease was estimated to be at 
least 1.2 million, with 135,000 deaths (62).  Meningococcal incidence trends are highly 
regional and are contingent on serogroup distribution (56). Meningococcal meningitis 
incidence is variable with  ranges from 0.3 - 0.05/100,000 in industrialised countries to 
1,000 per 100,000 population during severe African epidemics (2, 51). Meningococcal 
disease can occur year-round, but has a seasonal pattern, which varies by country. 
Generally, peak incidence occurs in late winter to early spring in countries with a 
temperate climate and during the dry season in SSA. High risk populations include 
infants, adolescents, and young adults. Other risk factors include travelling to an 
endemic area, closed populations (e.g. military personnel, Hajj pilgrims), recent upper 
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respiratory tract infections and smoking (2, 51). Because of this, local understanding of 
the epidemiology and burden of disease need to be facilitated through meningococcal 
disease surveillance.  
 
The African meningitis belt  
Epidemic meningitis in Africa dates back to more than 100 years ago (63). In 1963, 
Lapeyssonnie coined the term ‘meningitis belt’, which represents the geographic 
distribution of sub-Saharan African countries with the highest incidence of 
meningococcal disease.  While the epidemiology of meningococcal disease varies 
greatly across geographic area and time, explosive meningitis epidemics occur in five to 
twelve year cycles in meningitis belt countries (2, 64). Generally, outbreaks and 
epidemics coincide with the dry Harmattan season (typically end of November to end of 
June). The African Meningitis Belt is comprised of 22-261 countries stretching from 
Senegal to Ethiopia, primarily in the semi-arid and sub-Sahelian areas (Figure 2.6).  
Cumulatively, this represents an at-risk population of 430 million people (64).  Before 
2010, serogroup A was the predominant strain in this region, accounting for 80-85% of 
all cases (61). The most devastating of these outbreaks was the 1996-1997 epidemic—
more than 250,000 cases and over 25,000 deaths were reported (65). Substantial 
outbreaks have also been due to serogroups C, W and X, though since 2002 these 
occurrences have generally decreased (59, 63, 66). The most recent large-scale 
meningitis epidemic in this region occurred in 2009 where more than 80,000 cases were 
reported and was due to serogroup A meningococcus (66).   
Transmission and carriage 
Humans are the only known reservoir for meningococcus and the disease is spread 
rapidly from person to person through the respiratory droplets of infected people (24). 
Thus, risk factors are associated with host characteristics and environmental factors.  
For example, people living in crowded and intimate living spaces, such as university 
                                                        
1 Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Tanzania, are usually considered part of the extended belt 
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dormitories and army barracks, are at higher risk than people who do not live in these 
spaces (51).  
N. Meningitides commonly inhabits the mucosal membranes of the nose and throat and 
it is estimated that at any given time 5-25% of the population are asymptomatic carriers 
(2, 24, 51). Carriage has protective and immunising properties and non-carriers are 
considered high-risk for meningococcal disease (67), but a clear association between 
carriage and immunity and disease remains unclear, especially in the African context (2, 
60). Carriage studies of pathogenic strains are occasionally undertaken to understand 
epidemic conditions and carriage reduction through vaccination with conjugate 
vaccines has been effective in interrupting transmission (63, 68, 69). 
Figure 2.6 Sub-Saharan Africa meningitis belt countries 
 
 
Source: PATH/MenAfriVac (70) 
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Diagnoses 
Patients with meningitis present with symptoms such as: stiff neck, headache, and an 
abrupt onset of fever. These features can be accompanied by sensitivity to light, 
confusion, and vomiting (24, 51). Upon presentation of meningitis symptoms, a lumbar 
puncture is performed to obtain cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), which should undergo 
laboratory diagnostic testing for confirmation of meningitis and isolation of N. 
meningitidis. These include culture, gram stain, latex agglutination and rapid diagnostic 
tests (71). These methods can be performed in basic environments with limited 
laboratory facilities. During outbreaks, identification of the serogroup is essential to 
ensure use of the appropriate vaccine.  Apart from culture, the reference standard for 
diagnosis is identification of meningococcal DNA using polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) (72).  PCR is used frequently in industrialised countries; however, the equipment 
and material resources needed to perform PCR can be difficult to obtain in resource-
constrained settings (2, 63).  
Treatment 
Meningitis can be effectively treated with antimicrobial agents (e.g. penicillin). Early 
diagnosis and treatment is critical to halt the rapid progression of the infection and 
decrease the probability of death (50, 51). Treatment should ideally be administered 
after blood or CSF sample is obtained to ensure that bacteria can still be detected 
through laboratory testing.  
Vaccines 
Vaccines are integral to the prevention and control of meningococcal meningitis. 
Polysaccharide vaccines have been available since the 1970s for serogroups C, A, W, 
and Y. These vaccines are relatively inexpensive, safe and effective, and are most useful 
in mass vaccination campaigns, where they have been used extensively to control 
epidemics in African meningitis belt countries.  Limitations of polysaccharide vaccines 
are: 1) they are less effective in young children, 2) they do not provide long-term 
protection  (immunity lasts for  3-5 years), and 3)  they have  little or no effect on 
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carriage and thus no herd immunity (2, 51). Due to this final reason, these vaccines have 
not reduced the frequency of epidemics in hyper-endemic countries. 
 
Conjugate vaccines were first successful for Haemophilus influenzae type B (Hib) and 
offer improvements over polysaccharide vaccines. These vaccines induce a strong and 
long-term immune response even in infants as young as two months old, and have been 
shown to reduce the frequency of N. meningitidis carriage and protect unvaccinated 
persons through herd immunity (51, 73, 74). The first meningococcal conjugate vaccine 
(serogroup C vaccine) to be licensed was introduced in the UK in 1999 where it 
demonstrated 90% vaccine effectiveness and significantly reduced the incidence of type 
C meningococcal disease (2, 74).  Europe, Canada and the US subsequently introduced 
monovalent C conjugate vaccines into their routine immunisation programmes. Since 
2005, tetravalent (A, C, W, Y) conjugate vaccine has been available in the United States 
and internationally. 
 
The main limitation of conjugate vaccines is the high costs, for example in 2011 the US 
CDC price for tetravalent vaccine was USD $85.12 per dose (75)-- an unattainable 
amount in SSA, which includes some of the poorest countries in the word.  Due to this, 
countries in Africa continued using polysaccharide vaccines until 2010.  Through the 
Meningitis Vaccine Project (a Bill and Melinda Gates funded collaborative effort 
between WHO and PATH), a novel meningococcal serogroup A polysaccharide–
tetanus toxoid conjugate vaccine (PsA-TT) (MenAfriVac®) was developed. Before 
development started, the Serum Institute of India agreed to not charge more than 0.60 
USD per dose. This new vaccine gives hope to achieving elimination of epidemic 
meningitis as a public health problem in SSA (76). Chapter 5 will further discuss the 
introduction of this vaccine into SSA and Chad. 
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2.3.2 Surveillance in the African meningitis belt 
The WHO-AFRO IDSR strategy is meant to be implemented across all disease 
surveillance programmes in Africa, including meningitis.  Under this strategy, the 
district level is the focus of most of the six activities (44) (26): 
1. Detection and notification of health events; 
2. Collection and consolidation of pertinent data; 
3. Investigation and confirmation (epidemiological, clinical and/or laboratory) of 
cases or outbreaks; 
4. Routine analysis and creation of reports; 
5. Feedback of information to persons providing data; 
6. Feed-forward (i.e. the forwarding of data to more central levels). 
 
Since 2009 the WHO has provided the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Enhanced Meningitis Surveillance in Africa (77), to African meningitis belt countries for 
supplemental guidance. This document provides technical meningitis-specific 
information such as case-definitions, intervention thresholds, and vaccine choice 
guidance. It also explains the recommended meningitis surveillance methodologies for 
African meningitis belt countries, which are defined below.   
 
Enhanced epidemic meningitis surveillance  
Since 2002, enhanced epidemic meningitis surveillance (ES) has been the baseline 
surveillance strategy for countries in the African meningitis belt. This passive approach 
uses population-based aggregated counts of suspected cases of all ages (according to 
the standard case definition) to compute weekly incidence at the district level. When 
district meningitis rates exceed 10 cases per 100,000 populations in a single week, 
reactive campaigns using a polysaccharide meningococcal vaccine are recommended 
and implemented (78). With ES, laboratory confirmation is required only for the first 
several cases, which serves to identify the pathogen Responsable for the outbreak. This 
means that under ES, health facility personnel only perform a few lumbar punctures 
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and send few samples to the laboratory.  These samples should be accompanied with a 
standard IDSR form with the details of the case. After the serogroup is confirmed, 
health facilities are not required to capture further detailed information or perform 
lumbar punctures on suspected cases.  All suspected cases however continue to be 
captured using a line list.  
 
Because this method relies on aggregated data and calls for limited laboratory 
confirmation, it has an incomplete capacity to respond to the new epidemiological 
needs and questions that have arisen from introduction of the new conjugate vaccine, 
including the impact of the new vaccine on serogroup circulation and epidemic 
patterns, as well as vaccine efficacy (78, 79).   
 
Case-based surveillance  
Unlike aggregated surveillance approaches, case-based surveillance collects 
information at the individual level. It requires all suspected cases of meningitis to be 
investigated individually and for all epidemiological information to be documented. 
Additionally, microbiology data from the individual are linked with their 
epidemiological information by a unique identifier. This active approach is resource 
intensive, but it also provides the most informative data and it is the only surveillance 
method for providing vaccine efficacy information (77). Due to resource constraints, 
case-based surveillance may be difficult to implement in all areas where the new 
conjugate vaccine has been introduced. Hence, making trade-offs regarding both the 
amount of information that can be expected and the amount of resources available is 
necessary to decide on the most appropriate surveillance strategy and its scale.  
 
The WHO guidelines, Epidemic meningitis surveillance in the African meningitis belt: 
Deciding on the most appropriate approach (80),  outline the scope of potential meningitis 
surveillance strategies in the context of the post- MenAfriVac® introduction. It provides 
Meningitis belt countries with an overview of surveillance objectives (Table 2.8) and 
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describes information on practical considerations for each strategy (Table 2.9).  Three 
types of case-based surveillance have been identified (81):  
 
1. Comprehensive case-based outbreak documentation: Active and systematic 
collection of detailed epidemiological and bacteriological information on each 
meningitis case during an epidemic.  
2. Sentinel case-based surveillance: Uses data systematically collected in a sample 
of high-quality sites across the country, which are purposely selected to bring 
forth valuable information and answer specific epidemiological questions. This 
approach is particularly relevant when resources are too sparse to implement 
nationwide effective surveillance. While a sentinel system will not at once 
answer all the epidemiological questions associated with the introduction of the 
conjugate vaccine, it is possible to combine different strategies to reach a 
satisfying level of information and meet the surveillance goals set for 
meningococcal meningitis. The proposed sentinel surveillance strategies for 
meningitis are:  
a. Paediatric case-based surveillance: Relies on same principles as paediatric 
bacterial meningitis surveillance (i.e. collects clinical and diagnostic data 
on children <5 years at sentinel hospitals which primarily serve 
children)  
b. Hospital case-based surveillance: Implemented in a selection of hospitals 
where meningitis suspected cases are treated  
c. District case-based surveillance: Implemented in all health facilities in a 
particular district. It is a population-based approach where information 
at the individual level of suspected cases is collected. In some countries, 
this involves referral of suspected cases to a district level facility for 
lumbar puncture procedure. 
3. Nationwide case-based surveillance: All health facilities in a country are 
included in the surveillance system. A population-based approach where 
information at the individual level is collected on each suspected case 
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(microbiological and epidemiological). It is the widest and most comprehensive 
approach to case-based surveillance.  
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Table 2.8 Meningitis surveillance strategies and associated objectives 
Source: WHO (80) 
 
                                                        
1 Using incidence thresholds in the districts involved in sentinel case-based surveillance 
 
Surveillance Objectives 
 
Surveillance Strategies 
Enhanced 
epidemic 
surveillance 
Comprehensive 
case-based 
outbreak 
documentation 
Pediatric 
case-based 
surveillance 
Hospital case-
based 
surveillance 
District case-
based 
surveillance 
Nationwide 
case-based 
surveillance 
1. Detect and confirm outbreaks, launch 
appropriate response strategies X    X
1 X 
2. Assess the case burden and incidence 
trends in time, place, and persons of 
meningococcal meningitis and other acute 
bacterial meningitis 
X     X 
3. Monitor the circulation, distribution and 
evolution of Nm serogroups and other 
pathogens 
X X X X X X 
4. Monitor the circulation, distribution and 
evolution of Nm strains (sequence-type) X X X X X X 
5. Monitor the antibiotic resistance profile 
of Nm 
X X X X X X 
6. Evaluate the control strategies 
X X   X X 
7. Evaluate the impact of the conjugate 
meningitis A vaccine on the number of 
cases and outbreaks, on epidemic 
patterns, and on circulating serogroups 
 X X X X X 
8. Estimate the efficacy of the meningitis A 
conjugate vaccine 
 X X X X X 
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Table 2.9 Breakdown of incremental resources needed per surveillance strategy  
 
Surveillance Strategies 
 
Types of incremental resources 
Human 
resources 
Laboratory 
capacity 
Specimen 
handling 
shipment 
Training Laboratory 
materials 
Lumbar 
puncture 
kits 
Complex 
preparation 
Complex 
implement-
ation 
Baseline: enhanced surveillance  (used as reference) 
 
Comprehensive case-based 
outbreak documentation 
Light Light Light Light Moderate Light Light Light 
Paediatric case-based 
surveillance 
Light Light Light Light Light Light Light Light 
Hospital case-based surveillance Light Light Light Light Light Light Light Light 
District case-based surveillance Moderate Light Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Nationwide case-based 
surveillance 
Heavy Moderate Heavy Heavy Heavy Heavy Heavy Heavy 
Note: These resources reflect the needs to operate baseline surveillance and serve as reference for the assessing the incremental resources required to run the other strategies. 
For sentinel strategies, the total amount of resources needed will depend on the number of sites or district selected.  
 
Source: WHO (80) 
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2.3.3 Chad 
Chad is a land locked country in central Africa bordered by Libya and Sudan to the 
North East, Niger and Nigeria to the West, and Cameroon and Central African Republic 
to the South. It is an ethno-linguistic mosaic of more than 256 language groups.  The 
two official languages are French and Arabic. It is among the poorest countries in the 
world and ranked 184th out of 186 countries on the 2012 UNDP Human Development 
Index. Around 55% of the population live below the poverty line and about 36% live in 
extreme poverty (29). Poverty is primarily concentrated in rural areas where 87% of the 
country’s poor live.  Socio-demographic indicators are summarised in Table 2.10.  
 
Table 2.10 Chad socio-demographic indicators 
Indicator Chad 
2013 population 12,661,091 
Area (million sq km) 1.284 
2012 Gross Domestic Product per capita US$ 1,006 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 50 
2011 mortality per 1,000 children < 5 years 169 
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births 94 
2010 maternal mortality per 100,000 births 1,100 
Percent  population under 18 years 57% 
Percent  female population 51% 
Percent  literacy of entire population 34.5% 
Sources:  Chad MoH documents, CIA World Fact-book (last updated 15/5/15) and the International Monetary Fund 
 
Chad has suffered from conflict and instability since its independence in 1960. President 
Idriss Déby’s administration has been in place since 1990, and in 1996 was officially 
designated during the country’s first pluralist elections. In 2003, Chad became an oil 
producing nation, and its gross domestic product per capita rose from an estimated 
US$ 253 in 2002 to US$ 1,006 in 2012 (82).  Recently, Chad has become an important 
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regional actor and safe haven for asylum seekers. It is the temporary home to thousands 
of Sudanese, Central African, and Nigerian internally displaced persons who have fled 
violent conflict in their home countries, these include thousands of Chadian migrant 
returnees (83, 84). Additionally, the Chadian Armed Forces have been influential in 
peace-keeping missions in Mali and Central African Republic, and has militarily 
intervened in terrorists attacks in Northern Nigeria (85). 
Chad is politically decentralised and regulated by four levels of administrative and 
territorial demarcations: rural communities, communes, departments and regions.  
Decentralisation is primarily implemented through regional delegations (i.e. regional 
action committees) (86). Health areas include regions (see Figure 2.7), districts and 
zones; MoH authorities are stationed at each level.  Health facilities are assigned to 
specific zones. 
 
Chad’s epidemiologic profile is characterised by both endemic and epidemic-prone 
diseases. The leading causes of morbidity in the population are attributed to malaria, 
tuberculosis, acute respiratory infections, HIV/AIDS, and diarrheal diseases (87). Child 
malnutrition rates are the highest in West Africa, with parts of the country experiencing 
persistent “food crises” since 2012 (88). Like many sub-Saharan countries children and 
women are the most vulnerable groups in the population. 
 
Recent history of meningococcal meningitis epidemics in Chad 
Chad is one of the six SSA countries that are hyper-endemic (i.e. Constant high 
incidence rates that affects all age groups equally) for meningococcal meningitis (66, 
89). For several decades, epidemics have persisted in Chad despite extensive use of 
polysaccharide vaccines in reactive vaccination campaigns (73). During 1966-2001, 
Chad reported meningitis cases to WHO almost every year, but there were three, 
distinct epidemic waves (90). The first phase was between 1970 and 1974, the second 
between 1988 and 1990, and a third phase between 1998 and 2001. In these epidemics, 
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between 4,000 and 6,000 cases were reported per year and the case fatality rate was 
around 10% (90).  
 
Figure 2.7 Regional map of Chad by administrative health divisions 
 
Source: Chad Ministére de la santé publique 
 
During the 2009 epidemic season, cases were primarily detected in the capital 
N’Djamena with smaller outbreaks in three southern regions, Mandoul, Chari-Baguirmi 
and Mayo-Kebbi Ouest (91).  A total of 1,299 cases and 140 deaths were reported in 2009 
(case fatality rate of 10.8%), with about half of the cases caused by NmA and the other 
half by serogroup W135 (91). In 2010, 3,228 suspected cases and 248 deaths were 
reported from 11 epidemic districts. The cases were again NmA and W135. In 2011, 
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there were 5,935 suspected cases, with 269 deaths in 17 epidemic districts. In 2012, 3,874 
cases and 163 deaths were reported from 12 epidemic districts. NmA was also the 
predominant bacteria in these two most recent outbreaks. 
 
MenAfriVac© was introduced through mass vaccination campaigns in 2011 and 2012. 
The campaigns targeted all 1-29 year olds and were conducted in three phases. Three 
regions (N’Djamena, Chari Baguirmi and Mayo Kebbi Est) had vaccination campaigns 
during December 2011 where approximately 1.8 million individuals aged 1-29 were 
vaccinated. Most other regions had campaigns between June and December 2012. 
However, some districts, such as Oum Hadjer and Moissala, had campaigns a little 
earlier than this in response to the 2012 epidemic (92). At this time, all regions in Chad 
were implementing passive surveillance.  To date, since the introduction of 
MenAfriVac®, there have been no meningitis outbreaks in Chad. 
 
2.3.4 Rationale for MenAfriVac® and Chad as research case study 
I chose to embrace the public health landmark of the introduction of MenAfriVac® in 
my thesis because I believe it provides a remarkable opportunity to test a new 
evaluation approach and to improve surveillance of an epidemic prone disease.  In 
addition, the commitment of partners, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
and the WHO, to use the research from our Chad study to support other meningitis belt 
countries in identifying the most appropriate surveillance aligned with my aims of 
sustainable health systems and evidence-based policy development.  Finally, the in-
depth observations presented in this thesis has value to the government, health care 
workers, and the population of Chad—this information will benefit these most 
important stakeholders through improved understandings of the issues. 
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2.4 Background to cost of communicable disease surveillance 
systems   
A cost study, or economic costing,  is a health economic technique which determines 
the costs of a health intervention or health programme and can underline its 
importance considered alongside its impact on population health (93).  Information 
about costs can be derived from a cost analysis, which can also be used to compare the 
costs of two or more approaches or elucidate the economic burden. Cost studies can 
provide value-for-money information to assist decision makers in efforts to 
appropriately allocate resources and prioritise investments for specific disease threats 
(11, 94, 95). 
 
Cost is a commonly reported barrier to communicable disease surveillance system 
maintenance and thus, performance. However, it is rarely calculated or assessed, 
revealing a major gap in knowledge to improve disease surveillance programmes, 
which are chronically underfunded, especially in low-income countries (96). In 2005, the 
WHO published the guidance document Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of National 
Surveillance and Response (97). Since then, there has been some surveillance research that 
include a cost analyses. A 2012 systematic literature review of 99 public health 
surveillance evaluations found that only 21 human health studies included a cost or 
cost-effectiveness component (98).  The objective of this section is to provide a 
background to the design of costing studies by summarising applied costing methods 
and detailing key components for conducting a CDSS cost study (99-106). The following 
subsections are categorised using concepts presented in the aforementioned WHO 
guidelines. 
 
  
64 
 
2.4.1 Methods of CDSS costing exercises 
Study objectives 
CDSS cost studies are usually undertaken to estimate incremental costs of additional 
surveillance components. Researchers capitalise on opportunities to assess newly 
adopted surveillance strategies (102, 105, 106), a new outbreak control programme, (99) 
or an electronic data-collection system (103). Studies are also conducted to estimate 
costs associated with a certain event, such as a community outbreak of meningococcal 
disease (104). While most studies have aimed to provide a cost-outcome description of 
the system, one study assessed disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) needed to be 
averted to determine cost-effectiveness of an early warning system (102). 
Time horizon 
The costs study time horizon, or the period of time for which the costs are measured in 
the analysis, is generally set to capture two reference points. Studies that include new 
system components are often defined as “preparatory phase” and 
“implementation/routine operation phase”. Researchers may choose to use more 
explicit terms to define their time horizon. For example, Baly et al. defined time horizon 
as “transmission” and “non-transmission” periods to capture attributable cost drivers 
during dengue outbreaks (99). Time horizon definitions generally correspond with 
retrospective data collection. 
 
Resource valuation 
Resource valuation is usually based on the notion of ‘opportunity costs’. Opportunity 
costs, are the cost of an alternative that must be forgone in order to pursue a certain 
action. Put another way: opportunity costs represent the cost of using resources for 
some purpose and measures their value in the proposed alternative usage (93). The 
purpose of this notion is to define the value of scarce resources in health care 
interventions – this is primarily a social-economic theoretical concept (107, 108). An 
example of an opportunity cost for CDSS is volunteer time for community based 
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surveillance activities.  Economic costs consider opportunity costs, while financial costs 
do not. 
 
Cost perspective and total costs 
A cost perspective is a decision of which social or institutional entities’ costs incurred 
will guide the identification of resource inputs to be included in the study; it must be 
established at the beginning, as the perspective determines the entire costing process 
(93). The choice of perspective is derived from the research question and study 
objective(s). The most comprehensive societal perspective, which includes costs 
incurred by all parties, is often preferred, but requires substantial resources needed to 
undertake such a study. The healthcare payer or provider perspective capture costs 
associated with MoH and partners. A healthcare payer perspective study in Costa Rica 
considered costs incurred by the National Reference Laboratory, the PAHO Costa Rica 
office, CDC, and a pilot sentinel hospital (106). In a Colombian study, a combined 
health service and government perspective was applied to estimate costs associated 
with treatment, surveillance and an outbreak investigation in one hospital and health 
department (104).  Mueller and colleagues provided an example of a study which 
considered the full opportunity costs covered by the Kenyan and Ugandan public 
health care systems (102).  
 
Classification of costs 
Capital (i.e. one-time investments) and recurrent (i.e. ongoing or operational) costs 
must both be collected in CDSS cost assessments.  Capital costs commonly include 
vehicles needed for surveillance supervision, laboratory equipment as well as 
computers and other office equipment. Costs associated with building infrastructure 
are sometimes omitted due to lack of information on buildings and replacement cost 
(99, 105). Recurrent costs typically include personnel, supplies and materials and can be 
very extensive. In one case of costing a dengue control programme, ‘materials’ included 
larvacides and insecticides, diagnostic tests, drugs, protective clothing, gloves, office 
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materials, operational costs, and utilities (99). An activity costing apportions various 
costs (e.g. transportation and administrative costs) on the basis of intervention-specific 
activity data. Cost estimates for staff time are generally determined on the basis of staff 
numbers and full-time equivalent staff work. 
 
Some costs are categorised by different inputs from the start-up and post-surveillance 
component implementation phase.  In some cases, recurrent costs are differentiated 
between setup costs and running costs. For example, in the above mentioned dengue 
control programme study, the operational costs included fuel and lubricants, vehicle 
rent, per diems and food, spare parts and maintenance of equipment, vehicle and 
buildings (99).      
 
Shared resources 
The challenge of attributing costs of a specific surveillance programme with shared 
resources is particularly common in surveillance since most resources and activities can 
(and should) be shared across disease programmes. Such costs include utilities, 
maintenance, administration, personnel, transport, and buildings. While there is no 
unambiguous rule to apportion shared costs, many economists try to estimate if the cost 
would change if the programme was taken away or added to the overall activity (this is 
called a marginal analysis) (107). In practice, cost studies deal with this by asking 
surveillance and/or clinical staff the proportional time allocated to related disease 
surveillance activities.  Sometimes this method is coupled with observation sessions or 
existing estimates are retrieved from the literature. Katz et al. tackled this issue within a 
new costing framework for International Health Regulations (2005).  In their study they 
resolved shared cost by eliminating duplication of itemised resources. In effect, they 
assigned each resource to the most relevant IHR surveillance indicator and not to the 
others (even if there was some part of that that was used in other activities) (100). 
However, in most studies, a systematic method for identifying shared costs was not 
articulated. For instance, in a study of IDSR implementation in three African countries, 
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the authors note that the data source (i.e. log books of time and expenses) did not 
provide the level of details needed to divide the cost of IDSR activities with other public 
health activities (105).  
 
Estimating resource consumption  
Costs data can best be collected using bottom up approaches such as the ingredient 
approach—a detailed micro-costing exercise which collects quantities of resources as 
well as their respective unit costs (109).   This approach seeks to measure costs as 
accurate as possible, but may be difficult in low-income countries due to absent or 
incomplete records of service resources (110). Mueller and colleagues assessed costs by 
means of the ingredient approach and then categorized into recurrent and capital costs 
to determine the incremental costs needed to set up and run an early detection system 
(EDS) on top of a functioning health care system (102). They reviewed expenditures for 
purchases and financial transactions and interviewed staff to estimate time spent on 
EDS-specific tasks. The authors captured costs at every level of the health system (i.e. 
health facility, district health office, and national level-MOH). In their study results, 
they provided a table of annual costs for Kenya and Uganda, disaggregated by different 
line items.  
 
Costs are sometimes analysed in aggregate without the inclusion of unit prices. For 
instance, Lukwago et al. established baseline costs by applying a top-down approach 
and collecting aggregate data at the national level due to national operated vertical 
programmes  (i.e. lack of decentralization).  Consequently, the analysis produced mean 
annual costs associated with key resources involved in IDSR implementation (101). A 
different method was used by Somda and colleagues, who collected aggregate 
pharmacy, clinical, and medical data using a structured questionnaire based on the 
SurvCost1 tool (111), a survey instrument that guides collection of data on all 
surveillance resources at all health levels (i.e. primary health care, district, region) (105). 
                                                        
1 SurvCost will be introduced and discussed further in the Methods chapter 
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The sources of data were surveillance budget and programme records and reported 
expenditures. Reported expenditures are preferable and always deferred to when there 
is discrepancy between source data.  
 
Annual depreciation 
Depreciation cost, or economic depreciation, is a component of capital costs that 
measures the decrease in value of an asset over a certain period of time (107). Annual 
depreciation rates may vary from 3% (105) to 5% (101, 102, 106) to 6% (99). The horizon 
for depreciation can be described broadly, as “normal length of life” or more 
specifically, as “over a 10-year useful life time horizon for normal capital costs”(101). 
Useful-life horizon is used to assess annual depreciation of buildings, laboratory 
equipment, office equipment, and vehicles (105, 106). Annualised cost is calculated as:  
 
 
 
 
In this equation, K is the purchase price of the item and r represents the depreciation 
rate and ‘t’ is the useful life years. 
 
Differences in currency 
Cost data is typically collected in local currency and subsequently adjusted to US 
dollars equivalents in the year corresponding with time horizon for data collection. 
Occasionally, studies use purchasing power parities (PPP) to adjust exchange rates of 
national currencies to international currencies that are comparable in different countries 
(100, 105).  
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Sensitivity analysis and validation 
In all cost analyses, there is a degree of uncertainty regarding the inputs and 
consequences; a sensitivity analysis is a critical appraisal method that assists in judging 
the robustness of conclusions. For instance, Mueller and colleagues performed a 
sensitivity analysis to model potential variation in the costs of the additional 
components, such as external technical assistance and increases in salaries.  They also 
included variations in the exchange rate and discount rate (i.e. estimated figures with 
applied discount rate options of 5% to 3% to 7%) (102). 
 
2.4.2 Capturing CDSS cost study results 
Cost displayed by population estimates 
Analyses of costs vary based on study perspective, resources collected, and use of 
population estimates. CDSS cost studies often present mean annual costs per resource 
categories and health structure level as well as disaggregated IDSR activities (e.g. 
detection, report, and analysis), which included detailed costs by year (105).  Generally, 
estimates per population figure are derived from national data or through a population 
census undertaken for the study (104). Costs per population are displayed in various 
ways using different population denominators and time intervals. For example,  Baly et 
al., compared the average total cost per inhabitant per month during the non-epidemic 
period (January to July) to the outbreak period (August to December) and presented 
average monthly economic cost by social actor (i.e. community, primary health care, 
and hospitals) and period (99). In contrast, Mueller et al. estimated annual costs of the 
early detection system per district and translated this to cost per annum per head of 
population in Uganda and Kenya (102). 
 
Main cost drivers 
Study results generally estimate the distribution of costs by programme resource. 
Overwhelmingly, staff time/personnel cost represent the largest cost driver (99, 102, 
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104, 106). Transportation of data or lab specimen is also a large cost component.  In 
Uganda, researchers realised that a large proportion of staff time was spent to transport 
these items and so they completed a separate analysis to differentiate the opportunity 
costs of staff time. They found that this represented 7% of total surveillance activity 
costs and could be reduced by half with the introduction of electronic data transfer 
systems (102).   
 
Missing data 
Missing data is often an issue when conducting studies in lower-income countries. One 
study describes missing cost data needed to approximate the value of half of the 
building related to laboratory testing and treatment (105). They compensate for 
building costs by inserting information from similar ministry buildings in the same 
locality. For laboratory costs they conducted two analyses; one, which excluded missing 
data, and the other that extrapolated relevant cost data from other countries. Another 
study stated that a limitation was not including costs such as education and 
dissemination of information (104). Resources are commonly collected from all relevant 
health levels, but many times there are difficulties accessing data sources.  For example, 
one study did not consider any costs incurred by MOH and other supra-provincial level 
actors in regards to surveillance and response costs of dengue. The authors commented 
that this omission could lead to underestimation during the epidemic period (99).  
 
Laboratory costs 
Laboratory costs are often not included in many CDSS cost studies. However, when 
they are, the detail of costs of materials and equipment is often limited to ‘laboratory 
reagents’. For example, Pinzon-Redondo and colleagues estimated costs for all 
surveillance-related activities during a meningococcal meningitis outbreak, but did not 
include specimen transport costs. Additionally, the authors include a category ‘tests’ in 
the micro cost analysis of five patients, but do not provide further details. Lukwago et 
al. sum up laboratory aggregate costs contribution in line item laboratory reagents (101). 
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Their narrative focuses more on epidemiologic activities than on laboratory analysis. 
Somda et al. estimate laboratory consumable materials and supplies for various 
diagnostic tests for IDSR reportable disease as well as laboratory equipment costs (105). 
The effect of such vague laboratory costs analysis can lead to an underestimation of the 
burden of resources used for surveillance activities (112). One study reported that 
laboratory-related costs represented almost a third of total costs and that the national 
reference laboratory was the largest cost share entity (106). They included costs 
associated with laboratory costs covered by the national laboratory as well as supplies 
donated by PAHO, CDC, and the local laboratory. The authors also captured capital 
and operational inputs of virology, bacteriology, and biochemistry laboratories.  
 
2.4.3 Conclusion: Including cost assessments in CDSS performance 
evaluations 
Though surveillance studies with cost-components are sparse, this section summarised 
how standard health economic principles have been applied to gain cost information 
about surveillance and response activities.  Difficulties to quantify the costs of disease 
surveillance include cost sharing, collecting expenditure versus budget information, 
inaccessible data, and missing information on costs of buildings and laboratories. Still, 
costing studies for CDSS are necessary and can provide important information in which 
other studies, such as economic evaluations or cost-of-illness analyses, can build upon 
(113). However, without a cost-consequence element, cost studies provide limited 
information to make any inference on surveillance performance quality and association 
with investment in the surveillance system.  
 
It was noticeable that while all the retrieved costing studies were published in the last 
10 years, none made reference (in text or in reference list) to the WHO Evaluating the 
Costs and Benefits of National Surveillance and Response Systems (97).  This is possibly 
because the document provides the steps involved in designing and evaluating 
surveillance cost studies, yet does not connect this to surveillance performance, but 
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rather to economic benefits of averting and controlling outbreaks. Finally, existing 
CDSS evaluation guidelines suggest that costs should be judged relative to surveillance 
benefits, but does not provide instructions on cost methods, resources, or how to 
include this component into a CDSS evaluation (31). (The next chapter will expand on 
the lack of cost assessments in CDSS performance evaluations). 
 
In reality, epidemiologists are not generally health economists, so this missed 
opportunity may reflect a failure to exchange ideas between academics and operational 
researchers, as well as a lack of collaboration between the health economics and field 
epidemiology disciplines.  Since cost evaluations benefit from existing baseline data and 
performance studies aim to persuade donors to invest in system components, there is 
an opportunity for these fields to unite technical expertise and resources to improve 
and expand CDSS evaluations. 
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3 Literature review of communicable disease 
surveillance system evaluations 
 
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of published literature on CDSS 
evaluations. The review was undertaken with two objectives: (i) to describe and 
examine methods used to evaluate CDSS performance and (ii) to analyse findings of 
CDSS evaluations.  In the context of the PhD, the aim of the review was to inform the 
proposed Work Process Analysis (WPA) framework and the methods of the Chad 
meningitis surveillance system evaluation study.  I have structured this chapter 
according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis 
(PRISMA) 2009 checklist1 and PRISMA 2009 flow diagram2. 
 
3.1 Previous systematic reviews  
Five published reviews relating to CDSS evaluation were identified during the search. 
These are summarised in Table 3.1.  
 
Robert German in 2000 (114) and Van Hest et al. in 2011 (115)  examined the 
methodologies of studies that calculate specific attributes of disease surveillance 
systems: sensitivity and positive predictive value (PPV); with Van Hest and colleagues 
looking specifically at capture-recapture method—a technique which assesses 
sensitivity of case reporting by using estimations of the total cases in the population 
under surveillance. In 2009, Sahal et al. (116) reviewed 32 studies to gain lessons learned 
from CDSS evaluations from developed and developing countries. They found that 
many African countries are “over-centralised” and that lower levels and private 
                                                        
1 http://www.prisma-statement.org/2.1.2%20-%20PRISMA%202009%20Checklist.pdf 
2 http://www.prisma-statement.org/2.1.4%20-%20PRISMA%20Flow%202009%20Diagram.pdf 
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hospitals were incongruous in their participation of the CDSS, and recommended that a 
cost or cost-effectiveness element be included in more evaluations.  
 
Two systematic reviews were recently published: One by Drewe  et al. (98) in 2012 and 
the other by Phalkey and colleagues (117) in 2015 (published electronically in 2013). 
Drewe et al. reviewed the approaches for 101 human and animal surveillance 
evaluations and assessed the articles by attributes, performance indicators, methods, 
framework type, and reportable health conditions. The authors concluded that only 
25% of evaluations were performed systematically and recommended the development 
of a comprehensive evaluation framework. Phalkey et al. included 33 studies in their 
review, which were limited to sub-Saharan Africa and the IDSR strategy. The authors 
found that several gaps still remain in IDSR implementation, including weak laboratory 
infrastructures, lack of established networks, and staff shortages. Both of the two recent 
systematic reviews included published and unpublished evaluations and presented 
data on system attributes as well as core and support functions performance. 
  
The present literature review has some overlap with these aforementioned reviews and 
also some distinctions (Table 3.1). While the recent publication date of several of the 
reviews negates the need for another systematic review of CDSS evaluations, it 
provides the opportunity to perform a literature review with a more focused objective. 
The main objective of the present review is to describe and examine the methods of 
evaluation studies, and more specifically, the data collection processes of studies. The 
underlying premise of this aim is that the findings of the evaluations are limited to the 
methods used and the level of information gathered. None of the other reviews held 
this same objective.  While in some ways the present review offers a more narrow scope 
than other reviews (e.g. animal studies are not included, calculation methodology of 
surveillance attributes are not assessed, nor are unpublished studies included), it adds 
to the literature by being more inclusive in other areas (i.e. inclusion of single and 
multiple surveillance systems, situational analysis reports, and assesses the 
consideration of costs).  Also, since this review contributes to the PhD aims of 
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informing a new comprehensive evaluation approach—akin to the one that Drewe et al. 
called for—it probes into the data collection method and delineates the who (e.g. study 
participants,), what (e.g. type of questions), and where (e.g. jurisdictions involved).  
Finally, in addition to this distinctive aim, the present review utilizes some different 
terms and databases than the other published reviews used to identify published 
articles.   
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Table 3.1 Comparison of CDS evaluation review papers 
Author Ref. No. of 
studies  
Databases / Paper 
sources 
Search Terms Aim 
German 
RR. 2000 
(114) 47 U.S. Public Health 
Service Combined 
Health Information 
Database, Embase, 
Health Periodicals, 
Health Planning and 
Administration (U.S. 
National Library of 
Medicine) and  Medline 
‘surveillance system’ and ‘evaluation’; 
‘sensitivity’ AND ‘surveillance’ AND 
‘predictive value positive’ 
To determine how predictive value 
positive (PVP) and sensitivity have 
been reported in epidemiologic 
literature in order to provide guidance 
to public health professionals  in 
computing sensitivity and PVP for a 
surveillance system 
Sahal, N  
et al. 2009 
(118) 32 PubMed, WHO, CDC ‘surveillance’, ‘evaluation’, 
‘communicable’, ‘diseases’, ‘infectious’, 
‘assessment’, and ‘system’ 
To reflect the experience of both 
developed and developing countries in 
the evaluation of CDSS in order to 
learn lessons to improve systems 
worldwide 
van Hest 
R, et al. 
2011 
(115) 52 PubMed/Medline ‘recapture’ To conduct a systematic review of the 
performance of capture-recapture 
analyses in the categories of human 
attributes, i.e. Hidden populations, 
injuries and mortality, and non-
infectious and infectious diseases, in 
resource-limited countries, assessing 
individual quality criteria and a 
minimum quality criterion per 
category 
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Author Ref. No. of 
studies  
Databases / Paper 
sources 
Search Terms Aim 
Drewe JA, 
 et al. 2012 
(98) 99 Web of Science, Google 
(grey literature), and 
conference proceedings 
of the International 
Society for Veterinary 
Epidemiology and 
Economics and the 
Society for Veterinary 
Epidemiology and 
Preventive Medicine. 
‘surveillance’, ‘evaluation’, ‘analysis’, 
‘performance’ 
To identify and examine existing 
frameworks for surveillance evaluation 
in animal health, public health and 
allied disciplines to discover which 
techniques are currently being used 
across the globe and to assess their 
strengths and weaknesses to inform 
the development of a generic 
evaluation framework for animal 
health surveillance systems in Great 
Britain 
Phalkey 
RK, et al. 
2015 
(117) 33 CDC,  Medline, Web of 
Knowledge, WHOLIS 
‘programme evaluation’, ‘project 
evaluation’, ‘health care evaluation 
mechanisms’, ‘evaluation/assessment 
studies as topic’, ‘self-evaluation 
programmes’, ‘evaluation studies’ 
[publication type]  ‘health services 
research’, process assessment (health 
care)’, ‘state health plans’, costs and 
cost analysis’, ‘task performance and 
analysis’, systems analysis’, 
‘benchmarking’, ‘lessons learned’; and 
‘communicable diseases’, 
‘communicable diseases, emerging’, 
‘communicable disease control’, 
‘disease outbreaks’, AND  ‘sentinel 
surveillance‘, ‘population surveillance’, 
To systematically review and 
document the experiences, lessons 
learned and the challenges identified 
with the implementation of the IDSR 
systems in low- and lower middle-
income countries and identify the main 
barriers that contribute to sub-optimal 
functioning of the IDSR. 
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Author Ref. No. of 
studies  
Databases / Paper 
sources 
Search Terms Aim 
‘epidemiology’ [subheading]; ‘disease 
eradication’ ‘infection control’; AND 
‘integrated disease surveillance and 
response’, integrated advanced 
information management systems’, 
‘information systems’, ‘hospital 
information systems’ 
Erondu 
NA, 2015 
(PhD 
Thesis) 
 20 Medline, Cochrane 
Library, Africa-Wide 
Information and Global 
Health 
‘assessment’, ‘evaluation’, 
‘surveillance’, ‘communicable disease 
control’, ‘data collection, ‘disease 
monitoring, ‘disease surveillance’ 
‘evaluation study’, ‘outbreak 
investigation’, ‘surveillance system’, 
and ‘vaccine preventable disease’. 
To assess and analyse methods used to 
evaluate CDSS performance in low- 
and lower middle-income countries to 
inform new evaluation framework   
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3.2 Methods 
Search strategy  
A comprehensive search of the published literature was undertaken using the Medline, 
Cochrane Library, Africa-Wide Information and Global Health databases. All databases 
were last accessed 1st December 2014.  Appropriate search terms were derived to meet 
the stated review objectives.  These terms were:  ‘assessment’, ‘evaluation’, 
‘surveillance’, ‘communicable disease control’, ‘data collection, ‘disease monitoring, 
‘disease surveillance’ ‘evaluation study’, ‘outbreak investigation’, ‘surveillance system’, 
and ‘vaccine preventable disease’.  The search term combinations, use of Medical 
Subject Heading (MESH) terms and free text phrases are presented in Error! Reference 
source not found.. The Cochrane Library produced no relevant or unique results and so 
was dropped from the review. 
 
The search was limited to papers published from January 1988 to December 2014.  The 
search began in 1988 because that was the year the CDC  first published their Guidelines 
for Evaluating Surveillance Systems (119). All languages were included.   
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Table 3.2 Search terms and search strategy used to identify relevant publications1 
Medline Africa-Wide Information Global Health 
1. evaluation studies 
[MESH]  
2. data collection/ OR 
surveillance system 
[MESH]  
3. communicable disease 
control/OR vaccine 
preventable disease OR 
communicable diseases/ 
[MESH]  
4. surveillance OR outbreak 
investigation OR disease 
surveillance OR 
monitoring 
5. evaluation OR assessment 
1. communicable disease 
2. surveillance system  
3. evaluation 
1. evaluation studies [MESH]  
2. data/collection/  
surveillance system 
[MESH]  
3. communicable disease 
control/ OR vaccine 
preventable disease 
[MESH]  
4. surveillance OR outbreak 
investigation OR disease 
surveillance OR disease 
monitoring  
5. evaluation OR assessment 
 
 
 
Inclusion Criteria 
Papers meeting the following criteria were included: 
1. Publications relevant to evaluating national communicable disease surveillance 
systems (i.e. active or passive).   
2. Empirical evaluation studies, assessment or lessons learned performed in low- 
or lower- middle-income countries, as classified by the World Bank.  
3. Studies that included an assessment of at least one surveillance system 
performance attribute or assessed surveillance system by core function or 
support activity  
4. Studies that included an evaluation of a human disease surveillance system 
                                                        
1 In each database search string results were combined with the operator ‘OR’ to find most  relevant 
studies, and finally all string results were combined with the operator ‘AND’ to generate the final list. 
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5. Published and unpublished reports retrieved from reference lists of included 
papers that adhered to the inclusion criteria. 
 
These criteria were applied to obtain the most relevant publications and reports on the 
surveillance aspect of health systems.  Particularly, my intention was to retrieve 
evaluations that focused on health information surveillance systems that monitor 
epidemic-prone and reportable diseases. A flowchart of the review process illustrates at 
what point the criteria were applied to the retrieved publications; this is presented in 
Figure 3.1.  The results section further explains how the criteria were applied and the 
reasons certain publications were excluded.   
 
There is an element of subjectivity in this review, especially with the discretionary 
unpublished reports that were included. While the search focused mainly on published 
literature, criteria five was added so that unpublished reports (i.e. grey literature) could 
be identified from references of selected publications, and included in this review. 
These reports were included on a discretionary basis.  Surveillance system evaluation is 
primarily an operational research function and many of the evaluation study field 
reports are never published and only available at the country level or through private 
institutions. I decided not to include all potentially accessible, yet unpublished 
evaluation studies that met the criteria of the search due to the structured, but not 
systematic standard of my review and due to the availability of the recent review by 
Phalkey and colleagues (117), which includes grey literature.   
 
Dr. Ulla Griffiths, my supervisor, scrutinized all papers to ensure that they met the 
inclusion criteria. She served as a cross-check to validate this step of the literature 
review. In case of disagreement we discussed why and if certain papers should be 
included.  
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Data extractions and synthesis of findings 
Data abstracted for the review included: country, whether the evaluation looked at an 
integrated vs. multi-disease surveillance system, date of publication, administrative 
level(s) included in the study, system components assessed, methods, whether cost was 
assessed, and key relevant findings. 2013 World Bank country income classifications 
were used (120).  Countries with Gross national income (GNI) per capita of less than 
US$ 1,045 were classified as low-income countries and those with GNI per capita 
between US$ 1,046 and US$ 4,125 were classified as lower-middle income countries.   
Study methods were reviewed, abstracted, and analysed.   Information on attributes, 
core and support functions assessed were documented in a matrix, which included the 
WHO framework of nine core surveillance functions and six support functions as well 
as the 13 system attributes identified in the CDC Updated Guidelines for the Assessment of 
Surveillance Systems (31, 34). 
 
3.3 Results 
Search results and study selection 
The process for selecting publications is shown in Figure 3.1.  The search identified a 
total of 805 publications, after the removal of duplicates. From the title and abstract 
review, 50 publications were selected for full text review and their citations were 
imported into an Endnote X6 library. After applying the inclusion criteria to these 
publications, 44 papers were excluded. Five review articles were excluded, but 
synthesised and presented above in section 3.1.1 (98, 114-117). The excluded 
publications included: eleven policy-related framework, guidance documents, and non-
evaluation reports (31-34, 44, 47, 121-125), two health system focused studies (126, 127), 
two non-evaluation reviews of CDSS (30, 128), and two syndromic surveillance system 
evaluations (129, 130).   Other publications were rejected because the evaluation was 
not performed in a low- or lower-middle income country (131-152). 
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Figure 3.1 Flowchart for selection of included studies 
 
 
3.3.1 Overview of selected studies 
Twenty published evaluation studies were eligible for review. These publications 
reported 19 separate evaluation studies; one study (i.e. same sample size) was reported 
by two publications, but at different time points (153, 154).  
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Study settings 
Characteristics of the selected studies are summarised in Table 3.3. The 20 papers in the 
review cover a total of 20 countries. SSA dominated the geographic spread with 16 of 
the 20 studies. Multiple studies were performed in Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
and Uganda (46, 79, 155). Three studies presented multiple country comparisons of 
CDSS. Two of these studies presented IDSR implementation experiences and lessons 
learned (46, 79) and the third compared meningitis surveillance systems only (155).  
Implementation of IDSR was assessed by seven out of the 16 SSA studies (46, 79, 101, 
154, 156-158); underscoring the importance and wide use of this regional surveillance 
strategy. 
Types of Surveillance Systems 
Eleven studies exclusively evaluated integrated disease surveillance (IDS) systems and 
discussed shared functions across disease systems. Four studies detailed the transition 
from a multiple disease surveillance systems (MDS) to an integrated system (157-160). 
One study assessed a partially implemented integrated system (118). Another two 
studies assessed MDS only (161, 162).  Of these seven studies that included a MDS 
evaluation, five were conducted before 2004 (157, 159-162). This shows that countries 
have begun to adopt integrated surveillance during the past ten years. The exceptions 
were set in Sudan (118) and South Sudan (158). At that time point both of these 
countries suffered from constant political instability and civil conflict; for instance, the 
South Sudan assessment was conducted in 2011, the same year it became an 
independent nation (163). These peculiarities likely reflect the lack of capable 
governments to support their health systems maturation towards integrated 
surveillance. The remaining two studies evaluated a community based surveillance 
system (164)  and a meningitis surveillance system (155), and did not indicate the 
overall CDSS design.  
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Study designs 
All of the studies used WHO and CDC guidelines to guide study design or adapted the 
WHO protocol for assessment teams to inform the data collection methodology(26).  
Table 3.3 show which studies used either or both of these guidelines. Sub-national level 
units (i.e. either peripheral or intermediate level) were part of the study design in 18 out 
of the 20 studies. Data collection from peripheral level health facilities or clinics 
occurred in 14 of these studies (101, 118, 153, 154, 156-160, 162, 164-167). Only one study 
evaluated a national health system only from the central office, i.e. national health 
authority,  and did not engage sub-national levels. This study was conducted in West 
bank and Gaza in 2001 (161) and describes a dubious socio-political environment of 
insecurity and instability of populations, which may have affected access to peripheral 
sites. The smallest structural unit included in site selection for data collection was the 
health facility.  This ranged from zero (161, 162) to 217 health facilities included in the 
study evaluations (101) (Table 3.3). Districts were selected either by convenience, to 
give a snap shot of the CDSS, or through a specific sampling method to ensure 
generalisability. None of the studies included primary data collection from all health 
facilities of any country, as this would have demanded considerable financial and 
personnel resources.  Eight studies mentioned inclusion of non-governmental health 
facilities in their sample size or study population (101, 153, 154, 157, 160, 161, 165, 167). 
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Table 3.3 Overview of included evaluation studies of CDSS 
Ref 
First 
author 
Guide-
line used1 
Country, 
year 
Study 
design 
Type of 
surveillance 
system studied 
Number of 
sites 
Levels 
included 
(P, I, C) 
Study objective(s) 
(159) CDC WHO 
Uganda, 
2000 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
MDS 
 
8 districts, 
52 HFs 
P,I 
 To describe results of CDSS baseline 
assessment 
 To indicate additional efforts 
needed for effective surveillance 
progress towards IDS 
(161) Awad R CDC 
Palestine, 
2001 
Descriptive 
study 
MDS 
3 health system 
providers 
(West Bank, 
Gaza Strip, 
UNRWA2) 
C 
 Describe the evaluation and make 
recommendations for strengthening 
CDSS 
(160) WHO WHO 
Ethiopia, 
2001 
Cross-
sectional 
survey and 
qualitative 
assessment 
MDS, IDS 
MoH, 
11 regional 
bureaus, 
12 zonal depts., 
33 Health 
facilities 
P,I,C 
 To illustrate first steps in 
transitioning from a multi-disease to 
integrated surveillance approach 
                                                        
1 Refers to if the assessment used either the CDC’s Updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems or WHO’s Communicable 
disease surveillance and response systems: Guide to monitoring and evaluating. 
2 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
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Ref 
First 
author 
Guide-
line used1 
Country, 
year 
Study 
design 
Type of 
surveillance 
system studied 
Number of 
sites 
Levels 
included 
(P, I, C) 
Study objective(s) 
(162) Wuhib T CDC 
Armenia, 
2002 
Qualitative 
assessment 
MDS 
1 National 
surveillance 
system 
P,I,C 
 To present observations and 
recommendations for reforming the 
Armenian infectious diseases 
surveillance system 
(157) 
Mghamba 
JM 
WHO 
Tanzania, 
2004 
Qualitative 
assessment 
MDS, IDS 
4 districts, 
26 HFs 
P,I 
 
 To discuss and detail the challenges 
within the surveillance functions 
and to present recommendation for 
adopting IDSR 
(166) Alfred D WHO 
Uganda, 
2005 
Retrospectiv
e  cross-
sectional 
IDS 
1 district, 
62 HFs 
P,I 
 To assess the reporting component 
of the CDSS in one district 
(167) 
Quality 
Health 
Partners 
WHO 
Ghana, 
2005 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
IDS 
28 Districts, 
171 HFs 
P,I 
 To gather data related to the 
readiness of facilities to provide 
quality reproductive and child 
health services 
 To collect baseline data for 
performance management and 
evaluation plan 
(153) Gueye D WHO 
Tanzania, 
2006 
Pre-post test IDS 
8 regions 
12 districts 
109 HFs 
P,I 
 To gather specific information on 
the performance of IDSR systems in 
each of the selected districts 
(154) 
Rumisha, 
SF 
CDC 
Tanzania, 
2007 
Baseline 
assessment 
IDS 
8 regions 
12 districts 
109 Health 
facilities 
P,I 
 To assess surveillance system 
performance before and after IDSR 
intervention 
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Ref 
First 
author 
Guide-
line used1 
Country, 
year 
Study 
design 
Type of 
surveillance 
system studied 
Number of 
sites 
Levels 
included 
(P, I, C) 
Study objective(s) 
(164) Chau, PD CDC 
Cambodi
a, 2007 
Descriptive 
CBSS, 
EWORS 
3 provinces, 
11 HFs/sentinel 
sites 
P 
 To identify strengths and 
weaknesses of the Community-
based surveillance system  (CBSS) 
and Early Warning Outbreak 
Recognition System (EWORS) in 
detecting disease outbreaks in 
Cambodia by using a modified CDC 
evaluation method. 
(46) 
Nsubuga, 
P 
WHO 
Ghana 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zimbabw
e, 2010 
Qualitative 
assessment, 
Descriptive 
IDS 
4 countries, 
56 Key 
informants 
I,C 
 To identify accomplishments and 
IDSR implementation lessons 
learned in four Global Surveillance 
Project countries 
(118) Sahal, N WHO 
Sudan, 
2010 
Descriptive, 
retrospective
, cross-
sectional 
MDS, IDS 
1 state, 
177 
epidemiology 
units 
P,I 
 To assess the core activities and 
supportive functions of the CDSS in 
Khartoum state from 2005 -2007 
(79) Sow, I WHO 
Cabo 
Verde, 
Eritrea, 
Gambia, 
Guinea 
Bisau, 
Uganda, 
2010 
Retrospectiv
e descriptive 
IDS 
8 countries, 
116 districts 
I 
 To review and analyse the findings 
of separate country assessments in 
regards to training health personnel 
on IDSR approaches, and how 
training can contribute to 
strengthening of national CDSS 
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Ref 
First 
author 
Guide-
line used1 
Country, 
year 
Study 
design 
Type of 
surveillance 
system studied 
Number of 
sites 
Levels 
included 
(P, I, C) 
Study objective(s) 
(165) 
Abubakar, 
AA 
CDC 
Nigeria, 
2010 
Cross-
sectional 
descriptive 
IDS 
1 local 
government 
area (LGA), 
49 HFs 
P,I 
 To assess the preparedness to 
respond to outbreaks and the 
capability to identify outbreaks in 
Sabon Gari LGA of Kaduna State 
(168) Dairo, MD WHO 
Nigeria, 
2010 
Cross-
sectional 
descriptive 
study 
IDS 
2 States, 
42 surveillance 
officers 
I 
 To assess the adequacy of the 
logistic support available for timely 
collection of data and its association 
with poor reporting of epidemics in 
the respective states of the 
federation 
(158) Pond, B WHO 
South 
Sudan, 
2011 
Qualitative 
assessment, 
descriptive 
MDS, IDS 
6 states, 
9 counties 
38 HFs 
P,I 
 To determine how effective the 
WHO has been in implementing the 
IDSR project 
 To recommend programmatic shifts 
to more effectively achieve the 
project’s aim 
 To provide recommendation for 
improving impact during the life of 
the USAID project 
 identify issues to consider beyond 
the life of the project 
(155) 
Djingarey, 
M 
CDC 
Mali 
Burkina 
Faso, 2012 
Descriptive 
Meningitis 
surveillance 
system 
2 countries, 
114 districts 
I,C 
 To describe the results of 
evaluations of existing meningitis 
surveillance systems in Burkina 
Faso and Mali before the 
introduction of serogroup A 
meningococcal conjugate vaccine 
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Ref 
First 
author 
Guide-
line used1 
Country, 
year 
Study 
design 
Type of 
surveillance 
system studied 
Number of 
sites 
Levels 
included 
(P, I, C) 
Study objective(s) 
(156) 
Abubakar, 
AA 
WHO 
Nigeria, 
2013 
Cross-
sectional 
descriptive 
IDS 
1 state, 
3 LGAS, 
21 HFs 
P,I 
 To assess IDSR implementation in 
selected LGAs of Kaduna State 
(101) 
Lukwago, 
L 
WHO 
Uganda, 
2013 
Pre-post test IDS 
56 districts 
(2001-2005) 
80 districts 
(2006-2007) 
P,I,C 
 To provide information on the 
progress, successes, and challenges 
of IDSR after several years of 
implementation 
 To highlight the costs involved 
(169) 
Phalkey, 
RK 
WHO 
India, 
2013 
Multi-centre 
retrospective 
cross 
sectional 
IDS 
1 state, 
34 districts, 
46 HFs, 
25 laboratories 
I,C 
 To assess the structure and 
performance of the IDSS in 
Maharashtra state of India 
 To understand the challenges for 
successful integration of 
surveillance functions in the district 
health care machinery 
 To make recommendations for a 
smooth transition to the district 
health surveillance system 
MDS: Multiple disease surveillance system; IDS = Integrated disease surveillance system 
P: Peripheral (local level health facilities that usually provide primary health services for community), 
I: Intermediate (usually called district, regional, or in some cases local government agent—Responsable for oversight and support of peripheral level and reports to Central level) 
C: Central level (indicates the country’s national or federal entity)   
HF: Health facility
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Assessed attributes and functions of CDSS 
To be included in the literature review, publications had to include an assessment of at 
least one surveillance system performance attribute or assess the surveillance system by 
core function or support activity, as respectively outlined by CDC (31) and WHO (26) 
guidance documents. As summarised in Table 3.41, most studies conjointly assessed at 
least one attribute and some core and support functions.  Wuhib et al.(162) was the only 
study to assess all attributes and core and support functions in their assessment of the 
Armenian surveillance system. This assessment used only qualitative methods and 
while it even included a cost review, no quantitative data was reviewed.  Sixteen 
studies (46, 79, 101, 118, 153, 154, 156-159, 162, 165-169) included an assessment of core 
and support functions.  These assessments appraised core functions (i.e. detection, 
registration, confirmation, reporting, analysis, and feedback) and support functions (i.e. 
communication, training, supervision, and resources) in some combination or collapsed 
form.  These studies usually occurred within the context of IDSR, though this was not 
the case in two studies; one conducted in Armenia (162) and one in India (169)—though 
this one did review the Indian Integrated Disease Surveillance Project strategy in one 
Indian state.  
 
‘Timeliness’ and ‘data quality’ were the most assessed attributes.  Overall, studies 
measured timeliness as the percentage of expected reports (i.e. weekly and monthly) 
received at the relevant health level by the pre-set due date. This attribute was normally 
measured against the IDSR 80% indicator (45).  Assessing completeness and consistency 
of case-level and aggregate data forms were usually the criteria to evaluate ‘data 
quality’.  Accordingly, studies that exclusively assessed these two attributes, usually 
did so while conjointly reviewing case detection and reporting core functions (46, 79, 
101, 154, 155, 162, 167).  
                                                        
1 All definitions of surveillance attributes are listed in Table Table 2.4.  
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Three studies selected one attribute to proxy the ability of a specific programme 
activity. Dairo et al. assessed case reporting in two south western Nigerian states in 
order to determine the association between logistic support availability and reporting of 
epidemics (168). They measured the percentage of health staff trained on reporting and 
notification to control for a potential confounder.  Abubakar et al. (2010) (165) assessed 
training, ‘timeliness’, and ‘completeness’ to identify needs to better position the 
intermediate CDSS for outbreak preparedness.  Alfred (166) also examined outbreak 
preparedness by concentrating on sub-national data reporting but assessed ‘timeliness’, 
‘completeness’, ‘accuracy’  to reveal other explanations for poor surveillance 
performance.  
Table 3.4 Surveillance components assessed by included evaluation studies 
  No.  of  
studies 
References 
Surveillance Acceptability 2 (161) (162) 
attributes Flexibility 2 (162) (164) 
 PPV 2 (162) (164) 
 Representativeness 4 (161) (162) (164) (155)  
 Simplicity 4 (160) (161) (162) (164)  
 Sensitivity 2 (162) (164)  
 Stability 1 (162)  
 Quality 12 (153) (154) (158) (155) (46) (79) (162) (159) (166) 
(167) (165) (101) 
 Timeliness 15 (118) (153) (154) (158) (160) (162) (164) (155) 
(46) (79) (166) (167) (165) (168) (101) 
 Usefulness 3 (164) (161) (162)  
 Core and/or  
support functions 
16 (118) (153) (154) (158) (46) (79) (162) (159) (157) 
(166) (167)  (165) (168) (156) (101) (169) 
 Cost 3 (162) (166) (101) 
PPV = Positive predictive value 
Core functions (i.e. detection, registration, confirmation, reporting, analysis, and feedback) and support functions (i.e. communication, 
training, supervision, and resources) 
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Support entities and functions, such as laboratory confirmation, are essential to the 
continuance of CDSS and to facilitate the core surveillance functions. Eleven included 
support functions are listed in Figure 3.2. When examining the studies by support 
functions assessed, they range from inclusion of one of eleven functions (164) to the 
inclusion of ten (169).  ‘Standards’ (i.e. knowledge of standard case definition) was the 
most assessed function, with only five of the 20 studies failing to include it in their 
evaluation (79, 155, 164, 168, 169). Transportation (i.e. means of transport for staff to 
perform surveillance duties) was the least assessed support function, included in only 
seven studies (156, 158, 165, 167-169). 
 
Figure 3.2 also shows the results of the studies stratified by whether or not data 
collection was completed at the peripheral level. While most of the functions were 
comparable between the two groups, ‘emergency preparedness capacity’ and 
‘materials’ (e.g. surveillance registers, specimen collection receptacles, and cold boxes) 
were assessed disproportionately more in evaluations, which included the peripheral 
level. Specifically, ‘materials’, a basic need to facilitate case detection and reporting, was 
assessed two and half times more in studies that engaged peripheral staff. Similarly, 
‘emergency preparedness’, which is paramount to effective outbreak response, was 
assessed three times more in the peripheral group.  In both groups ‘supervision’, 
‘training’, and ‘standards’ were assessed most frequently.   
 
 94 
 
Figure 3.2 Proportion of studies assessing selected support functions according to 
inclusion of peripheral health level 
EP: Emergency preparedness; HR: Human resources  
 
3.3.2 Evaluation study methods 
A summary of the methods used for evaluating surveillance systems is seen in Table 
3.5. In accordance with CDC guidelines (31), eight out of 20 studies included a 
description of the CDSS flow of information (156, 159-162, 166, 168, 169).  A mixed 
method approach was applied far more commonly than quantitative only or qualitative 
only approaches—just one study (164) used qualitative methods only and five studies 
exclusively used quantitative methods (79, 101, 161, 165, 168, 169). The evaluation 
studies often started by reviewing policies and guidelines, followed by key informant 
interviews and field visits to gather information.  The most common quantitative 
method, employed by eleven studies, was for researchers to conduct a facility audit and 
review surveillance-related tools (e.g. registers, archived line lists, etc.), reports, and 
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other materials to capture the proportion of suspected cases reported and the quality of 
records (46, 118, 153-155, 157, 158, 165-167, 169). The other quantitative methods that 
were applied included budget or expense records review, record tracking (i.e. following 
one suspected disease record through all levels of the CDSS to demonstrate accuracy 
and timeliness of data), secondary data analysis, interviewer administered and self-
administered questionnaire. 
 
The most widely used qualitative method was ‘field visit’. Five studies explained this 
method as a process that involved the evaluation researchers speaking to health staff at 
the intermediate (district, regional) and local/peripheral level and having an un-
structured discussion to capture flow of surveillance and to assess more subjective 
attributes, such as ‘simplicity’ and also measure support functions, such as training and 
logistics (157, 159, 162, 166, 167).  Mghamba et al. (157) did this by speaking to health 
staff in Tanzania about how and why disease surveillance related activities occur and 
about perceptions of the CDSS from those who implement it. Other qualitative methods 
used by studies included: qualitative system description, focus group, key informant 
interview, pre- and post-assessment workshop, and SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, threats) analysis. 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to assess the impact of 
surveillance system improvement after IDSR implementation. Lukwago and colleagues 
(101) and Nsubuga et al. (46) customized versions of the WHO and CDC monitoring 
framework to perform multiple year assessments of IDSR indicators in a total of five 
SSA countries.  Gueye et al. (153) and Rumisha et al. (154) undertook baseline and follow 
up assessments, respectively, of IDSR implementation in selected districts in Tanzania.  
 
Effect of evaluation method on study results  
Studies that focused on core and support functions as recommended in the WHO 
guidelines generally found more precise system issues and were able to make more 
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applied and detailed recommendations for improvement than studies that only 
assessed system attributes.  For instance, the Uganda CDSS evaluation was able to 
recommend that a specific position, ‘Records Assistant’, be designated and trained for 
all health units in order to fill the gap of incomplete and unreliable data (166). In 
contrast, studies that solely used the CDC evaluation guidelines, which focuses solely 
on surveillance attributes, were less likely to provide recommendations for specific 
operational improvement. Sahal and colleagues (118) found a similar result in their 
study. 
 
Five studies specifically stated as an objective to provide recommendations for policy or 
programme improvement (157, 158, 161, 162, 169). These studies varied in which health 
system levels were included and in study design, though just one study used 
quantitative methods only (169).  Compared to the Awad et al. study, which only 
included the central level (161), studies that included at least one sub-national level 
(157, 158, 162, 169) differed in the type and amount of information assessed for the 
evaluation. Additionally, studies that included sub-national data collection generally 
included information on vehicle use, logistics, training, staff burden, and sustainability 
of resources in detail and gave precise recommendations to optimise peripheral and 
intermediate surveillance performance. 
 
As a result, the studies that included sub-national data collection, and more specifically 
the peripheral level, were able to spot specific surveillance system gaps and craft 
recommendations to the appropriate entity.  For example, Awad and colleagues (who 
only included national data collection) developed recommendations for national 
unification of health systems, general instructions for more multilateral participation in 
surveillance, and increased support and feedback. In contrast, Pond et al. (158) reported 
the uses of equipment used by county surveillance officers (intermediate level) and 
provided unique recommendations about technical programme improvements to 
USAID, Ministry of Health, and the WHO. Pond et al. and similar sub-national inclusive 
studies reported that recommendations had already been incorporated in policy and 
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structural reformation initiatives (46, 154, 155, 158, 160, 162, 167). In contrast, studies 
that focused data collection and study engagement only at the intermediate and central 
levels missed an important opportunity to obtain verifiable data and information about 
barriers to optimal exercise of surveillance functions (46, 79, 155, 161, 168, 169).  
 
Lessons learned or critical comparisons of the study results compared to previous 
studies were presented in six studies (46, 154, 156, 157, 160, 168).  Nsubuga et al.(46) 
distilled lessons from data collected at the intermediate and central levels of experience 
implementing IDSR in four countries and provided guidance to the AFRO region on 
establishing central coordinating bodies and strengthening laboratory networks, among 
other points.  Similarly, Rumisha and colleagues (154) juxtaposed their findings to the 
literature to illustrate a pattern of challenges that low-income countries have in IDSR 
management and implementation. Through speaking with health staff at the peripheral 
and intermediate levels the authors discovered issues, such as weak data management 
and organisation at health facilities and in the district surveillance offices. 
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Table 3.5 Qualitative and quantitative methods used in each evaluation study 
 Qualitative Methods Quantitative Methods 
First author    
(REF) 
System 
descrip-
tion 
Field 
visit 
Focus 
group 
Key Infor-
mant 
interview 
Pre-/post- 
asses-
sment 
workshop 
SWOT 
Analysis 
Budget/ 
expense 
record 
review1 
Document 
review2/ 
facility 
audit 
Record 
tracking 
Secon-
dary data 
analysis 
Interviewer 
administered 
questionnaire 
Self-admin-
istered 
questionnaire 
CDC (159)  X     X      
Awad R (161)          X   
WHO (160)     X X     X  
Wuhib T (162)  X X        X  
Mghamba 
JM 
(157) 
 X      X     
Alfred D (166)  X      X X    
QHP (167)  X      X     
Gueye D (153)   X     X    X 
Rumisha SF (154)   X     X     
Chau PD (164) X            
Nsubuga P (46)    X    X   X  
Sahal N (118)        X     
Sow I (79)          X   
Abubakar 
AA (2010) 
(165) 
   X       X  
Dairo MD (168)            X 
                                                        
1 Record review = surveillance tools, i.e. registers, disease surveillance forms, outbreak investigation and response,  annual audit reports 
2 Document review = reports, databases, budgets, training schedules, bulletins, etc 
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 Qualitative Methods Quantitative Methods 
First author    
(REF) 
System 
descrip-
tion 
Field 
visit 
Focus 
group 
Key Infor-
mant 
interview 
Pre-/post- 
asses-
sment 
workshop 
SWOT 
Analysis 
Budget/ 
expense 
record 
review1 
Document 
review2/ 
facility 
audit 
Record 
tracking 
Secon-
dary data 
analysis 
Interviewer 
administered 
questionnaire 
Self-admin-
istered 
questionnaire 
Pond B (158)    X    X     
Djingarey M (155)    X    X     
Abubakar 
AA (2013) 
(156) 
       X   X  
Lukwago L (101)       X   X   
Phalkey RK (169)        X     
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3.3.3 Factors influencing surveillance performance 
Several factors were identified as having a direct impact on CDSS performance or 
indirectly on activities that affect CDSS performance.  Several studies cited lack of 
standardisation of procedures, such as case definitions, as a barrier to accurate case 
detection (118, 159, 162, 167). Lack of regular feedback and/or supervision was 
frequently mentioned as a cause of low motivation among health staff to optimally 
participate in surveillance activities (79, 118, 153, 154, 156, 159, 161, 162, 167, 169).  This 
factor was often stated as essential, with one study concluding that supervisory 
feedback is one of the most important tools to develop skills in health workers and 
improve their work performance (154). Similarly, Abubakar (2013) et al. remarked that 
the absence of feedback on suspected cases from higher levels may lead to poor 
performance due to staff not receiving the results of reporting.  
 
While the existence of adequate resources is an underlying requirement for surveillance 
performance, only six studies explained in varying levels of detail how budgets and 
funding impact surveillance performance (101, 158, 162, 166, 168, 169). Importantly, 
Dairo and colleagues showed a significant association between inadequacy of support 
and reporting of epidemics in 42 local government area in Nigeria (168) and findings 
from Lukuwago et al. suggested a link between political and financial commitment and 
progress of IDSR performance (101). While cost of surveillance was often suggested as 
an essential consideration for CDSS performance, only one study performed a cost 
calculation (101).  More commonly studies noted the concern for the sustainability of, 
and investment in, surveillance systems (79, 160).  A study from Uganda found that a 
surge of government funding for surveillance greatly benefited the performance of the 
newly adopted integrated system (166).  Other studies underscored the importance of 
surveillance funding by crafting recommendations that urged MoHs and partner 
agencies to increase surveillance funding and provide adequate resources to support 
staff and routine and outbreak response activities. Sustainability was also captured by 
Nsubuga et al. (46) who recommended educational and career structures to support 
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local capacity building and assurance of surveillance expertise and knowledge transfer 
through the promotion of university linkages and establishment of a field epidemiology 
training programme. 
 
Studies which documented the modernisation (e.g. more complex strategy or advanced 
streamlined processes)  of out-dated surveillance systems cited efforts such as, 
harmonising reporting forms (155, 157, 161), transitioning to computerised reporting 
(155, 156, 166, 169), and ensuring complete transition between old and new systems (79, 
118, 165, 169) as important developments for optimal surveillance performance .  
 
Country studies that described IDS adoption supplied some unique reasons for weak 
surveillance system performance. One of these was persisting vertical surveillance 
systems, which were often described as the unwanted relics of vertical funding 
structures (e.g. guinea worm, polio, and measles programmes)—this factor was 
identified as a hindrance to actual integrated surveillance (101, 117, 158, 167). 
Additionally, data analysis at sub national levels (117, 118, 154, 156, 167) and IDS 
training and mentorship (46, 79, 153, 155, 159, 166, 168) were recognised as needed 
institutionalised components of healthcare systems to guarantee synthesis of work 
processes and full commitment of staff. Table 3.6 presents the comprehensive list of 
CDSS performance factors identified in the included studies. 
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Table 3.6 Factors that influence CDSS performance 
1.  Access and availability to transport to 
perform surveillance activities 
21.  Partial vs. full implementation of 
surveillance strategy 
2.  Amount of work for health staff (i.e. existing 
non-surveillance duties) 
22.  Perceived severity of the disease by health 
staff 
3.  Anonymised data  
(if it hinders linking of clinical and lab data) 
23.  Perceived value of disease surveillance  
(i.e. staff motivation) 
4.  Clearly written objectives for CDSS 24.  Strength of data analysis capability at 
intermediate level 
5.  Community involvement in case detection 25.  Political commitment and motivation 
6.  Established and effective specimen 
transport system 
26.  Managerial skills 
7.  External funding and support 27.  Punitive measures for low case reporting 
8.  Frequency of feedback  
(i.e. confirmed status of suspected case) 
28.  Rapid outbreak response capacity and/or 
established rapid response teams 
9.  Frequency of supervision  29.  Regular evaluation of the CDSS 
10.  High staff turnover 30.  Technical support from highly skilled health 
staff 
11.  Human resource capacity to perform 
surveillance activities  
31.  Training of staff in surveillance methods 
12.  Adequate government funding 32.  Separation of surveillance and clinical 
activities 
13.  Adequate resources for CDSS  33.  Simplicity of case definition  
14.  Incentives for case reporting 34.  Simplicity of data form 
15.  Integration of health systems and 
surveillance functions 
35.  Standardised procedures and definitions 
16.  Laboratory capacity to confirm all priority 
diseases 
36.  Standardised surveillance forms  
17.  Level of involvement of NGO’s, public and 
private health facilities  
37.  Strength of core and support functions 
18.  Linkage between clinical, laboratory and 
surveillance data 
38.  Strength of support functions at sub-
national levels 
19.  Logistic support 39.  Sustainable funding for  CDSS 
20.  Multiple communication channels  
 
40.  Use of proven surveillance tools 
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3.4 Discussion 
The review identified studies that have evaluated CDSS in low and lower-middle 
income countries. The primary aim of the review was to explore which methods were 
used to evaluate CDSS performance and synthesise evaluation findings.  In total, 20 
publications met eligibility criteria and these contained 19 distinct evaluations of CDSS. 
 
The review revealed that there is a greater benefit of including an assessment of core 
and support functions in evaluation methods for low-income countries than assessing 
surveillance system attributes only. This suggests that there may be a system 
maturation gradient to consider when deciding which evaluation method is most 
applicable.  This is an important finding for future CDSS evaluation design, given that 
the specificity and accurateness of recommendations affects the overall evaluation 
usefulness—evident by the uptake of findings and influence on relevant policies.   
 
The review findings suggest that studies conducted in countries with resource 
constraints prefer primary data collection to analysis of secondary data—all studies, 
with the exception of two (79, 161), collected data from primary sources. This strategy 
appears counterintuitive since it requires more resources to collect primary data (e.g. 
researchers usually need to travel to reach primary health centres and to interview 
informants compared to stationary analysis of a data set); however, researchers who 
undertook this effort were able to validate data quality and contextualise system 
impediments. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were useful in obtaining 
information for surveillance systems improvement. Particularly, methods that engaged 
health staff and officials (e.g. structured interviews, key informant interviews and focus 
groups) produced the most robust evaluation findings and provided a vital perspective 
of reported performance measures.  Additionally, the review findings show that health 
level included in study design influences study methods and may play an important 
role in identifying useful and targeted information for CDSS improvement.  
Participation and data collection at the sub-national levels appeared to provide 
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information to craft recommendations, which were more likely to be taken up by 
policy.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This review illuminates CDSS evaluation methods and factors affecting surveillance 
performance. The way these methods are incorporated into evaluation plans is highly 
dependent on understanding how the PHSS operates in a specific country. The studies 
highlighted the major factors in surveillance performance, including: timely feedback, 
regular supervision, perceived complexity of case definition, and attitudes about 
reporting. Still, none of the studies cited operational or environmental factors (e.g. 
‘condition of roads’ or ‘data transmission method’) as direct or indirect factors affecting 
CDSS performance. These factors are directly linked to programme planning and a 
high-level commitment to the surveillance system effectiveness.  
While many of the studies mentioned the need for support or reinforcement of skills, 
capabilities, or human resources, none undertook a detailed assessment or review of 
CDSS costs. These omissions are important to underscore as they influence public 
health budget development and programme planning.  For example, when funding is 
allocated for disease-specific surveillance, hidden gaps between these vertical (i.e. non-
integrated) systems can impede overall performance.  
The studies benefited from existing frameworks that provide general descriptions, 
standard surveillance definitions, and other important guidance about what 
functioning communicable disease surveillance systems should achieve (8, 31, 33). 
While overall system performance is important, other information, such as programme 
integration and collaboration, programme planning priorities, costs, and specific 
training needs have proven difficult to ascertain using traditional methods; especially in 
challenging or resource-constrained settings. Neglecting these considerations reveals a 
lack of understanding of the full range of system complexities between human, 
structural, and financial influences. Finally, the current literature reveals a distinct lack 
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of standardisation regarding the best approach for using CDSS evaluation findings 
facilitate decision making (98). Based on these findings, the intention of this PhD is to 
undertake a detailed evaluation of a CDSS in a low-resource setting, by integrating 
rigorous research methods and health economic costing principles into traditional 
programme evaluation. The identified shortfalls of the existing CDSS frameworks and 
methods are addressed in this thesis.   
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4 Thesis aims, objectives, and conceptual framework 
 
In this thesis I examine the intersection of policies, funding, and programme 
implementation for sustaining CDSS in sub-Saharan Africa and try to understand the 
causes and impacts of the current dynamics. Guidelines and practical frameworks for 
CDSS evaluations exists, but have seldom been reviewed for effectiveness. With this 
PhD, I seek to understand how these standards have practically guided public health 
surveillance and epidemiological investigations, and critically consider whether they 
are sufficient for progressive programme improvement, particularly in low-income 
countries.   
 
The potential benefit of an improved evaluation approach, which combines cost and 
performance information, may be greater for low-income countries as they have a 
greater need to advocate for financial and non-pecuniary resources to sustain CDSS, 
especially at sub-national health levels. The conceptual and empirically tested approach 
presented in this thesis will provide evidence-based recommendations that can fuel 
policy and health system improvements. Further, the work sets out to underline the 
advantages of incorporating health economic costing principles in field epidemiology 
and operational surveillance research activities.   
 
The aim of this PhD is to ascertain a methodology to practically and proactively 
improve CDSS operations and performance in resource constrained settings. This thesis 
seeks to reach this goal by 1) examining existing CDSS monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) frameworks and methods 2) presenting and critically assessing a new M&E 
framework and 3) empirically validating this framework through evaluation of the 
Chad meningitis surveillance system.   
 
The specific research objectives are as follows: 
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1. To understand the methods and findings of previous work and existing 
literature of CDSS evaluations 
2. To describe a new methodological approach for surveillance evaluation 
3. To apply said approach to develop an evaluation plan and data collection and 
analysis for the Chad meningitis surveillance evaluation 
4. To conduct a performance and cost evaluation of the Chad meningitis 
surveillance system  
5. To examine how unconventionally assessed contextual factors influence 
surveillance performance 
6. To explore the policy and general programme implications of the research 
findings  
 
Thesis conceptual framework 
McNabb et al.’s conceptual framework of public health surveillance and action and its 
application to health sector reform is the foundation from which the current work 
builds (33). This framework was also the fulcrum for the IDSR strategy and WHO’s 
guide to monitoring and evaluating CDSS (8, 49).  The objective of the framework is to 
facilitate and standardise national-level assessments in order to produce an easy to 
follow plan of action for national surveillance reform. This objective is achieved by 
developing and aligning relevant inputs (i.e. activities) to the public health functions of 
surveillance and action, as seen in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework of public health surveillance and action 
 
Source: McNabb et al. (33) 
 
 
The conceptual thinking and causal relationship of my PhD and study activities are 
captured in the log frame presented in Figure 4.2. The sources used to construct this 
framework include previous research, my aforementioned experiential knowledge, 
personal thought experiments, and some exploratory research. The new M&E approach 
presented in this thesis (i.e. the work-process analysis [WPA]) is used to maximise the 
usefulness of surveillance outputs for action by deconstructing the McNabb et al.’s six 
core and four support activities and isolating discrete and measurable tasks. This thesis 
proposes a new approach that does not replace existing CDSS evaluation methods, but 
supplements traditional methods with tools that produce activity-specific information 
and exposes gaps and impediments in the system. The hope is to present a new 
standard, systematic, and quantifiable approach to comprehensively evaluate 
surveillance system performance.  
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Figure 4.2 Study framework for the process-centred evaluation of Chad meningitis surveillance system 
 
WPA: work process analysis; CDSS: communicable disease surveillance system; IDSR: integrated disease surveillance and response
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Figure 4.2 illustrates how the evaluation findings and recommendations can lead to 
critical programme outcomes to ultimately achieve the goal of elimination of type A 
meningococcal meningitis in Chad (green box).  Moreover, this framework highlights 
the progressive relationship between the PhD activities and emphasises those 
completed as part of the meningitis evaluation study (orange box). All components of 
this model are impacted by the inputs, which represent potential drivers (or inhibitors) 
of the project activities and outcomes at different points. In this conceptual framework I 
have identified three concepts (i.e. inputs), which are defined below. 
 
Technical skill and ability  
Training and written guidance should be available to health facility personnel 
participating in surveillance activities and should include such topics as reporting 
requirements, epidemiologic methods, case finding, and investigation. Likewise, 
surveillance officers at each jurisdictional should have the knowledge and means to 
transmit this information and make it readily available to national authorities and 
others who are required to participate in disease reporting and surveillance (170). This 
concept also encompasses the skill and expertise needed to conduct evaluations and 
translate recommendations into useful, effective programmes and political strategies.  
 
Political Will  
Political will is defined as the highest political commitment and significant financial 
support to invest in the development of health systems, including overall strengthening 
and sophistication of routine surveillance systems. This commitment translates to a 
long-term investment in national capacity-building, such as laboratory strengthening 
and establishment of a field epidemiology training programme (124). In many African 
countries, political will is highly contingent on national priorities and political agendas 
as well as local and international stakeholders. 
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Human and financial resources  
Resources to sustain surveillance can be used to facilitate support functions, including 
financial, technical, and human inputs, the availability of funds, trained personnel, 
materials and communications infrastructure (i.e.  Telephone or computer). Resources 
should promote or improve all eight core surveillance activities (33).  
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5 Methods overview 
 
This chapter presents a summary of methods employed for each component of the 
research study. Section 5.1 introduces the Work Process Analysis (WPA) approach and 
details how this primarily business and industrial concept can benefit the public health 
practice of surveillance. The methods to apply this approach to the development of a 
new CDSS evaluation framework are also described. Section 5.2 introduces the Chad 
meningitis surveillance costing and evaluation study and provides a summary of the 
methods used. The summary includes the study setting, research activities, 
development of the study instruments using the WPA framework, description of the 
sample, and data collection and analyses techniques. The chapter concludes with 
section 5.3, which describes the ethical and administrative approval procedures for the 
Chad study. Detailed methods of the main study components (i.e. performance 
assessment, cost analysis, and upgrading exercise) are presented in the succeeding 
Results chapters (Chapters 6-9). 
 
5.1 Introducing the work process analysis approach  
Understanding workflow processes can increase the productivity of a system (125). The 
workflow process analysis (WPA) evolved from the notion of process analysis in 
manufacturing where it was used to increase productivity by concentrating on the 
routine aspects of work activities (171). Used frequently in business management, 
‘processes’ are defined as market-centred descriptions of organisations’ activities and 
‘workflow’ is a schematic that provides a conceptual explanation for understanding, 
evaluating, and redesigning business processes.  Since industrialisation, the 
manufacturing and business fields have been at the forefront of developing techniques 
to increase efficiency and reduce costs and waste. These fields have used work flow 
models in many diverse ways, such as: to guide selection of the appropriate project 
management processes for the EU Energy Sector (172), to analyse the loan evaluation 
processes (173), and develop complex operations metrics (174). Wide-spread use and 
increased understanding of work flow processes has led to the development of analytic 
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frameworks (173, 175), evaluative tools (172) and innovative workflow designs and 
process models (174).    
 
The health field is slowly beginning to adapt WPA to improve efficiency and to capture 
performance within health care settings.  While there are few documented examples, 
one study found that proposing alternative work-flow models in hospital operating 
rooms demonstrated better cost- and work-efficiency than the traditional work pattern 
(176). WPA has also been used to harmonise and connect informatics support teams to 
traditional research teams and streamline collaborative production (177). The appeal 
from international health leaders for more measurement and accountability in health 
(178) (179), speaks to the need for application of such a technique. WPA is a pertinent 
exercise for public health practice and is nimble enough to be employed in most 
scenarios.  
 
Development of the WPA as a public health evaluation approach 
The work process analysis approach for public health practice is a product of several 
years of experience of working within different health systems.  Dr. Scott McNabb, a 
prominent epidemiologist and former director of the CDCs Division of Integrated 
Surveillance Systems and Services, first customised WPA for PHS in 2002. Then, he and 
colleagues separated surveillance work into a conceptual framework of core function 
and support activities—the framework was eventually adopted by the WHO-AFRO 
regional office as the IDSR surveillance strategy (33). In their framework they presented 
an approach for standardising evaluation assessments by defining measurable activities 
across public health surveillance systems. The other objective was to create actionable 
evaluation results for system improvement. In that same year, McNabb and colleagues 
incorporated the WPA into a framework to evaluate a tuberculosis surveillance and 
response system. They focused on specific activities and programme processes and 
associated costs in a county health unit in the U.S. state of Florida (180).  The researchers 
were able to measure the performance and cost and found that there were several 
activities that were amenable to intervention modifications and cost savings.  
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I started working with Dr. McNabb at CDC in 2009 as a junior science fellow in his unit, 
and then again from 2012 as an epidemiologist with a team of public health consultants. 
In this capacity I have worked with them to refine this approach through both 
conceptual and practical exercises. I have personally been involved in the application of 
this framework to monitoring and evaluating laboratory biosafety programmes (181) 
and assessing implementation of International Health Regulations (2005) (182, 183).  
The team worked to cultivate the approach into a conceptual and then applied analytic 
framework. It is agnostic to a health system but is particularly useful for disease 
surveillance, since it can provide information that highlights system gaps and areas of 
integration. Additionally, this framework advocates for the identification of cost 
estimates for surveillance activities, and provides a platform to examine contextual 
factors that affect each setting differently (e.g. road access, availability of courier). The 
next sections discuss the research rationale and the constructs of the WPA as a CDSS 
evaluation framework. 
 
5.1.1 Rationale for using WPA in CDSS evaluations1 
The WHO Health Systems Framework cites improved efficiency and financial risk 
protection as two of the four desirable outcomes of a comprehensive health system (5). 
National surveillance systems should also produce these outcomes. Yet, as 
demonstrated by the literature review, the current PHSS evaluation frameworks do not 
provide a systematic way to assess financing and efficiency.  
 
For effective public health surveillance, processes, inputs, and even hindrances to the 
system must be identified, understood, and sufficiently supported. Certain work 
processes are repeated for every disease programme, and surveillance systems can 
benefit greatly from consolidating repeated tasks into discrete programme components 
that are easier to manage; this is the premise of IDSR. A practical example of the multi-
                                                        
1 This section is broadly based on the Elsevier textbook chapter Erondu N. New public health surveillance 
evaluation model, in: McNabb SJN, J.C. M, Ferland LD, Okutani SML, Park MM, Shaikh AT, et al., 
editors. Transforming Public Health Surveillance In The 21st Century: Promises Yet Unfulfilled, 
Elsevier; Forthcoming 2015 
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componential nature of communicable disease detection can be seen when examining 
the processes at the patient’s first point of contact (i.e. the local health facilities).  
 
To successfully monitor priority diseases, each person who exhibits clinical symptoms 
meeting the case definition for a priority or reportable disease must first be diagnosed 
by a clinician and then reported to the appropriate public health authority. 
Furthermore, at this first point of contact, the provider must collect and send the 
necessary specimen (e.g. blood samples for suspected measles or stool samples for 
suspected poliomyelitis), according to standard operating procedures (SOPs), to the 
laboratory for analysis and confirmation of the disease agent (e.g. bacteria strain or 
virus type). Several presuppositions underlie this process:  
1) There are policies in place that establish national priority and reportable 
diseases; 
2) There are enough health workers at the local health facilities to adequately serve 
the population;  
3) These health workers are aware of national reportable and priority diseases and 
are able to identify each disease based on standard case definitions;  
4) There are appropriate tools and mechanisms to register and report suspected 
cases of notifiable diseases; 
5) Health workers have been trained to collect appropriate specimens for 
laboratory analysis;  
6) There are materials and mechanisms (e.g. accessible roads, services, vehicles) in 
place to store and send the specimens to a diagnostic laboratory;  
7) There is an accessible diagnostic laboratory equipped to analyse the specimens 
and confirm the presence of disease; and  
8) There is a mechanism for the laboratory to report back the results  
 
Activities in the above list delineate various public health surveillance work processes 
needed to operate a disease surveillance system—they also highlight possible 
contextual factors that might impede or interrupt this process (e.g. step 6). Additionally, 
there are several inputs that must be identified in order for these tasks to occur, 
including human and financial resources (e.g. laboratory technicians, funds to purchase 
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materials for the specimen). These inputs will change depending on work tasks and 
must be thoughtfully identified and considered to ensure that the system is able to meet 
the needs of the population. Further, context-specific factors may augment or lessen the 
costs and effectiveness of these inputs. The process-activity-input relationship is the 
central construct of the WPA approach and the substructure of every health system. The 
WPA allows for a granular examination of this relationship at all administrative levels. 
This differs from traditional evaluation approaches which an all-encompassing, but 
generally less precise assessment.   
 
In summary, the WPA methodological framework presented here is intended to 
supplement traditional surveillance frameworks by identifying gaps in public health 
practice and processes by providing more robust data and tailored information to fill 
those gaps. The framework incorporates research and programme evaluation principles 
to provide evidenced-based recommendations to decision makers and programme 
managers. The ultimate aim is to ensure that surveillance systems are efficient, 
satisfactorily resourced, and able to operate at an acceptable standard. The following 
section describes this approach as a public health M&E framework, and details its 
constructs and tools.  
 
5.1.2 WPA as a CDSS evaluation framework  
Adapting the WPA approach into a public health evaluation framework provides a 
more precise methodological approach for assessing the performance of communicable 
disease surveillance processes than what is currently available. Three steps were 
undertaken to develop the WPA framework. The first was to describe the workflow in 
sequential order (i.e. Logic model). This served as the foundation of the framework and 
from which the next two components were built. The second step was to create a task-
by-task description of work activities (i.e. Work process tree). The third step was to 
identify or develop indicators that provide objective measurements of performance (i.e. 
Indicator database). This section provides the operational definitions of the constructs 
and components of the framework. 
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The process-activity-input Relationship 
The following definitions are applied: A process is a high level activity that must be 
achieved. It is then disaggregated into discrete work-tasks. Activities (sometimes 
referred to as tasks) are chronological steps needed to fulfil the attribute listed. Finally, 
the inputs needed to complete each task are identified. Inputs are composed of 
associated costs for human labour, materials, and other items needed to fulfil a task. 
Framework tools 
The objective of the WPA framework is to define and assess discrete public health 
processes by linking work tasks to programme indicators and outcomes. Assessing 
discrete tasks allows for a more granular understanding of work processes throughout 
the administrative levels of the public health system. Figure 5.1 depicts the steps 
described in developing each tool as well as how the set of tools produce useful 
evaluation results and outputs.  
 
Figure 5.1 Work Process Analysis conceptual framework 
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The WPA uses of the following tools to organise evaluation components: 
1. Logic model:  
A logic model is a graphic representation of a system and identifies important elements 
and their relationships (181). When properly constructed, the logic model illustrates the 
underlying hypotheses that a selected intervention(s) will result in an observable and 
measureable outcome. A logic model frame is used to separate surveillance components 
into individual programme and evaluation elements, including inputs, outputs, 
intermediate outcomes, and long-term outcomes (Table 5.1). Logic models should be 
‘read’ as though following a chain of reasoning or ‘if-then’ statements that connect the 
programmes’ components.  
 
In the WPA framework, the logic model is also a portrayal of the ‘operational standard’ 
for ideal implementation of the surveillance system and depicts the standard system 
components identified by international and local authoritative sources (e.g. World 
Health Organisation, CDC, MoH). This can only be assembled by understanding the 
different players and their roles—this means perspectives from high-level policy 
makers to local health practitioners. 
 
This tool provides a systematic blueprint of expected public health practice, allowing 
programme managers to articulate gaps, areas of overlap, and impediments. In the CDC 
CDSS evaluation framework, steps 1 and 2 are describing the programme and engaging 
stakeholders (31); the logic model provides a platform to do both. Furthermore, the 
logic model provides a starting point to identify performance measures and indicators. 
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Table 5.1 Logic model component definitions 
Data categories Definitions 
Inputs Resources, policies, and other needs to set up or start the 
programme 
Activities Steps to implement (i.e. detection, confirmation, reporting, 
analysis, and feedback activities) 
Outputs Evidence that the activity was executed 
Short-term outcomes Measure of implementation of activities or application of tools 
(i.e. measuring if and how the activity is occurring) 
Intermediate 
outcomes 
Measure of application of activities (i.e. if the activity is 
implemented, how is it going?) 
Long-term outcomes Measure of overall programme progress/ impact (i.e. overall 
quality of the programme) 
 
 
2. Comprehensive performance indicators:  
Performance indicators are items of information collected at regular intervals to 
track the performance of a system. Indicators that assess surveillance 
performance should include international, national, and disease-specific 
measures. The indicators can also comprise both impact and process measures.  
Once selected or developed, indicators can be used to develop complementary 
evaluation tools, such as interview questions and study questionnaires, data 
abstraction forms, and checklists. 
3. Work process tree:  
This tool is a diagram that incorporates work processes identified through the 
established guidance and evaluation data collected from system stakeholders. 
Work process trees are composed of sequential tasks needed to complete a given 
surveillance activity and inform graphical representations that illustrate gaps in 
the surveillance system. The tool also provides a platform for collecting data on 
the cost of surveillance activities, which can be harmonised with micro-costing 
methods. Along with the selected indicators, the tasks from the work process 
can be transposed to study evaluation instruments. 
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Beyond measuring surveillance systems’ performance, the WPA approach can provide 
decision makers and programme implementers with data to inform a comprehensive 
plan of action. The plan should define an operational standard of surveillance in the 
country of implementation and identify interventions to fill gaps and impediments in 
the current system; from here the costs of proposed interventions can be estimated. 
Countries can use the results of the evaluation to solicit donor funding for 
strengthening surveillance activities. The disaggregation of functions into tasks can also 
be useful in identifying system components needed to achieve requirements under IHR 
(2005).     
 
In summary, this new M&E framework: (1) describes the work tasks to achieve effective 
and efficient public health surveillance, (2) identifies impediments and gaps in 
performance, and (3) assists programme managers in decision making.  Further, the 
resulting rich evaluation outputs could enable decision makers to prioritize needs and 
allocate resources and (potentially) assess budget impact. In the Chad meningitis 
surveillance evaluation study, the framework was used to develop study instruments, 
shape the analysis, and guide policy recommendations.   
 
5.1.3 Added benefit of the WPA approach to traditional evaluation frameworks  
The traditional evaluation frameworks provide structure with a basis to assess and 
inform operational CDSS. Likewise, the present evaluation built upon this guidance, but 
found it insufficient to address the challenges of evaluating health systems in low-
resource settings. The WPA approach adds several evaluation optimisation 
considerations to the WHO and CDC frameworks (collectively referred to as ‘traditional 
evaluation frameworks’).  The matrix shown in Table 5.2 summarises these by 
presenting each methodology by evaluation domain and with particular attention to the 
practical application in resource-constrained settings. The matrix illustrates that the 
CDC framework reinforces broad mechanical attributes of the system that should be 
tailored, while the WHO generally emphasises the value of ensuring surveillance 
functionality and optimising Member State cross-collaboration and coordination. 
Column 4 of the matrix shows how the WPA approach fills areas that the other 
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frameworks miss.  The main advantage of the WPA is the systematic and narrow focus 
on identifying and reinforcing specific programme needs.  Its explicit links to budget 
development and policy influence is more beneficial to countries like Chad compare to 
comprehensive and impactful evaluations; especially since regular assessments are not 
possible due to financial constraints and a paucity of evaluation expertise.  
 
The thesis contends that conventional evaluation methods are more suitable for well-
functioning CDSS.  Defining a ‘well-functioning CDSS’ can present its own challenges 
when considering contextual relativity; however, most standards are developed to be 
generalizable and thus should be applicable at or around the average situation.  The 
WPA approach provides structure for the CDSS outliers that fall much lower than the 
average. Chad is a fitting example of these types of settings. As one of the 48 least 
developed countries, Chad meets the UN criteria of depressed per capita income, low 
performing human asset indicators, and detrimental economic vulnerabilities (184). 
Least developed countries have health systems that differ substantially from the rest of 
the world. The WPA is a methodological evaluation approach that anticipates and 
embraces these challenges. 
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Table 5.2 Comparison of WPA contributions to traditional CDSS evaluation guidelines in low-resource settings 
Key Evaluation 
Domains 
CDC’s updated guidelines for 
evaluating public health surveillance 
systems 
WHO’s communicable disease surveillance 
and response systems: 
Guide to monitoring and evaluating 
Work-process analysis approach for CDSS 
evaluations in low-resource settings 
Intended 
Audience 
 U.S. State and local health 
department and general PHSS 
 MoH surveillance and epidemiology 
staff 
 CDSS programme managers and 
surveillance officers at all levels 
 Public health laboratory personnel at all 
levels; 
 Other persons with the mandate or 
interest in monitoring and evaluation of 
CDSS  
 CDSS programme managers in low 
resource-settings 
 Researchers evaluating rudimentary 
CDSS 
 Financial managers in charge of CDSS 
budget development 
 CDSS stakeholders and key 
development partners 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
 Provides comprehensive list of 
stakeholders (defined as people who 
use PHSS data) 
 Encourages networking and 
partnerships between stakeholders, 
partners and countries 
 Refers to inter-sectoral collaboration and 
coordination 
 Promotes meaningful engagement of 
local stakeholders (defined as any 
entity that participates in operation of 
national CDSS) 
 Purposeful collaboration of 
stakeholders during the formative 
research stage to secure “buy-in” 
Describing the 
surveillance 
system 
 Provides guidance on how to 
describe the purpose and operations 
of PHSS  
 Suggests parameters for measuring 
diseases in relation to population 
health (E.g. total number of 
cases/deaths, case fatality rates) 
 Emphasizes need to articulate the role 
and responsibilities of implementers and 
stakeholders 
 Promotes clear understanding of flow of 
surveillance data across different levels 
 Provides guidance on defining 
standards and guidelines 
 Triangulates data sources to validate 
data and increase confidence in 
findings; particularly for CDSS with 
low quality data or high amounts of 
missing data. 
 In addition to CDSS description, 
explains how materials and forms are 
managed  
 Includes non-surveillance contextual 
factors to explain differences across 
performance 
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Key Evaluation 
Domains 
CDC’s updated guidelines for 
evaluating public health surveillance 
systems 
WHO’s communicable disease surveillance 
and response systems: 
Guide to monitoring and evaluating 
Work-process analysis approach for CDSS 
evaluations in low-resource settings 
Methods  Promotes assessing system quality by 
attributes. 
 Makes certain assumptions that 
favour established systems, such as 
connectivity between surveillance 
entities, availability of data, and 
minimum standards of data 
availability 
 4 out of 9 attributes require reliable 
data 
 Evaluates CDSS attributes and core and 
support functions 
 Assess surveillance system structure in 
regards to local, regional and global 
policies 
 Periodic review of national priority 
diseases 
 Provides examples, formulas and case 
studies of practical calculation and 
description of certain CDSS surveillance 
attributes 
 Structured by core and support 
functions 
 Focuses on features work processes 
and ability to perform expected tasks.  
 Seeks to understand weaknesses and 
hindrances for collecting and reporting 
quality data, particularly at the sub-
national levels  
 Promotes inclusion of indicators from 
multiple sources, as well as 
development of sound indicators when 
necessary 
Resource 
assessment 
 Suggest evaluations consider direct 
costs of  personnel and “other” 
resources 
 Does not provide any methods for 
systematic assessment 
  
 No mention of CDSS resource 
assessment 
 Employs rigorous health economic 
cost-analysis methods  
 Collaborates with health economist for 
study design 
 Provides example for how to integrate 
cost with performance assessment 
 Includes direct and indirect costs 
Evaluation 
recommendations 
 More broad and general descriptions 
according to system attribute (forest 
approach) 
 Justifies whether or not the PHSS 
reaches its objectives and address 
public health problems 
 Does not explicitly link to specific 
programmatic improvements 
 Suggests that recommendations should 
inform planning  
 Does not provide any examples on types 
of recommendations  
  
 Focuses on specific CDSS 
improvements in relation to its 
objective, with an emphasis on context 
and feasibility (trees approach) 
 Provides “Step-by-step” 
recommendations towards realizing 
progressive system strengthening 
 Aligns missing resources with system 
priorities and needs  
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Key Evaluation 
Domains 
CDC’s updated guidelines for 
evaluating public health surveillance 
systems 
WHO’s communicable disease surveillance 
and response systems: 
Guide to monitoring and evaluating 
Work-process analysis approach for CDSS 
evaluations in low-resource settings 
 Aims to rapidly resolve low-hanging 
fundamental gaps and impediments  
Dissemination 
and use of 
findings 
 Encourages dissemination of findings 
and lessons learned 
 Promotes formal written reports and 
journal publications 
 Suggests evaluation results should be 
disseminated, through summary 
reports, to all implementers and users of 
the CDSS. 
 Focus on sharing lessons learned at the 
central level and between Member 
States 
 Encourages collaborative 
dissemination meetings with 
stakeholders and participants to 
increase probability of real programme 
improvement and system sustainability 
 Encourages transfer of knowledge 
from peripheral to central levels 
 Focuses on informing PHSS budget 
and optimising surveillance and 
response plan of action  
CDC: U.S. Centers for Disease Control; CDSS: Communicable disease surveillance system; MoH: Ministry of health; PHSS: Public health surveillance system;  
WHO: World Health Organisation
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5.1.4 Key limitation of the WPA approach 
The Chad meningitis surveillance evaluation study required two months cumulative 
data collection (includes formative research). In contrast, WHO’s Protocol for The 
Assessment of National Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response Systems estimates 
17 days, inclusive of analysis and report, to conduct the activities of the WHO 
guidelines (185). Table 5.3 compares the duration of the evaluation activities in Chad to 
the WHO’s recommended schedule. A major factor of the 16-fold difference in activity 
duration is the composition of the assessment team.  The WHO protocol recommends 
having an external leadership team that facilitates multiple national assessment 
contingents.  For the Chad study, the field team was composed of one research assistant 
and myself.   
 
Table 5.3 Comparison of Chad study and WHO protocol evaluation steps  
Evaluation Step Chad study (WPA) WHO guidelines 
protocol 
Pilot test or pre-assessment workshop 2 days 3 days 
Training  3 days 3 days 
Field assessment and travel 7 weeks 6 days 
Analysis and report 24 weeks 4 days 
Post-assessment workshop 1 day 1 day 
Total ~32 weeks 17 working days 
(3 weeks) 
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5.2 Evaluation of performance and cost of meningitis surveillance 
in Chad  
5.2.1 Study aim and objectives1 
The WHO in collaboration with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
(LSHTM) and Agence de Médecine Préventive (AMP) initiated a project to establish 
strong surveillance in the African meningitis belt. The study, entitled Estimation of the 
Costs of Meningitis Surveillance in Chad and Niger, assessed the costs of various levels of 
meningitis surveillance in Chad and Niger and was funded by the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation. This was the first study to estimate the cost of meningitis 
surveillance in the African meningitis belt. The two countries were selected partly 
because of already established institutional links in both countries and also because 
between them several of the WHO recommended surveillance strategies were 
represented in their national surveillance plans of action.  
 
The LSHTM was responsible for the study in Chad and AMP conducted the fieldwork 
in Niger. While the two country studies used a similar data collection protocol, 
collaboration was limited. Thus, the remainder of this thesis will refer to the Chad 
study only. 
 
The need to conduct this study arose from several evident issues in the African 
meningitis belt, specifically:   
 The need for countries to adapt their surveillance systems to capture 
epidemiological shifts in bacterial meningitis after introduction of MenAfriVac® 
as well as Hib and pneumococcal conjugate vaccines.  
 The need to know the costs of strengthening surveillance to be able to assess the 
impact of MenAfriVac®, Hib and pneumococcal conjugate vaccines.  
                                                        
1 Many parts of this section are modified from “Estimation of the Costs of Meningitis Surveillance in Chad 
and Niger: Study Protocol, LSHTM 2014”  
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 The need for countries and partners to know the costs of implementing different 
levels of surveillance to aid in determination of the most feasible and 
sustainable surveillance strategies.  
The aim of the study was to estimate the total and incremental costs of various 
meningitis surveillance strategies to inform the choice of the most appropriate and 
sustainable system within a specific country, and supplement the WHO guidelines, 
Epidemic meningitis surveillance in the African meningitis belt: Deciding on the most 
appropriate approach (80). The aim of these guidelines are to properly equip countries to 
select the best-fit and appropriate strategy in light of their disease programme aims, 
capacity, and available resources. At the time of its publication the guide only 
qualitatively presented the types of incremental resources needed and provided no 
figures on costs. For this reason, an aim of the study was to provide reliable estimates of 
total and incremental costs to complement the WHO guidelines. 
 
The study objectives were:  
1. To estimate the current costs of enhanced epidemic meningitis surveillance 
in Chad.  
2. To estimate the current costs of case-based district sentinel meningitis 
surveillance in Chad.  
3. To estimate the potential, incremental costs of upgrading from enhanced 
epidemic surveillance to case-based district surveillance in Chad.  
4. To estimate the potential, incremental costs of upgrading from case-based 
district meningitis surveillance to nationwide case-based surveillance in 
Chad.  
5. To use the study results to develop a cost extrapolation model that can 
generate cost predictions for other countries in the meningitis belt.  
6. To evaluate the performance of the meningitis surveillance system in Chad. 
7. To examine the contextual factors that influence meningitis surveillance 
performance in Chad. 
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Study objectives 6 and 7 were added partly because of the aims of this PhD, but also 
because intuitively it became clear that to properly assess the utility of distinct 
surveillance strategies, it would be necessary to not only estimate costs, but to also 
measure system performance.  
5.2.2 Application of qualitative methods 
The gold standard to increase validity for qualitative research methods is to use cross 
validate data analysis and findings with a trained researcher.  Due to the solitary nature 
of this project and the unavailability for an additional experienced researcher to work 
with me in the field collection and data analysis, other measures were used to cross-
validate the study findings. These methods include having a dissemination meeting to 
review all findings and interpretation, review of findings by my PhD supervisor and 
advisory group members, and validation of findings with the AMP study team. Table 
5.4 describes the methods in which the analysis and findings were cross-checked (i.e. 
validated). Further, as explained later in this thesis, measures such as interview 
recording and double data-entry were undertaken to ensure that the data quality was to 
the highest standard possible. 
 
Table 5.4 Description of validation measures for analysis and findings  
Research analysis or findings Validation measure 
Description of Chad 
surveillance system 
- Input provided and reviewed by Chad MoH officials 
- Input provided and reviewed by counterparts at CSSI 
- Presented at the study dissemination meeting (participants 
included: Chad MoH, WHO-CHAD, CSSI, LSHTM, and 
CDC) 
Chad meningitis surveillance 
performance analysis 
- Presented at study dissemination meeting  
- Reviewed by all study partners for inclusion in study report 
Chad meningitis surveillance 
cost-analysis 
- Performed conjointly with Dr. Ulla Griffiths  
- Reviewed and comments/input provided by AMP and 
WHO-Geneva counterparts 
- Upgrading method and data were guided by input from 
laboratory and meningitis experts from Chad, LSHTM, 
MSF, and WHO 
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- Reviewed by AMP and reviewers for journal Vaccine, where 
it was subsequently included in a co-authored publication 
with AMP 
Application of WPA framework 
for upgrading 
- Method published in book chapter and reviewed by editors 
and colleagues 
- Framework was also used by AMP colleagues 
- Reviewed by all study partners for inclusion in study report 
Discussion and interpretation of 
findings 
- Reviewed by Dr. Ulla Griffiths 
- Reviewed by Dr. James Stuart and Dr. Heather Meeks, 
advisory committee members 
- Reviewed by. Dr. Bernadette Henson, colleague 
 
 
The methods described in this section include qualitative data collection methods for 
process and outcome evaluation. My background includes training in these methods, 
which was part of my Masters in Epidemiology coursework and fellowship training at 
the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention from 2008-2011. I have experience in 
structured and semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and key informant 
interviews.  
 
5.2.3 Study setting  
From March 1st to June 30th 2012, surveillance in Chad was scaled up in three regions 
(12 districts), which were vaccinated in December 2011. This was possible through the 
support provided by the MenAfriCar consortium carriage study (187), coordinated by 
LSHTM. The study supplied health facilities in these districts with training, standard 
operating procedures for meningitis surveillance, a secure transport system for CSF 
samples, and they identified points of contact at each laboratory and health facility (73). 
This study successfully demonstrated that MenAfriVac® is highly effective at 
preventing meningococcal meningitis carriage, and moreover, it showed that with 
sufficient funding, Chad could implement case-based surveillance, as pertinent to the 
present study of meningitis (73). Following these findings, the Chadian Ministry of 
Health (hereafter referred to by the French designation Ministère de la santé publique 
 130 
 
[MSP]) in 2012 developed a plan of action to implement case-based surveillance in 18 
districts (87).  To date, this plan has not yet been implemented.  
 
The costing and evaluation study was authorized on 14 March 20131 , which followed 
the MenAfriCar study by one year. At this time, the MenAfriCar case-based 
surveillance support activities were dwindling in selected districts. The two LSHTM 
professors, Sir Brian Greenwood and Dr. James Stuart, who coordinated and managed 
the MenAfriCar study to local health stakeholders, were instrumental in the 
introduction of our evaluation study and provided an important link to in-country 
networks and contacts. Furthermore, the positive perception of the LSHTM brand was 
useful in engaging with local Chadian partners for our project. Professor Stuart 
accompanied Dr. Griffiths and myself on the initial visit in April 2013.  
 
5.2.4 Study design 
This study utilised a retrospective and cross-sectional design. The study objectives fell 
into five mains study activities:  First, conduct a systematic evaluation of the Chad 
meningitis surveillance system; second, estimate the actual costs of the existing 
meningitis surveillance systems in Chad; third, estimate the costs of upgrading to 
operational standards and scaling up the surveillance systems according to relevant 
options outlined in the WHO concept paper; fourth, use the results to develop a 
surveillance cost model that can be used for predicting the costs of surveillance 
strategies in other countries in the meningitis belt; and fifth, to examine how certain 
factors affected performance of surveillance activities (this was added for the purpose 
of this thesis). Table 5.5 presents an overview of these components with associated 
study methods (i.e. activity used to achieve study component, study instrument, and 
population included in the activity). 
 
                                                        
1 See study authorisation can be found in the Appendix 1. 
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Costs and process data were collected for the July 2012 – July 2013 period. The main 
data collection activities occurred during September and October 2013. Interviews were 
conducted with surveillance-related personnel at each level of the health system, which 
included health facility, district, regional, national, and international staff. Paper based 
questionnaires were developed for each entity and used to administer the interviews. I 
was the principal researcher for the in-country portion of this project. One research 
assistant, Ms. Haoua Oumar, and I (hereinafter referred to as “the study team”) 
conducted all data collection activities and data entry. The full research timeline and a 
summary of the research activities indicating my role and the roles of others are 
provided in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.5 Overview of study methods for each study component 
Study component  Activity Study instrument Population 
1. Conduct a systematic evaluation of 
the Chad meningitis surveillance 
system 
Construct Chad meningitis surveillance 
system description through formative 
research (i.e. literature reviews, key 
informant discussions, government 
document reviews)  
WPA: logic model and 
work process tree 
Subject matter experts with 
experience in Chad 
surveillance  
 Review of health facility registers for 
missed cases of a 28 day period during 
2012 and 2013 meningitis season 
Retrospective record 
search 
Health facilities  
2. Estimate actual costs of existing 
meningitis surveillance system in 
Chad 
Conduct inventory of materials and 
supplies used for surveillance and 
record unit costs; capture resource 
utilisation 
Excel spreadsheet  
Structured 
questionnaires  
 
National finance records, 
laboratories 
Surveillance staff at study 
sites 
3. Develop upgraded model for Chad 
meningitis surveillance system (i.e. 
Design operational standard) 
Identify gaps in existing systems and 
estimate cost to bring system to a 
feasible and operational standard  
WPA: work process tree 
Cost analysis 
Chad 
4. Develop surveillance predictive cost 
model  
 Cost analysis African meningitis belt 
5. Examine the factors that influence 
surveillance performance 
Direct observation of work processes, 
health facility characteristics, and other 
relevant factors,  
Structured 
questionnaires  
Field notes 
Health facilities  
 Interviews to capture indicator measures 
and contextual factors 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 
Key informants 
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Table 5.6 Timeline of PhD research activities for Chad study 
Study 
Component 
Timeline Activity Lead* Additional  
support* 
Preparatory 
work 
Feb 2013 – 
July 2013 
Ethics approval and amendment 
AMP, WHO communication and coordination 
UKG NE 
Study design  Design and development of protocol and 
study instruments 
UKG, NE AMP, JS, 
WHO 
Data 
collection 
Field visit 1: 
29 April – 
14 June 
2013 
Coordinate local travel to the seven districts 
for LSHTM and local researchers, including 
obtaining all necessary clearances from the 
Ministry of Health 
JT, HO NE 
Data 
collection 
 Introduction trip to introduce study CSSI, NE MSP 
Data 
collection 
 Determine surveillance system structure, 
format, and data/specimen flow 
NE HO, KG 
Data 
collection 
 Field test study tools NE HO 
Data 
collection 
Field visit 2: 
18 August – 
29 October 
2013 
Collect data on selected indicators of health- 
and immunisation system functions in 
relation to meningococcal surveillance  
NE HO 
Data 
collection 
 Identify key experts on surveillance systems 
at national level  
NE JS, JT 
Data 
collection 
 Meet with each key informant for individual 
interview or focus group discussion 
NE HO 
Data 
collection 
 Conduct interviews in the seven districts NE, HO  
Data 
collection 
  Laboratory data collection  NE KG, HO 
Data entry  Record and translate all interviews and focus 
group discussions 
NE, HO  
Data entry  Data entry NE, HO  
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Study 
Component 
Timeline Activity Lead* Additional  
support* 
Data analysis November 
2013 – April 
2014  
Data cleaning and preliminary analysis NE  
Data analysis  Cost analysis and extrapolation UKG NE 
Data analysis  Reanalysis of cost for thesis NE UKG 
Data analysis  Participate in the synthesis meeting towards 
the end of the project to review and compare 
data and draw lessons from Niger and Chad 
NE, UKG, 
AMP 
 
Dissemination January 
2014 – April 
2014 
Draft a country report  NE, UKG KG, JS 
Dissemination March 2014 Conduct Chad dissemination workshop  CSSI, NE UK, JS, MSP 
Dissemination  Development of policy recommendations NE, UKG  
Dissemination April 2015 Submission of paper ‘The actual and potential 
costs of meningitis surveillance in the African 
meningitis belt: results from Chad and Niger’1  
AMP NE, UKG, 
WHO, 
Dissemination May 2015 MenAfriNet visit CDC NE, JS 
Dissemination  Finalisation of report and submission to 
country 
NE, UKG KG 
Supervision July 2013 – 
July 2015 
Overall project 
Overall PhD/thesis 
UKG 
UKG 
NE (Chad) 
* Individuals or groups responsible for each activity denoted by initials or acronym. 
NE: Ngozi Erondu, UKG: Ulla Kou Griffiths, JS: James Stuart, JT: Jacque Toralta, HO: Haoua Oumar, KG: Kadidja Gamougam 
AMP: Agence de Médecine Préventive, CSSI: Centre du Support en Santé International, WHO: World Health Organisation, MSP: Chad 
Ministère de la Santé Publique; CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention   
 
  
                                                        
1 Submitted to journal Vaccines, candidate is second author  
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Site selection 
Selection of districts and regions 
Centre du Support en Santé International (CSSI) and Ministry of health officials guided 
a purposive sampling strategy to ensure inclusion of sites from different geographic 
areas with recent meningitis cases.  Chad has 23 health regions, 102 health districts (of 
which only 75 are functioning) and 1,305 health zones (of which 1,061 are functioning). 
Non-functioning health zones do not have either staff or a structure, so the functioning 
health zones cover for the non-functioning ones. Due to insecurity in many parts of 
Chad, we were only permitted to travel to the southern part of the country. It was 
decided that seven districts would be most feasible due to road access, feasibility and 
time constraints. Two criteria guided district selection a) the district reported a 
suspected meningitis case in the previous four years and b) the district had meningitis 
surveillance activities in place.  
In order to compare different surveillance strategies, the original selection approach 
was to select three districts operating case-based surveillance and four that were 
operating enhanced surveillance. To ensure variation, districts were considered across 
four regions and a mix of primarily urban and rural districts were selected. Urban and 
rural were defined by population (i.e. > 5,000 persons or < 5,000 persons) of district and 
geographic proximity to major trade routes1. Though the capital, N’djamena, was not 
included as one of the study districts, the national reference laboratory was included 
due to its essential role in meningitis surveillance in Chad.  The final included regions 
and districts are listed in Table 5.7 and can be seen on the map in Figure 5.2. 
 Among the enhanced meningitis surveillance districts, Moundou is an urban district 
with a regional laboratory. Goundi district is rural and was reporting the most 
meningitis cases during 2012/2013. Koumra is also a rural district, in the same region as 
                                                        
1 The definition of ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ changed during the course of the study to reflect characteristics 
of the surrounding area (i.e. a concerted built environment such as a city or town) rather than just the 
catchment population.  
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Goundi. Among the CBS districts was N’Djamena Nord, which is part of the capital and 
thus an urban district. Two rural districts, Gounou-Gaya and Guelengdeng, were also 
selected as CBS districts and along with N’djamena Nord were part of the MenAfriCar 
carriage study that were still being supported by LSHTM (73).  The fourth CBS district 
was Moissala, another rural area, where CBS was implemented and supported by 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (92). 
 137 
 
Figure 5.2 Map of Chad with study regions and districts 
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Reclassification of case-based surveillance study districts  
It was discovered that the districts that were part of the MenAfriCar study (N’djamena 
Nord, Gounou-Gaya, and Guelengdeng) were not actually performing complete CBS.  
MenAfriCar was concluding and the overlap of financial and technical support to those 
districts with our study activities was for approximately four months.  For the 
remainder of the year, ENS was in place.  Hence, the study team retroactively classified 
these three districts as “partial” CBS systems compared to Moissala, which operated 
“exclusive” CBS.   
Table 5.7 Study districts and regions 
District Region 2012 population 
Enhanced surveillance   
Koumra Mandoul 189,029 
Goundi Mandoul 158,379 
Moundou Logone Occidental 393,876 
Partial case-based surveillance 
Gounou-Gaya Mayo-Kebi Est 293,538 
Guelengdeng Mayo-Kebi Est 214,254 
N’Djamena Nord N’Djamena 166,100 
Exclusive case-based surveillance 
Moissala Mandoul 260,145 
 
 
Selection of study health facilities and laboratories  
The project research proposal stated that approximately 15 percent of health facilities in 
each study district were to be included. This proportion of health facilities was 
determined by the study team based on the total number of sites in Niger and Chad 
that could practically be reached during the study period. This resulted in three health 
facilities per district in Chad. The study area was further restricted to the Southern 
region of Chad because of safety concerns in the north and east of the country and near 
the region of Lake Chad.  
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The actual health facilities were selected during the first introduction visit. The Chief 
Medical Officer (Médicine Chef du District) coordinated our visit with the district 
surveillance focal point(s), who normally held the position/title of Chef du Zone (CdZ). 
The CdZ was designated to guide the researchers with selection of health facilities. The 
two selection criteria were:  
(i) The health facility had reported higher numbers of suspected meningitis 
cases in comparison to other health facilities in the same district during 2012 
or 2013 
(ii) The health facility would be accessible for the study team during the rainy 
season 
A variety of facility types were included, such as government, private, and NGO. Each 
associated district laboratory was automatically included in the study as well as the 
regional reference laboratory in Moundou1 and the national reference laboratory in 
N’djamena.  The MSP, the regional delegate, and laboratory directors approved 
laboratory participation. Table 5.8 list all sites included in the study, including the final 
surveillance strategy classification of districts. 
Table 5.8 Total number of data collection sites (n = 44) 
Surveillance 
office 
Health 
facility 
District 
lab 
Regional 
lab 
District 
surv. 
office 
Regional 
surv. office 
National 
surv. 
office 
National 
lab 
N’Djamena –
HGRN 
- - - - - - 1 
MSP - - - - 7 1 - 
Enhanced Surveillance      
Koumra 3 1 - 1 - - - 
Goundi 3 1 - 1 - - - 
Moundou 3 - 1 1 - - - 
                                                        
1 The Moundou laboratory serves as the laboratory for the large Moundou hospital, the Moundou 
district, and for the surrounding regions (i.e. in the Southeast part of the country).  
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Surveillance 
office 
Health 
facility 
District 
lab 
Regional 
lab 
District 
surv. 
office 
Regional 
surv. office 
National 
surv. 
office 
National 
lab 
Partial case-based surveillance      
Gounou-Gaya 3 1 - 1 - - - 
Guelengdeng 3 1 - 1 - - - 
N’Djamena Nord 
3 1 - 1 - - - 
Exclusive case-based surveillance 
Moissala 3 1 - 1 - - - 
TOTAL 21 6 1 7 7 1 1 
HGRN: L'Hôpital Général de Référence Nationale (Chad national reference laboratory) 
MSP: Ministére de la santé publique (Ministry of health) 
ES: Enhanced surveillance 
CBS: Case based surveillance 
Surv. = surveillance 
 
Design and validation of study instruments through the operationalisation of the WPA 
framework 
This section provides steps of how the WPA framework was applied to the design of 
the evaluation questionnaires for the present study.  Moreover, this section details the 
construction of WPA tools, which resulted in questionnaire items and selected 
variables.  
Step 1. Construction of Chad meningitis surveillance programme logic model 
As explained in the WPA framework description, understanding how the country-
specific nuances of how the surveillance system is implemented is the starting point for 
creating an evaluation plan. An extensive literature review was conducted to identify 
the needed resources, standard activities, and programme objectives needed for 
enhanced and case-based meningitis surveillance in the African Meningitis Belt. To 
serve the Chadian context, existing national guidelines, policies, and regional standard 
operating procedures were also reviewed (45, 71, 77, 188, 189).  
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While the overall evaluation study was to assess process performance and certain 
outcomes, the application of the WPA framework was for formative evaluation 
purposes. Formative evaluations aim to optimise and improve a programme’s design of 
purpose (in this case the programme is CDSS evaluation) (190). Formative questions 
isolate specific tasks so that gaps in processes are easier to identify for improvement 
and summative evaluation questions correspond to programme outcomes and are 
helpful in measuring the quality and effectiveness of the current surveillance system. 
Table 5.9 outlines the evaluation components and questions developed for this thesis.
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Table 5.9 Operationalisation of the WPA framework into evaluation study components 
Objective Research activity Evaluation questions  
Apply Work Process Analysis 
framework to assess operational and 
financial gaps in the meningitis 
surveillance system  
a. Map meningitis surveillance components into 
logic model and work process tree framework  
b. Collect information on what is needed to achieve 
an optimal and feasible MSS in Chad  
c. Measure gap between current system and 
desired optimal and feasible MSS 
d. Assess areas for programme integration 
opportunities 
 What are the activities and costs to achieve an optimal and 
feasible MSS in Chad? (F) 
 Where are the opportunities to strengthen meningitis work 
processes with other communicable diseases surveillance 
activities? (F) 
 What are the incremental costs of improving the current 
system to a desired optimal and feasible MSS? (F) 
Conduct a systematic evaluation and 
costing of the meningitis surveillance 
system  
 
a. Transform work process trees into study 
instrument items 
b. Assess performance of tasks by core and support 
functions 
c. Measure performance of current system using 
identified indicators 
d. Explore relationships between performance and 
cost 
 What is the description of the MSS in Chad?  
 What is the MSS performance of selected health facilities 
in Chad? (S) 
 How much does surveillance costs?  (F) 
 What is the relationship between surveillance cost and 
performance across districts? (F) 
Examine the factors that influence 
surveillance performance 
a. Document factors observed at health facilities 
and attained through health staff interviews 
b. Describe contextual factors across health 
facilities and districts  
 What were the most reported factors that participants 
believed impacted surveillance and how? (S) 
 Which factors were observed that appeared to influence 
surveillance work practice? 
 How does funding source/policy affect surveillance 
performance? 
MSS: Meningitis surveillance system 
(F): Formative evaluation question 
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Step 2. Selection of study indicators 
The indicators selected were measures of achievement and performance for meningitis 
and IDSR surveillance. These indicators are meant to provide objective information, 
which facilitates improvement of the system and provides evidence to justify advocacy 
of resources. Indicators were identified concurrently with logic model components 
through the literature and policy reviews and were then reviewed to ensure that they 
could provide information to answer the evaluation questions. The programmatic 
indicators were mostly quantitative, but contextual indicators were also included, 
which were informed by qualitative data from key-informant interviews. All indicators 
were mapped to the logic components (inputs, activities, outputs, and intermediate 
outcomes) to establish the evaluation blueprint.  
 
The indicators were comprised of metadata, which were collected during the study; this 
includes numerator, denominator, existing target (if applicable), indicator reference, 
and data source. Indicators about cost were aligned to the objectives of the cost analysis 
component, such as cost per function, cost per suspected case, etc. The indicators 
collected and used for the study are further discussed in Chapter 7. The indicators, in 
conjunction with the work process tree, were used to develop the final evaluation and 
assessment tools. 
Step 3. Formation of work process tree and study questionnaires 
A work process tree was created to expresses the nonlinear components of each activity 
or to define alternative routes to produce outputs. The work processes were defined as 
a set of tasks that were needed to achieve each process listed in the logic model. The 
first step was to delineate the flow of data into process trees (using information from in-
country surveillance informants as well standard operating procedures) into processes 
(e.g. weekly reporting) and discrete activities/tasks (e.g. send SMS to district 
surveillance focal point every Monday; send written forms to district surveillance focal 
point by courier).  
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Next, each process tree was aligned with the required human and financial resources, if 
applicable. The last step was to transfer processes and tasks to the appropriate study 
instrument. Tasks were modified according to the indicator target. Specifically, a mix of 
question types (e.g. multiple choice, open-ended, ordinal scale, contingency) to estimate 
the measure of variance around the intended target as well as the implementation of the 
task itself. For example, if the standard requires each health facility to report weekly, 
we would ask the following open question: “How often do you report suspected cases?” In 
contrast to “Do you conduct weekly reporting of suspected cases?”  This former question is 
more useful to help programme managers make specific corrections to programme 
health practice. Another example of a set of process-task questionnaire items can be 
seen in Figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5.3 Example of work process and tasks concepts as questionnaire items (health 
facility questions 36 – 41) 
 
 
Where a resource was needed, relevant sub questions were developed to gather 
information such as:  unit cost, salary, frequency of use, distance, age and condition of 
equipment. These cost-related variables were ultimately captured in data abstraction 
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tables nested in the relevant study questionnaire.  Figure 5.4 provides an example 
abstraction table from the health facility questionnaire.  After collection of these data, 
they were entered into Excel spread sheets; this tool is explained further in the 
following section.  
 
Figure 5.4 Example of question to estimate the value of donations for cost analysis 
(health facility question 15) 
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In total, the following five study questionnaires were created from this process:    
 124 - item health facility questionnaire  
 40 - item district/regional questionnaire 
 64 - item laboratory questionnaire 
 35 - item central level questionnaire 
 5 - item partner agencies questionnaire 
 
The district/regional questionnaire was used to conduct interviews for both district 
surveillance focal points and regional surveillance focal points. The national/partner 
questionnaire was used to conduct interviews for both MSP officials at the central level 
and in-country international health partners (i.e. WHO, MSF, CDC).  
 
All questionnaires were written in English and a third-party contractor translated them 
into French.  AMP and CSSI then refined these translations. To validate the selection of 
activities and processes, surveillance and laboratory experts as well as study partners 
reviewed and provided commends and modifications. Additionally, the study protocol, 
inclusive of the evaluation plan and study instruments underwent third-party (persons 
not associated with the study) scientific reviews at LSTHM and WHO-Geneva. The 
health facility questionnaire can be found in the Appendix 4.  
 
Step 4. Development of data entry and analysis tool for resource utilisation and unit 
cost data collection 
The data entry and analysis tool that was used in the study was built upon an existing 
tool platform called SurvCost. SurvCost is a spreadsheet-based tool developed to aid 
public health officials to estimate the costs of IDSR systems at national, region/ 
province, district, and health facility levels1. The tool has been developed using 
                                                        
1 SurvCost is a product of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in collaboration 
with the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa (WHO/AFRO) 
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Microsoft Excel/Visual Basic. The tool and guidelines can be downloaded at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/dphswd/idsr/tools/survcost.html 
 
The SurvCost tool is composed of three groups of spreadsheets linked together by 
formulas: 
1. Data Collection or Entry – for gathering information 
2. Data Synthesis or Results – calculates costs  
3. Data Summary – provides aggregated totals for each category 
 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the structure of the SurvCost data collection spreadsheet template.  
SurvCost was used as a starting point for designing the data entry and analysis tools 
used for the study, but as SurvCost was not developed for simultaneously capturing 
data from many different study units, the structure of the sheets were changed 
substantially.   
 
Cost-related data for health facilities, district, regional and central surveillance offices 
were collected during interviews and documented in the questionnaire abstraction 
tables. Then the data were manually entered into the excel sheets for analysis.  The 
laboratory inventory was entered directly into the data entry sheets. 
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Figure 5.5 SurvCost data entry spread sheet structure 
 
 
Source: Someda et al. (111) 
 
 
Field test 
Field-testing is a commonly used research technique performed to test and establish 
validity of study instruments. Validity is the degree to which an instrument measures 
what it is supposed to measure (191).  For the present study, this technique as well as 
expert review was used to increase internal validity of the study questionnaires.  
 
The field test was conducted over two days in September 2013 in N’djamena Nord 
district. This consisted of testing the health facility, district/regional and laboratory 
questionnaire during working hours as would happen during the actual data collection 
period.  
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The purpose of this field test was to optimise the study questionnaire by testing:  
- The comprehension of study items,  
- The accuracy of data source for certain questions (e.g. deciphering if the CdZ or the 
CASE kept a line lists for suspected cases),  
- The appropriateness and logic of the questionnaire length and layout, and 
- The ability and willingness of participants to answer the questions.  
 
Another aim was to simulate actual field conditions in order to understand the time 
needed to administer each questionnaire and to inform the data collection schedule.  
The study team took comprehensive field notes and made edits on the study 
questionnaire during these visits.  The field notes were taken to ensure that a wide 
breadth of information, including participant feedback was captured. Notes were 
compared and collated after each site visit. Each interview was recorded and the 
recording was reviewed during the revision process; this was especially necessary to 
resolve discordant responses between the interviewers or to clarify intelligible 
responses. A summary of the field test results is presented in Table 5.10. The 
central/partner questionnaire was not tested in the field, but was reviewed by 
surveillance and health economics experts for appropriateness and completeness. 
 
N’djamena Nord, was originally selected for testing purposes only; the baseline 
questionnaire used for this district was subsequently amended.  However, the study 
team decided to include this district in substitution for an earlier district that was not an 
urban area. Subsequently, in November 2013, the research assistant returned to 
N’djamena Nord and collected the missing data that were omitted on the first version 
of the study tools.   
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Table 5.10 Summary of questionnaire field test results 
Participant/ 
questionnaire 
Duration Questionnaire modifications Field notes 
CdZ, N’Djamena Nord 
district/ District and 
regional questionnaire 
1 hour - Added question about CdZ original career or 
certification (e.g. nurse or physician) 
- Added the conditional question inquiring if no 
vehicle was available, did they have a personal 
vehicle that they use for work 
- Deleted a confusing question about early notification 
of evolving outbreaks from district to regional level 
- We delivered the questionnaire one week in advance 
but the CdZ did not review or fill it in before the 
time of the interview 
-  This was a new CdZ who did not have a lot of 
knowledge or much of the data that we requested.  
- He requested that we talk to Médicine Chef du District. 
RCS at the Mileze 
Centre du Santé/ 
Health facility 
questionnaire  
2 hour 40 
min 
- Added public and private options for ‘type of 
establishment’ 
- Added question to see documentation when specific 
information was requested 
- Need to pre-define ‘follow up’ which should mean to 
check on confirmed case after release from health 
facility, and look for persons who may have been 
exposed to the disease. 
- Modified questions about specific distance 
- Added specific questions related to rainy season  
- Added specific questions about sending forms to 
district and regional focal points 
- Moved data about aggregate case totals for other 
disease to district/regional questionnaire  
- Difficulty finding 2012 disease register 
- Taking pictures of information posted on the wall 
was useful 
- RCS seemed happy to complete the interview despite 
the length, there were two other staff attending to 
patients 
- CdZ was with us for the first part of the interview—
this seemed to put pressure on the RCS. 
- Noted that the Likert-scale questions did not 
translate well in the setting (suggested changing the 
5-point scale to a 3 point scale) 
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Participant/ 
questionnaire 
Duration Questionnaire modifications Field notes 
Chef du Service du 
Laboratoire, Hospital 
de la Paix/ Laboratory 
questionnaire 
2 hours - Moved population data about the local area to the 
CdZ questionnaire 
- Modified the analysis table with the recommended 
analyses reform  
- Added laboratory support staff to capture the 
amount of personnel in each laboratory  
- Added question to document each piece of 
equipment and respective locations 
- We delivered the questionnaire one week in advance 
and the Chef du Service had completed the first few 
pages of the questionnaire, at the time of the 
interview. 
- Participant was also positive regarding the time 
length 
- Necessary to confirm laboratory documentation to 
confirm that test were done 
- Excel form was difficult to collect information 
specific data (e.g. salary) 
- Prayer on Friday afternoons is necessary 
consideration for study schedule 
- Chef du Service agreed to email the list of meningitis-
related reagents. 
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Data collection and management 
Preparation and training  
The data collection period occurred during September and October 2013. I trained the 
research assistant (RA) on the structured interview and field notes methods; this 
entailed going through each questionnaire item and explaining the intended meaning. 
The purpose of this was to generate good quality data by ensuing that we both had the 
same baseline knowledge and understanding of the study instruments and procedures. 
I also prepared interview introduction scripts, which we both practised before the study 
started.  The script included greeting, study introduction, and a request for a verbal 
consent and recording permission. For most of the interviews, the RA primarily 
facilitated the introduction. This was important because she is Chadian and when she 
opened the interview by introducing us as a team, the participants seemed to be more 
at ease. We were also accompanied by a CSSI driver (also a Chadian) who usually 
assisted us by bringing in the participant incentive of one dozen bottles of soft drink, 
one dozen bottles of water, and two packs of biscuits.    
 
Participants 
Data for performance assessment, contextual factors, and some information for cost 
estimates were obtained from the four interview sources (i.e. staff at the health facility, 
district, region, and central levels). Table 5.11 summarises the relevant surveillance staff 
who participated in the study by administrative level. At the sub-national level, 
participants included staff from 42 study sites (See Table 5.8 [p. 139]). Interviews 
conducted at the central level were conducted with government decision-makers, 
policy stakeholders, domestic disease programme leads, and international health 
partners.  
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Table 5.11 Health care structure and corresponding surveillance staff 
Administrative 
level  
Entity Surveillance contact(s) occupation 
National Ministére de Sante Publique 
(MSP) 
National Laboratory (HGRN) 
 
 National surveillance coordinator and 
deputy coordinator 
 Data manager  
 National laboratory focal point 
Regional  Regional Delegation 
Regional Laboratory 
 Chef d’Antenne de Surveillance ´Epidémiologie 
(CASE): Regional surveillance lead 
 Regional laboratory Responsable 
District District Hospital 
District Laboratory 
 Chef de Zone (CdZ) : District surveillance 
lead 
 District surveillance focal point 
 District laboratory manager 
Peripheral  Health Facility   Responsable du Centre de Sante: Health 
Facility manager  
 
Structured interviews  
Structured interviews were used to collect performance and cost data at each 
administrative level. Question-types included close-ended, open-ended and free-
response questions; the latter allowed for personal opinion of challenges, 
discussion/explanation of disease surveillance in general, and auxiliary information for 
certain responses. Types of data collected included demographic information of 
participant and study site, history of surveillance training activities, assessment of 
meningitis surveillance knowledge and skills (health facility, district/regional), 
surveillance activities performed, past response activities, surveillance resources, 
community engagement, and information about integrated surveillance activities. We 
captured the majority of responses by directly filling in the questionnaire with 
participants’ answers and extracting data from disease registers, reports, etc. 
Additionally, the health facility questionnaire included a 19 qualitative Likert scale 
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questions to gauge participant beliefs and opinions about budget, logistics, human 
resources, and reporting. Specifically, these questions discussed ability to do work, 
maintenance of systems, staff capacity, capability, and motivation, and opinion 
regarding timely feedback. 
Though the interviews were not self-administered, each participant was given a copy of 
the questionnaire so that they could follow along and read the question as it was asked.  
This was to minimise confusion or miscomprehension that could occur due to my 
accent or limited French ability.  Additionally, the RA sat next to each participant and 
guided him or her along the questionnaire as I read the questions aloud.  The RA filled 
out the questionnaire in front of the participant as they spoke, and I filled out a separate 
questionnaire, so each participant interview was documented twice. At the end of each 
interview, we retrieved both questionnaires. During the data entry process, we 
compared the responses and reviewed the recordings for any discordant or intelligible 
responses. There were no refusals to participate. 
 
Key informant semi-structured interviews 
Throughout the study period key informants (KI) were identified based on their 
experience with disease surveillance in Chad.  The criteria for selecting key informants 
was that the person must have worked in Chad for at least six months in a surveillance-
related role for any vaccine preventable disease, and they must have been working in 
the sub-Saharan African context for at least three years, in a surveillance-related 
capacity (Table 5.12 summarises this list by topic.). The interviewed persons included 
local NGOs, Ministry officials, and partner organisation staff.  KI discussions did not 
follow a conventional topics list since different KIs for contacted to inform different 
components of the research study.  Rather, KIs were approached to fill knowledge gaps 
about certain aspects of the research, which were identified prior to each interview and 
served to guide the discussion. Some informants helped to inform the process of 
describing the surveillance system, some KI’s were asked to provide information about 
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the challenges and/or benefits of the national meningitis surveillance system, and some 
KIs were asked about specific recommendations to improve the system. Eighteen 
potential KIs were solicited to participate, but due to scheduling and travel, I was not 
able to speak to two individuals. In total, I conducted sixteen face-to-face interviews.  
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Table 5.12 Key Informant participants and topic summary 
 KI role KI organisation Topic discussed 
1.  Data Manager MSP Chad meningitis surveillance description 
2.  Researcher/ Epidemiologist CSSI/MSP Chad meningitis surveillance description 
3.  MenAfriCar-Chad coordinator CSSI Chad meningitis surveillance description 
4.  Laboratory technician HGRN Laboratory role, Chad meningitis 
surveillance description 
5.  Epidemiologist/ Technical 
officer  
CDC-Atlanta IDSR and Polio activities 
6.  Epidemiologist/ Technical 
officer 
CDC-
Atlanta/WHO 
IDSR funding,  performance, and needs 
7.  Country director Carter Centre IDSR, guinea worm programme activities  
8.  Medical coordinator, Chad MSF-France Moissala district meningitis surveillance 
9.  Field lead Moissala MSF-France Moissala district meningitis surveillance 
10.  Administrator MFB  Chad salary structure for government 
employees 
11.  Assistant administrator CSSI Chad salary structure for government 
employees 
12.  Surveillance officer WHO/Chad WHO role in Chad meningitis 
surveillance 
13.  Immunisation and vaccines 
development country lead  
WHO/Chad Suggestion for surveillance strategy 
14.  Supplies manager WHO/Chad Unit cost for resources 
15.  Chef de Zone Koumra MSP Suggestions for surveillance 
improvements 
16.  Chef de Zone Goundi MSP Suggestions for surveillance 
improvements 
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention   MFB: Ministry of Finance and Budget  
HGRN: Hospital Général Réference National   MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières  
KI: Key informant      MSP: Ministere Santé Publique  
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A semi-structured format was used to allow for a conversational, but still focussed 
conversation. During each interview I guided the KI through pre-defined topics of 
interests.  Each interview began with more general questions about the Chad 
surveillance and health system, and then we discussed specific topics and issues that 
were relevant to the KIs expertise and experience. While some questions were phrased 
ahead of time, many of the questions were created in response to the KI’s response or to 
probe for more information.  This flexible format was chosen to compensate for my 
limited local knowledge and allowed for new information to emerge. I took 
comprehensive notes and synthesised them as required to inform the respective 
research component.  Depending on the time constraints of the participant, these 
interviews ranged from 20 to 70 minutes. A few times I arranged to meet with the KI 
between meetings and so I asked very specific questions about their work or experience 
in a certain district.  While most KIs were interviewed before or during the main data 
collection period, selected study participants (e.g. CdZs from certain districts) were 
approached and asked to participate in an interview to provide additional insight on 
surveillance issues.  
 
Record review 
At each health facility a retrospective record review was conducted to verify suspected 
meningitis case registration. This usually occurred near the beginning of the interview 
and involved me searching through the registers for suspected cases during the 
previous 28 days as well as during 12 March through 8 Avril 2012.  The purpose of the 
‘previous 28 days’ period, was as a quality check to verify if actions recently performed 
matched with general participant responses regarding surveillance activities (i.e. to 
ensure that reality matched with what participants may have thought were the 
expected answer). We selected the '12 March through 8 Avril 2012’ period because those 
dates coincided with the  11th  through 15th  epidemiologic weeks—this period was well 
into the high incidence of meningitis in the previous four years in Chad.  
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If within the previous 28 days a suspected meningitis case was noted in the register, I 
asked the participant for a copy of the case- or weekly-reporting form that included the 
suspected case.  This usually was not available at the health facility due to SMS 
reporting, lack of archives, and other reasons that are detailed in Section 5.2.4. In any 
case, if a form was found, one to three cases (but often times more) were randomly 
selected to verify that the case was reported to the district level.   
 
Collection of resource utilisation data  
Data was collected for costing by interviewing surveillance-related staff and 
stakeholders at the different health levels and reviewing relevant documents and by 
collection of accountancy records and financial statements. As mentioned above, a 
Microsoft excel-based tool was developed for data entry of cost-related information. 
Data on unit costs and quantities of regional and national laboratory supplies were 
collected through a separate inventory (i.e. apart from the laboratory structured 
interview) and entered into the excel tool. Specific unit costs of surveillance-related 
resources were collected from a variety of sources, including salary scales from the 
Ministry of Finances and Budget (Ministére des Finances et du Budget), accounts and 
invoices, partner agencies engaged in procuring surveillance supplies, and from 
potential suppliers.  
 
Collection of contextual factors 
Contextual questions intended to assess unique factors about the health facility, were 
included in the HF questionnaire. These included distance from district hospital, type of 
area (i.e. urban or rural), number of health staff, accessibility (e.g. paved or dirt road, 
difficult or easy access), and source of financial support. Contextual factors were 
captured using four methods: 
1. Reported context-related factors from the literature,  
2. Key informant interviews,  
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3. Context-related tasks that emerged from WPA exercise, and  
4. Direct observations at study site during health facility visits.   
 
Data collection experience 
The data collection experience was pleasant due to the hospitable nature of the Chadian 
culture as well as the positive reception of our incentives.  The major challenges were 
the distance between districts and sometimes health facilities, as well as my language 
barrier during the earlier interviews.  Though the RA spoke fluent French, her limited 
experience in research studies made it difficult to ask probing questions when needed. 
 
Quality assurance 
A high level of field supervision was maintained during the fieldwork period. The RA 
and I worked closely on all field activities. Each questionnaire was checked before data 
entry for completeness. Missing or incomprehensible data necessitated the study team 
calling the participants to provide the correct information.  Questionnaire data were 
entered manually shortly after each interview. I entered data for my questionnaire and 
the RA entered data for her questionnaire (i.e. the same questionnaire data was entered 
by two different people), so double data entry occurred.  Afterwards, the study team 
physically convened to synthesize data, review all responses, and resolve discrepancies 
in real time. After the data collection period, upon arrival to London, all raw data were 
cleaned and coded. Inconsistent data were rechecked against the paper questionnaires 
and corrected where possible.  
 
 161 
 
Figure 5.6 Chief laboratory technician preparing to analyse CSF at the national 
laboratory, N’djamena  
 
 
Figure 5.7 The study team with the technicians at Koumra district laboratory 
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Figure 5.8 An in-progress interview with the Moissala Chef de Zone  
 
 
Figure 5.9 An in-progress interview with the Responsable of Dele Centre de Santé, 
Moundou 
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Data analysis 
I performed data analysis in London. When necessary, the RA and the lead laboratory 
technician provided requested necessary outstanding data, via email. Expert input from 
study collaborators and external colleagues was also required to complete the data 
analysis.  
Performance assessment  
Questionnaire data were summarised using frequency counts, measures of central 
tendency and proportions. Data were presented to describe the distribution of key 
variables, including: study site, surveillance strategy, environmental factors, funding-
support mechanism, number and type of staff, suspected meningitis cases, source 
information of surveillance materials and equipment, and process and structural 
surveillance-related variables. Data on the contextual factors were analysed and 
summary measures of means, ranges, and standard deviations generated.  Data were 
presented by health facility, district, and laboratories. The performance assessment at 
the health facility level looked at the system as a whole rather than comparing them by 
surveillance strategy, since this comparison was primarily intended to understand the 
incremental cost of transitioning strategies. The subnational (health facility, lab, district 
offices) performance assessment gauged whether the system was able to complete 
activities as expected by the MSP, in accordance to standards. 
 
Indicators were measured using two techniques. First, performance was quantitatively 
assessed by a calculation of programme data, which were then compared to expected 
performance targets, derived from study indicators. This analysis continued to 
categorise surveillance functions as low, medium, or high performance based on 
percentage of attained indicators. The second level was to qualitatively1 characterise the 
surveillance system by using selected surveillance characteristics. This assessment 
included the surveillance core functions and corresponding activities, ‘detection and 
                                                        
1 Data were analysed using nominal qualitative categorization; the use of qualitative here is not 
intended to imply a qualitative research approach  
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registration’, ‘reporting and analysis’ and ‘feedback’. Frequency distribution tables 
were created for the performance indicators and stratified by administrative level and 
by district strategy. The methods for the performance assessment are presented in 
further detail in Chapter 7.   
Cost-analysis  
First, the total and average across study districts costs of existing ES and CBS of 
meningitis surveillance systems in Chad were estimated. Then the incremental costs of 
upgrading these systems to an operational standard, which include integrated 
surveillance system with other diseases, were estimated. 
 
Broad types of costs were analysed by: 
- Meningitis surveillance activities 
- By surveillance strategy 
- Surveillance core and support functions 
Mean costs were calculated per 100,000 population and per capita according to 
surveillance strategy. To inform the efficiency of the in-place surveillance system, mean 
costs per suspected case, per investigated case, and per confirmed case were also 
estimated. Methods applied for estimating each type of cost are described in more 
detail in Chapter 8. 
 
Average cost were compared for potential differences between district surveillance 
strategies. Total system cost along with the performance analysis was performed to 
inform the best-fit surveillance strategy for the Chad context. 
 
Creating an operational standard  
The ‘operational standard’ is defined as the comprehensive set of meningitis 
surveillance activities that comply with the guidelines for case-based bacterial 
meningitis surveillance customised to country circumstances. This upgrading method 
was informed by the WPA framework and utilizes the logic model and the work 
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process trees to define the programme gaps and identify the needs at core function 
and/or administrative levels. Detailed methods applied to upgrading the system are 
presented in Chapter 9.  
Dissemination meeting 
In March 2014, a dissemination meeting in N’djamena was organised and attended by 
study collaborators, MSP officials, and partners. During this meeting the study team 
presented the preliminary study results, and participants were trained on completing 
surveillance forms.  
 
Figure 5.10 shows how the results chapter are aligned to the PhD research activities 
presented earlier. Each results chapter further describes specific methods and outcomes. 
 
Figure 5.10 Results chapters and affiliated research activities  
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5.3 Ethical approval 
Political buy-in was a large component of this study—as it should be when objectively 
evaluating a health system, and especially as an outside institution. With this 
understanding, the study commenced with an introduction and exploratory visit 
during the months of April and June 2013. The primary aim of this visit was to describe 
the study objectives and assess the perceived value of the study to primary stakeholders 
(i.e. the Chadian government, international partners, and CSSI—the local technical 
collaborator). We explained that the anticipated study results were to equip policy 
makers and external stakeholders with information to determine the most feasible and 
effective meningitis surveillance strategy for Chad.  
 
Ministry of Health officials reviewed and approved our overall study as well as the 
request to access and analyse sensitive financial expense data and interviews with 
health facility staff. They also guided selection of potential study sites. I then embarked 
on introductory visits to the pre-selected study sites with one research assistant, Ms. 
Haoua Omar and the CSSI study liaison, Dr. Jacque Toralta. Our team completed an 
introduction tour to each of the seven districts where study authorizations were 
obtained from each regional governor.  Soon after, the LSHTM Research Ethics 
Committee granted the study ethical approval. Also, as this study was low risk to all 
participants, it received an exemption from the WHO Ethics Review Committee.  
 
To ensure confidentiality, all persons interviewed were assigned a unique study 
number that was used for data storage and analysis allowing personal identifiers to be 
omitted. All the information provided in the study was anonymised. Participants were 
verbally briefed on the purpose of the study and data collection methods, and informed 
consent was obtained. We also asked permission to record at the beginning of each 
interview. All study questionnaires have been stored in protected rooms and the 
pertaining databases are secure and shared only among team members from WHO, 
LSHTM and AMP. 
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6 Public health surveillance in Chad described using 
work process analytic tools   
A clear description of the surveillance system is a crucial first step in understanding it.  
CDC and WHO suggest engaging stakeholder’s at all pertinent government levels as 
well as auxiliary professional and private organisations (8, 31).  The product of such 
engagement should result in an explicit understanding of: 
- the public health importance and specific objectives of the system,  
- the resources used to operate the system, and  
- the priority diseases and health-related events under surveillance in the 
respective country. 
In this chapter I present the overarching public health surveillance system in Chad, 
followed by a description of the design and operational components of the meningitis 
surveillance system. The ensuing descriptions are the result of stakeholder input and 
empirical observations as previously described. 
 
6.1 Public health surveillance structure 
The health system in Chad is composed of a private and public sector. The Chad 
Ministére Santé Publique (MSP) in 2012 was organised into one central level and two 
intermediate levels, which includes 23 regional health delegations (Délégations Sanitaires 
Régionales) and 70 health districts (Districts Sanitaires). There are 1165 peripheral “zones 
of responsibility”; each zone includes a number of health facilities. This health 
infrastructure covers 69% of the country (Chad 2012 Polio certification report), the rest 
of the country is either unserved or inaccessible.  
    
The MSP operates through a hierarchy, with the national level officials directly 
overseeing the intermediate level, which in turn supervises the peripheral level.  At 
each administrative level, SSEI surveillance staff or health facility staff undertake daily 
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surveillance duties.  Table 6.1 summarises the surveillance staff at each administrative 
level.  
 
Table 6.1 Health care structure and corresponding surveillance staff 
Administrative 
level 
Entity Surveillance staff positions 
Central Ministére de la sante 
publique (MSP) 
National lab (HGRN) 
 
 National surveillance coordinator and 
deputy coordinator 
 Data manager  
 National laboratory focal point 
Regional  Regional delegation 
Regional laboratory 
 ‘Chef d’Antenne de Surveillance 
d´Epidémiologie’  
(CASE-Area surveillance lead) 
 Regional laboratory Responsable 
District District hospital 
District laboratory 
 ‘Chef de Zone’ (CdZ -Zone surveillance 
lead) 
 District surveillance focal point 
 District laboratory Responsable 
Peripheral  Health facility   ‘Responsable du Centre de Sante’ (RCS) 
(Health facility manager) 
 
 
The MSP in Chad coordinates all communicable disease surveillance through the 
Integrated Epidemiological Surveillance Service (“Service de Surveillance Épidémiologique 
Intégrée” [SSEI]), who works closely with specific disease programmes including the 
Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI).  While the national surveillance strategy 
is labelled “integrated”, these disease programmes largely operate in a vertical manner 
(i.e. through parallel systems) at the subnational level. This includes separate systems 
for EPI, specific priority diseases (e.g. polio, guinea worm, and malaria), nutrition and 
several other conditions. Efforts to integrate surveillance activities are largely realised 
through weekly review meetings of the National Committee for Epidemic Control 
(“Comité Technique national de Lutte contre les Épidémies” [CTNLE]). However, this 
integration does not trickle down to where it is most needed. CTNLE includes 
representatives from all disease programmes as well as national and international 
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partners. The chief communicable disease surveillance partners in Chad are the WHO, 
MSF, The Carter Centre, and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  
 
In Chad, the CTNLE makes the ultimate decision on national notifiable (or priority) 
diseases and health events to be monitored; this process is accomplished by considering 
incidence and prevalence rates, outbreak-potential, and severity.  In addition, external 
entities have successfully added to country priorities by funding and supporting 
disease-specific initiatives such as polio and guinea worm eradication. Meningitis is a 
national notifiable disease under the integrated surveillance program, along with those 
listed in Table 6.2.  There are, in addition, disease specific surveillance systems for 
onchocerciasis, preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV, trypanosomiasis and 
tuberculosis.  
 
Table 6.2 Notifiable diseases under surveillance in Chad, 2012 
 
 
While most of the health districts are under the direction of the MSP, several are 
operated by private entities. In the Chad study two districts, Goundi and Moissala, 
were examples of this. Goundi has been operated by a Spanish missionary organisation. 
Several years of support has developed Goundi to a well-known district for health 
services in the region; the district hospital regularly serves patients from around Chad. 
Moissala district was operated by MSF-France. Moissala is 30 kilometres from the 
Diseases marked 
for eradication 
Diseases marked 
for elimination 
Diseases with 
epidemic 
potential 
Diseases targeted 
for reduction of 
incidence and 
prevalence 
Diseases under 
surveillance 
Guinea worm 
Poliomyelitis 
Neonatal tetanus 
Measles 
 
Cholera 
Yellow Fever 
Meningitis 
Malaria Influenza A 
(H1N1) 
Avian Flu 
Hepatitis E 
Malnutrition 
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Central Africa Republic border, and MSF ensures that health-related services, including 
meningitis are robust to sustain an influx of fleeing refugees from conflict areas. These 
districts are called ‘private’ districts and receive minimal financial support from the 
MSP but are still a part of the administrative supervisorial structure. 
 
6.2 Logic model for meningitis surveillance in Chad 
I spoke to ten key informants in order to understand the activities related to meningitis 
and integrated disease surveillance and to detail the presumed flow of epidemiologic 
and laboratory surveillance data. This information was used to identify specific 
activities and individual tasks for conducting meningitis surveillance. This was 
imported into a logic model framework, which was organized by functional 
components of disease surveillance (i.e. detect and confirmation, reporting and data 
analysis, case investigation and response, supervision and feedback, and monitoring 
and evaluation.). Using an activities-centred “mapping-outward” method the logic 
model was constructed by first systematically categorising the activities by 
administrative level (i.e. health facility, district, regional, and central) and existing 
surveillance strategy (i.e. ES, CBS). The activities were then represented and validated 
by the local surveillance experts. Figure 6.1 shows the activity portion of the Chad 
meningitis surveillance system logic model.  
 
Next, the inputs (e.g. financial resources, relevant policies, skills, training required to 
fulfil the activities) were identified and mapped to the relevant core functions. The 
outputs were mapped as the expected products (i.e. documents, sub-activities) resulting 
from the required programme activities. The intermediate outcomes were identified to 
obtain measurable changes of accomplished activities that should lead to attainment of 
programme objectives (i.e. long-term outcomes). The intermediate outcomes as well as 
some of the outputs were extracted from high-level meningitis programme and IDSR 
indicators. 
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Lastly, the long-term outcomes in this logic model correspond to the intended impact of 
meningitis surveillance on the health system and as a service that prevents or limits the 
damage inflicted by disease on the population.  This includes important IDSR 
fundamentals such as “prompt detection”, “rapid confirmation” “up to date 
information”, “early response”, and “increased quality and ability of the system”.  
 
The full logic model is presented in Appendix 2. The logic model depicts the “ideal” 
meningitis system for Chad, and this was used to construct the next set of tools of the 
WPA framework. 
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Figure 6.1 Excerpt of Chad logic model, ‘meningitis activities’ section 
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6.3 Meningitis surveillance by IDSR function 
Case detection 
The case definitions for a suspected adult and infant case of meningitis used in Chad 
are:  
‘Any adult with acute onset of fever (> 38.5 ° C or rectal temperature of 38.0 ° C axillary 
temperature) with one of the following signs: neck stiffness, neurological disorder or other 
meningeal signs.’  
And,  
‘Any infant with sudden onset of fever (> 38.5 ° C or rectal temperature of 38.0 ° C axillary 
temperature) with one of the following signs: neck stiffness or soft neck, bulging fontanelle, cap 
look, convulsion or other meningeal signs’ (192).  
Suspected cases were detected mainly through patients presenting at health facilities. 
The MSP policy was that a doctor must perform a lumbar puncture at the health facility 
and send the sample to a district laboratory.  However, due to a shortage of doctors, the 
health facility Responsable (i.e. Manager), which were mainly nurses, had been granted 
permission to perform lumbar punctures at the health facility.  Many health facilities 
referred suspected meningitis patients directly to the district hospitals for lumbar 
puncture, as their staff did not have the necessary skills.   
Information, education, and communication (IEC) activities were also part of case 
detection activities. These were conducted as early morning sessions to inform the 
community, of the signs and symptoms of notifiable diseases, including meningitis.  
Laboratory confirmation 
The CSF was generally sent from the health facility in a trans-isolate (TI) medium, to be 
tested at the district laboratory for diagnosis using cytology, gram staining and/or by a 
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rapid latex test (Pastorex [(Bio-Rad rapid agglutination test)]). If there was no functional 
district or regional laboratory, the CSF sample was sent directly to the national 
reference laboratory in N’djamena. This occurred in 14% (n =3) of the 21 health facilities. 
According to the national meningitis treatment protocol, patients should receive 
antibiotics immediately after a lumbar puncture. However, 57% (n=12) of health 
facilities in the sample reported that they often treated suspected cases with antibiotics 
before the patient proceeded to the district hospital for the lumbar puncture procedure.   
 
The regional laboratory in Moundou was equipped to perform all of the tests at the 
district level and could as well grow a culture from the specimen to identify the 
causative agent. They also performed tests of sensibility to antibiotics, and serological 
tests to determine the serogroup. However, it did not perform any meningitis–related 
analysis in 2012 due to lack of numerous supplies, including gram stain kits and rapid 
latex tests. The national laboratory is currently equipped to perform all of the tests at 
the district and the regional levels as well as DNA extraction followed by gel-based 
PCR to confirm diagnosis.  
 
Reporting and analyses 
In Chad, most districts employ enhanced surveillance alongside weekly routine EPI 
disease surveillance; suspected cases were reported even when there are no cases, 
which is referred to as “zero” reporting. The health facility Responsable du centre de 
santé (RCS) initiates reporting of suspected meningitis cases by notifying their 
respective CdZ or zone focal point. Epidemiological data at the health facilities are 
recorded in clinical registers1; weekly data counts are usually transmitted to the CdZ by 
text message. Each month, total suspected cases are counted from the register and then 
                                                        
1 Availability and utilization of clinical registers varied within the study sample.  Most times a generic 
notebook or programme specific (i.e. mother and child) register was used and discarded after some 
months.  It was difficult to keep these records due to lack of archival fixtures for storage and 
protection of documents. 
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transferred to a standardised paper forms, this was occurring at 90% (n = 19) of the 
sample Health facilities. Typically, these forms were sent via a local courier to the CdZ 
at each month’s end. The CdZ was responsible for obtaining data from all health 
facilities within his/her district. In some instances, the CdZ travelled to the health 
facility and collected the paper forms. The CdZ sent the data to the regional 
surveillance lead (i.e. CASE) by weekly texts and by monthly courier.  
 
The CASE for each region collates the data from the multiple CdZs throughout his/her 
region and then reviews the data of each district for data quality (e.g, duplications, 
completeness, and inconsistencies). If there were any issues with the data, the CASE 
would contact the CdZ immediately. Once resolved, the CASE aggregates and analyses 
the data for the district and sends a report to the central level (i.e. SSEI) each week by 
phone and each month by courier or by email. At the regional office, 100% of the 
CASE’s in this study used a laptop to summarise data and enter it in an Excel sheet. 
Furthermore, each month all CASE’s used a standard MS Word form to report regional 
data to the central level. No quality assurance measures (e.g. double data entry) were 
systematically occurring. 
 
At the central level, the SSEI data manager reviews and aggregates data from all 
regions, and then presents a national summary of all integrated diseases at the weekly 
CTNLE meetings. The summary includes a weekly and running sum of case and death 
counts, case fatality rates, and districts with reported suspected cases for each disease.  
Additionally, an epidemic trend graph is generated for each disease displaying the 
epidemiologic weekly disease trends from the current and previous year. Data is 
managed in a national Microsoft Excel and presented as a weekly PowerPoint 
presentation. Finally, each week, the SSEI data manager sends this information to the 
WHO Inter-Country Support Team in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Figure 6.2 depicts 
the flow of data. This diagram was constructed post-field visit.  
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Figure 6.2 Chad meningitis surveillance case detection, reporting and analysis system 
 
IDSR: Integrated disease surveillance and response [form] 
CBS: Case-based surveillance [form] 
Dotted red line symbolizes that this pathway was not observed in 2012 in the study districts, but participants reported the occurrence in 
previous years.  
 
 
Supervision and feedback 
Following receipt of a CSF specimen by the laboratory, there are specified time limits 
for results to be reported to the facility that sent the sample(s). To inform adequate 
response efforts, CdZs should receive the results within 48 hours; regional delegations 
within five days; and national level focal points within seven days upon reception of 
the sample. In actuality, these response times were rarely to never followed. 
 
Feedback was predominantly provided in the form of supervision of sub-national level 
surveillance activities.  CdZs and CASE’s were responsible for providing support to 
health centres and to oversee implementation of surveillance procedures as a system 
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quality check. Table 6.3 describes the prioritization method used to support health 
facilities. Additionally, the national surveillance and laboratory cadre had the 
responsibility for undertaking field visits to selected health facilities and district and 
regional surveillance offices at least two times per month if resources are available. Due 
to lack of resources, such a visit occurred once in 2012. 
 
There is no written feedback medium (e.g. surveillance bulletin). So other than the rare 
supervision visits, peripheral health staff relied on communication from the national 
laboratory focal point through district lab personnel to discover the results of suspected 
cases.  It was not clear why there is no other designated focal point to relay this 
information. 
 
Table 6.3 Health facility supervision visit schedule 
Priority 1:  
Receives supervision 
once per week 
 Health facility has a high frequency of disease cases, a 
large population (i.e. urban zone), or has identified at least 
one case of polio.   
 Responsable is new (i.e. has been working at the health 
facility for less than one year.)  
Priority 2:  
Receives supervision 
twice per month 
 Health facility is in a rural and low disease risk area.  
Priority 3:  
Receives supervision 
once per month 
 
 Low frequency of reported cases and health facility is in a 
rural area.  
 Responsable is experienced and has been at health facility a 
prolonged period of time. 
 
Case investigation  
Active case detection or search: About half of the health facilities in the study 
performed regular active case search in some form. This is a targeted surveillance 
strategy where the health staff reach out to the community and should regularly screen 
the population to find cases of meningitis or other health conditions. This can occur 
during weekly visits to villages for information, education, and communication forums 
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on a priority disease as well as door-to-door monitoring for clinical signs of disease in 
the population. This surveillance method is a strong component of IDSR and 
underscored in many programmes, including the polio eradication initiative.  
 
Follow up case investigation: Most of the health facilities in the study performed 
follow up case investigations. This is the active case search that occurs after a suspected 
case is confirmed by laboratory analysis.  The Responsable or other health staff goes to 
check the health status of the suspected case and also assesses close contacts and other 
possible populations exposed to the infectious person(s) (e.g. schoolmates or church 
congregations). If more cases are found, a vaccination campaign, quarantine, or other 
intervention methods are employed to contain the outbreak and interrupt further 
transmission. This method is standard surveillance practice and also included in the 
national protocol of Chad. 
Response  
For meningococcal meningitis, the WHO guidance on alert and epidemic thresholds for 
enhanced surveillance is shown in Table 6.4. If there are enough cases in a district to 
meet the alert threshold, detailed data are recorded on a line list. CSF samples are sent 
to the national laboratory for confirmation and serotyping. If the epidemic threshold is 
reached, mass vaccination campaigns are normally implemented at the district level 
using the appropriate polysaccharide vaccine, targeting 2 -29 year olds. At this point, 
approximately 5-10 CSF specimens per week are collected and sent to the national 
reference laboratory.  This was done for both enhanced and case-based surveillance 
strategies.  
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Table 6.4 Alert and epidemic thresholds for meningococcal meningitis 
Population size Alert thresholds Epidemic thresholds 
Above 30,000 Attack rate of five 
cases/100,000 persons per 
week 
Attack rate of 15 
cases/100,000 persons per 
week 
Less than 30,000 Two cases in one week or 
an increase in cases 
compared to previous non-
epidemic years in district 
populations  
Five cases in one week or 
the doubling of the number 
of cases over a 3-week 
period 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Africa (49) 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The Chad meningitis surveillance system is situated within IDSR system. The key 
informants provided a scheme of how the system works as well as where it deviates 
from national protocol and standard operating procedures. In general, the CDSS 
operated as both a shared system in some areas and as multiple parallel, disease-
specific systems in other areas. Regular case reporting to the next level was systematic 
and operational across all of the diseases. In other areas, such as active case search, 
response and feedback, processes and resources from established systems, such as 
polio, were not leveraged for meningitis surveillance. While several of the processes 
outlined in the national standard operating procedures were adhered to, there were 
areas that could not be properly facilitated. One important example of this was 
feedback of final case status of analysed CSF. Overall, the absence of written 
dissemination methods as well as automatic feedback mechanisms driven by trained 
and dedicated personnel were hindrances to several surveillance system processes.  
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7 Performance assessment and observations 
 
This chapter presents the performance assessment of CDSS in Chad, with an emphasis 
on meningitis and IDSR activities. Our evaluation examined the resources needed to 
perform surveillance functions and activities. Also presented here are descriptive 
observations of the study sites; these notes intend to supplement performance 
indicators and elucidate study results.  Recommendations for modifications to the 
implementation strategy, planned activities, and resource allocations, are likewise 
presented in this chapter.  
 
There are four main results sections stemming from this study component: Sections 
7.2.1 provides an overview of the study sample and Section 7.2.2 briefly presents the 
contextual factors for the study regions. Section 7.2.3 discusses the performance 
findings and observations at sub-national study sites. Section 7.2.4 appraises the overall 
quality of the meningitis surveillance and IDSR in Chad to inform the “best-fit” (i.e. 
upgraded) strategy decision through a critical review of selected surveillance 
characteristics1. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methodological issues and 
summary of findings. 
 
  
                                                        
1 Chapter 9 describes the upgraded system cost and components, which were derived as a result of the 
performance and quality assessments presented in this chapter. 
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7.1 Methods 
7.1.1 Definitions  
The following definitions were applied for this assessment: 
Performance 
 Performance was defined as the system’s ability to achieve selected standard 
programmatic indicators for meningitis and IDSR.  The categorisation of performance is 
further quantified in the next Assessment of Health facilities and districts subsection. 
 
Standard vs. supporting indicators 
Indicators from authoritative (e.g. WHO, CDC) and other published sources were 
defined as “standard indicators”. Other indicators were developed by the study team 
and were largely derived from best field practices. There are referred to as “supporting 
indicators”. 
 
Contextual factors 
In public health research, ‘context’ has several definitions; the following definitions are 
helpful to guide understanding of this concept as used in this thesis.  
a. The social, organisational, and political setting of a public health intervention 
(193); and 
b. the external factors, institutions, interests, and ideas that influence decision 
making (194).  
Likewise, contextual factors could be defined as the relevant characteristics or features 
of such entities. While traditional programme evaluations consider assumptions or 
context in relation to the programme, I found that existing CDSS evaluation 
frameworks did not systematically capture or analyse contextual factors.  While this 
isn’t the central theme of my research, I decided to expand the thesis to see if it would 
be useful in aiding programme managers with prioritisation or discover additional 
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gaps and impediments. My a priori theory is that there are palpable obstacles to disease 
surveillance systems, especially in a low-income settings, which affect the execution, 
ability, and ultimately the performance of public health practice. Further, contextual 
factors are key to explaining the external validity of our study and the WPA 
framework, as it will describe the extent to which the results can be generalised in other 
settings.  
 
Few frameworks for capturing contextual factors for public health systems exist; 
however, there is considerable guidance in health policy development and evidence-
based policy decision literature (193-198). Inspired by these studies as well as social 
ecological approaches which provide well-founded models for examining such factors 
(199), I decided to focus on the influence of multiple “environments” on surveillance 
systems. I integrated the contextual factor component as a policy analysis component of 
the WPA. In the present study I focus on the context levels of ‘practice’, ‘organisation’, 
and ‘environment/infrastructure’ with the intent to provide more clarity and 
understanding of potentially critical factors that may impact meningitis surveillance 
performance and cost. 
 
7.1.2 Assessment of health facilities and districts  
The performance areas targeted in this assessment were the sub-national level activities 
for detection, confirmation, reporting and analysis activities. A total of 31 indicators 
were identified or developed to assess the performance and to more accurately estimate 
the incremental costs of improving the surveillance system in order to comply with 
operational standards. These were incorporated into the data collection questionnaires. 
The indicators were selected or developed if they were:  1) reliable, 2) obtainable, and 3) 
allowed us to provide improved estimates of cost of a well-functioning system.  
 
Indicators that were derived from authoritative guidance on meningitis surveillance 
include those from the Paediatric Bacterial Meningitis (PBM) surveillance network 
 183 
 
assessment strategy (189) (which was expanded to  include blood cultures for 
pneumonia and now goes by the name, Invasive Bacterial Vaccine Preventable Diseases 
Laboratory Network [IB-VPD]) (200). The IB-VPD network aims to provide 
participating countries with local data to guide new vaccine introduction. A table of 
these indicators are located in the Appendix 3. 
 
Detailed observations 
In order to determine why certain activities were working or not working at the sub-
national level, a work process tree (which was incorporated in the study questionnaire) 
was generated from the Chad PHSS description to guide detailed observations, which 
identified the capacity, behavioural, and organisational factors that hampered or helped 
the execution of each task. Table 7.1  provides the work process trees of the necessary 
meningitis surveillance tasks that should occur according to surveillance activity.  
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Table 7.1 Work process analytic summary of expected surveillance tasks at sub-national 
levels  
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At the health facility these main activities should occur to detect and register a case of 
meningitis: 
1. Sick person arrives at the health facility 
2. Health facility staff clinically diagnose sick person with meningitis 
3. Health facility staff records patient details into the clinical register and onto the 
tally sheet 
4. Health facility staff refers patient to district hospital or performs lumbar 
puncture him/herself  
5. Health facility provides antibiotic treatment to patient  
6. Health facility staff follows up patient and other close contacts  
Reporting at the health facility requires the following activities: 
1. RCS completes and submits a weekly and monthly reporting to CdZ by the 
appropriate means at the designated time 
2. RCS completes a case investigation form for each suspected case of meningitis 
and sends it to district lab with accompanying CSF specimen (CBS districts 
only) 
3. RCS reports number of suspected cases that were referred to district hospitals, if 
applicable 
4. RCS completes an on-going monthly line list of suspected meningitis cases and 
keeps the list at health facility for potential case investigation activities. 
T
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District and national laboratories are primarily responsible for confirmation of the 
causative agent and reports (feedforward and feedback) to the appropriate levels, this 
requires the following activities: 
1. Laboratory staff receive the CSF from the health facility (sometimes via the 
CdZ); 
2. Laboratory staff performs appropriate analysis and provides result; 
3. District laboratory completes appropriate sample collection form; 
4. National laboratory provides results to district laboratory;  
5. District laboratory provides results to CdZ 
6. National laboratory sends results to WHO collaborating centre for further 
analyses and quality control. 
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The regional (CASE) and district surveillance officers (CdZ or Point Focal) are the direct 
Ministry of Health authorities that are both directly responsible for supporting their 
assigned health facilities in their area of responsibility (e.g. zone or region). Surveillance 
at these levels require the following activities: 
1. Provide periodic supervision to health facilities, which includes supplying 
necessary materials; 
2. Obtain weekly and monthly [suspected] case counts; 
3. Retrieve specimen for certain diseases and deliver to district laboratory and in 
some cases, send to national laboratory; 
4. Complete line list and develop trend of suspected cases for outbreak-prone 
notifiable diseases (e.g., meningitis, polio); 
5. Report aggregate case counts to next higher level (i.e. regional or national);  
6. Support health facilities in response and active case search activities; 
7. Receive and report laboratory results and provide to district laboratory and 
health facilities; 
8. Provide periodic surveillance trainings to health facilities and district 
surveillance officers (CASE only).  
 
 
Final list of indicators 
Many researchers have difficulties collecting data in resource poor setting due to issues 
of access and availability – we had this issue as well. We found a lack of availability of 
paper or electronic archived surveillance data at the health facilities and in some cases 
at the office of the CdZ.  Several indicators could not be assessed due to missing data or 
because activities related to the indicator were not practiced in Chad. Moreover, 
available data were mostly collected at the national level. Very limited data were 
available from the study districts and the health facilities. Consequently, only 12 of the 
31 surveillance performance indicators included in the study protocol could be 
collected. The 12 indicators are summarised in Table 7.2. 
 
 While the inability to collect important data was a serious limitation, all of the original 
31 indicators were useful in constructing the recommended operational standard, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 9.  
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Table 7.2 Meningitis surveillance performance indicators collected in the study 
 Indicator Target Surveillance 
functions 
1.   Percent  of staff that know the case definition of meningitis* NA Detection 
2.  Percent  of health facilities with case definition of meningitis 
displayed* 
NA Detection 
3.  Average number of staff at health facilities* NA Detection 
4.  Average length of employment of professional staff at 
health facility*  
NA Detection 
5.  Average length of employment of district surveillance lead* NA Detection 
6.  Percent  of probable bacterial meningitis cases with a known 
outcome recorded  
90% Laboratory 
confirmation 
7.  Percent  of suspected pneumococcal meningitis cases 
identified*  
NA Laboratory 
confirmation 
8.  Percent  of CSF contamination ≤ 5% Laboratory 
confirmation 
9.  Percent  of CSF specimens forwarded to the reference 
laboratory for PCR and genotyping 
20% Laboratory 
confirmation 
10.  Proportion of districts in which a current line graph of 
weekly trend analysis of meningitis is available 
80% Reporting and 
analysis 
11.  Percent  health facilities that report meningitis data on time 
to the district (weekly) 
80% Reporting and 
analysis 
12.  Number of trained staff in surveillance methods*  NA Reporting and 
analysis 
  * Denotes supportive indicators created by research team 
 
 
Moreover, we considered the influence of certain contextual factors, which emerged 
from interviews and observations, on ability to conduct surveillance activities.  
 
Assessment of overall system quality  
The surveillance system was further evaluated by assessing selected surveillance 
attributes to qualitatively compare surveillance systems in the WHO Meningitis 
Surveillance strategy document (80). Since the objective of our study was to provide 
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information to assist Chadian decision makers choose an optimal strategy with 
consideration to their capacities and needs, I decided that looking at quality attributes 
of the  entire system was an  appropriate way to understand supplemental performance 
data and a useful way to depict the current surveillance system. Additionally, these 
categories of interests are commonly promoted by other authoritative sources (31) as 
practical considerations for national surveillance systems. This assessment is based on 
information gathered through the study and by central staff and partners.    
 
In the analysis, the surveillance attributes of interest (informativeness, sustainability, 
resource intensiveness, flexibility, and simplicity) were evaluated by core function 
activities. An ordinal scale to understand the current needs in terms of desired 
complexity of the system (i.e. surveillance strategy objectives) and resources needed to 
support a sustainable system. In the scale, a score of ‘4’ represents the optimal situation 
and a score of ‘1 represents the least optimal situation for the category of interest. The 
categories are described in Table 7.3. The results were then examined in relation to the 
Epidemic meningitis surveillance in the African meningitis belt: Deciding on the most 
appropriate approach guidance document (80) (Table 2.8 [p57] and Table 2.9 [p58]) to 
inform the feasible operational standard used for the upgraded system model. In this 
document resources need for each recommended surveillance approach are plotted on 
spider charts. These visualization supports are intended to help countries decide on the 
most appropriate strategy. Likewise, at the end of section 7.2.3, I also construct a spider 
chart of the Chad meningitis surveillance system based on the system quality 
assessment results to inform a best-fit approach. 
 
Table 7.3 Analytic framework to qualitatively assess existing surveillance functions 
Categories of interest Description Scale 
Informativeness  The amount of information generated by the 
system and what we learn from it. This 
feature does not account for the quality or 
precision of the data.  
(1) Weak (least optimal) 
(2) Moderate  
(3) High 
(4) Very high (optimal) 
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Sustainability  The likelihood that the system can be 
maintained in the long term. 
 
(1) Not at all (least optimal) 
(2) Somewhat 
(3) Moderately 
(4) Very (optimal). 
Resource- 
Intensiveness  
Human, financial, and logistical resources 
needed to setup and run the system 
(1) Very high (least optimal) 
(2) High 
(3) Moderate 
(4) Small (optimal) 
Flexibility  
 
The ease with which the system and facility 
can be adapted to integrate into other 
systems.  
(1) Not flexible (least optimal)  
(2) Slightly flexible 
(3) Flexible 
(4) Very flexible (optimal) 
Simplicity  Overall functioning of the system 1) Very complex (least optimal)  
(2) Relatively complex  
(3) Simple  
(4) Very simple (optimal) 
 
 
7.2 Results  
7.2.1 Description of sample 
In total, 47 structured interviews with 53 interviewees1 were conducted to assess 
surveillance performance. The sample included RCS (n=21), laboratory managers (n =9), 
CdZs and/or district focal points (n=12), CASE (n=4), central level MSP/SSIE staff (n=4) 
and partners (n=3). The study team jointly performed all interviews at the sub-national 
level; while I alone interviewed or had discussions with central level and partner 
organisation participants. All but one of the sub-national participants were Chadian 
natives; the exception was a Spanish RCS. The partner sample included two American 
and one Cameroonian national.  
 
7.2.2 Health facility contexts 
                                                        
1 At two district offices and one laboratory more than one participant was interviewed.  
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Table 7.4 provides a summary of common factors noted to potentially influence the 
performance of the health facilities. Practice factors were most proximal to the health 
facilities daily function. Understanding the population demands, workforce capacity, 
and capability to perform surveillance duties could provide an explanation to strong, 
weak, or missing surveillance functions. The environmental/infrastructure factors 
include characteristics that affect surveillance activities like follow up or community 
engagement. These factors could also explain certain surveillance indicators, such as 
number of detected cases, by providing information about environmental realities that 
could hamper health facility access and utilisation. The organisational factors appeared 
as underlying economic initiatives or programme policies that provided structure and 
facilitated resources to and support at the health facilities. One example of this was the 
Results-based Financing Programme. This World Bank funded pilot programme 
supported select districts in Chad from 2011-2013 and focused on improving mother 
and child outcomes; though, several objectives were focused on improving and 
incentivising clinic management. I observed that the health facilities that participated in 
this programme were ostensibly cleaner and more organised. Figure 7.1 juxtaposes two 
health facilities –one that participated in the pilot and one that did not.  
 
Factors such as ‘office organisation/ storage capacity’, emerged through my 
observations of how certain structures inhibited or facilitated surveillance activities.  In 
the case of office organisation and storage space, I noted that most of the health facilities 
lacked structures such as files and desk, and therefore could not store surveillance 
forms or keep copies of reports.  Table 7.4 also shows the heterogeneity of the health 
facilities within and between regions. While we were not able to include a 
comprehensive collection of contextual factors, the factors displayed here could 
contribute to a further systematic investigation of other contextual factors as well as an 
analytical understanding of association and distribution across health facilities.  
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Figure 7.1 Two health facility exteriors to highlight impact of Results-based Financing 
pilot  
 
Moriku CDS (Guelengdeng district), on the top, did not participate in the Results-based Financing Programme pilot. Kabo 8 (Moissala 
district), the health facility on the bottom, did participate in the Results-based Financing Programme pilot. 
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Table 7.4 Summary of select contextual factors of health facilities across study regions, 2012 
   Region  
   N’djamena   
(n = 3) 
Mayo-Kebi Est 
(n = 6) 
Mandoul  
(n = 9) 
Logone Occidental 
(n = 3) 
P
ra
ct
ic
e
 
Population 
 
< 10,000 
10,000 – 20,000 
> 20,000 
1  
1  
1  
1  
4  
1  
0 
7 
2  
0 
1  
1  
Number of staff 1-2 
3-4 
> 5 
1  
0 
2 
4 
2 
0 
7  
2  
0 
0 
0 
3  
Access to vehicleb  Yes  
No 
0 
3 
3  
3  
3  
6  
0 
3 
Nomad population Yes 
No 
0 
3 
0  
6  
3  
6  
1  
2  
Office organisation/ 
storage capacity 
Poor  
Average  
Good 
 
ND 
1  
1  
1  
2 
2  
3  
0 
1  
2  
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   Region  
   N’djamena   
(n = 3) 
Mayo-Kebi Est 
(n = 6) 
Mandoul  
(n = 9) 
Logone Occidental 
(n = 3) 
ND = 3 ND = 2 
Supervision in the 
past 3 months? 
Yes 
No 
1 
2  
5  
1  
6  
1 
ND = 2 
2  
1  
Community 
supported?a 
Yes  
No 
3  
0 
6  
0 
8  
1  
3  
0 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t/
In
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
Type of facility Urban 
Rural 
1  
2  
2  
4  
2  
7  
2  
1  
Road type Paved 
Gravel 
Dirt 
1  
0 
2  
1  
0 
5  
1  
2  
6  
1  
1  
1  
Availability of public 
transport 
Bad 
Medium 
Good 
3  
0 
0 
5  
1  
0 
7  
2  
0 
0 
2  
1  
Distance to district 
hospital 
≤ 5 km 
6 -15 km 
0 
3  
2  
0 
2  
1  
2  
0 
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   Region  
   N’djamena   
(n = 3) 
Mayo-Kebi Est 
(n = 6) 
Mandoul  
(n = 9) 
Logone Occidental 
(n = 3) 
16 -25 km 
26+ km 
0 
0 
1  
3  
3  
3  
0 
1  
Flooding impacted 
health facility services 
in 2012? 
Yes 
No 
3  
0 
3  
3  
4  
5  
2  
1  
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 
Has a guinea worm 
programmec 
Yes  
No 
0 
3  
3  
3  
6  
3  
0 
3  
Participates in the 
results-based 
financing programmed 
Yes 
No 
0 
3  
3  
3  
3  
6  
0 
3 
Financial support for 
health facility 
Public only 
Religious  
Privatee  
3  
0 
0 
3  
1  
2  
2  
4  
3  
1  
1  
1  
a Community supported refers to financial and volunteer support from community to health facility 
b Refers to access to ambulance or motorbike for surveillance activities  
c The ongoing Carter Centre Guinea worm intensive surveillance programme in select districts in Chad 
d In Chad this programmed is called Financement Base sur les Resultats.  
e Private includes local and international Non-governmental organisations 
ND: No data available or data missing 
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7.2.3 Performance of sub-national and laboratory sites  
Health facilities (n = 21) 
Detection and registration of suspected meningitis cases 
 Percent of health facilities with case definition of meningitis displayed. 
Ten out of 21 (48%) of health facilities had a paper copy of the case definition for 
bacterial meningitis.  This is an important indication of precision in detecting suspected 
meningitis cases.  In eradication/elimination disease programmes, like polio and 
measles, it is recommended that 80% of health facilities have a posted case definition.  
Hence, this indicator was not met. 
 
 Percent of staff that know the case definition of meningitis. 
Participants were asked to retort the clinical signs or a suspected case of meningitis. Out 
of 34 health staff asked, 33 (97%) correctly responded with the case definition of 
bacterial meningitis.  
 
 Average number of staff at health facilities. 
There was an average of three clinical staff in each health facility (range 1-8).  This 
represents staff that were specifically involved in diagnosis of meningitis.  The 
distribution of this indicator is presented in Figure 7.2 below. 
 
 Average length of employment of professional staff at health facility.  
Across the 21 health facilities, the average employment of clinical staff relevant for 
meningitis diagnosis was 2.6 years.  The average employment per facility ranged from 8 
months to 5 years.  
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Figure 7.2 Distribution of clinical staff* across study health facilities (n = 21) 
 
* Clinical staff defined as persons who had completed diploma programme or specific professional training for the position. 
 
 
Observations on case detection and reporting at the health facility 
 
The actual proportion of the Chadian population that will go to the health facility when 
they become ill is not well known, nor was it captured in this study. However, most 
RCS reported conducting multiple outreach clinics per month for immunization 
activities, though 43% said they did not have adequate resources (e.g., transport, 
materials) to support these activities (n =9). Additionally, every health facility reported 
conducting information education and communication (IEC) regularly.  I observed 
several of these short educational sessions that centred on diseases with high-incidence 
in the particular season. IEC was conducted usually in the early morning shortly after 
the health facility opened and mostly to an audience of women and children. Finally, 
100% of participants reported a community organisation or volunteer network 
associated with the health facility, the average number of volunteers was 30 (range, 2 – 
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132; SD = 28).  Chad has a history of local supported and managed health facilities and 
the collaboration often consisted of regular meetings were health staff could include 
committee members and volunteers in health activities, such as active case searches.  
Most of the health facilities did not have any reliable documentation to support that 
these activities had happened for meningitis specifically, but it was noted that districts 
which had a strong Guinea worm programme had a stronger and more structured 
collaboration between community and health facility. These efforts are useful in 
extending the reach of the clinic and increasing the probability to detect cases.  
 
Some reported perceived barriers for the community to access the health facility, 
included far average distances from villages to health facilities, flooding in the rainy 
season (71%, n = 15), and poor public transport (66%, n =14). Most sick persons walk to 
the health facility or are carried (bicycle, push cart) by relatives in order to get there (See 
Table 7.5) It is hard to imagine that people would go to such efforts for milder 
symptoms, and so several cases may never reach the health facility.  Public 
transportation, namely a clandoman (motorcyclist) was accessible for 33% health 
facilities at an average cost of CSF 2733 (US$ 5.50) for a return trip (n = 7).  
 
Table 7.5 Means of transporting meningitis patients when referred to the district 
hospital 
Type of transport Number of health 
facility staff reporting 
this method* (n=21) 
Motorbike 18 
Chariot (Wagon pulled by an animal) 14 
By Foot 10 
Bicycle 7 
Pusse-Pusse (Cart pulled by a person) 3 
By Vehicle  3 
Family or neighbours 2 
*Most interviewees named multiple means 
 
 
In general, the observations and interviews at the health facilities revealed that staff 
were very aware of the health events that affect their communities. They also had a 
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good understanding of the national notifiable diseases and associated specimen for 
collection. Most health facilities had staff that were very knowledgeable about the case 
definition of meningitis and confident in the recent vaccination campaigns—though, 
this led to the belief that all meningitis was gone. Most were not aware that although 
NmA had been significantly reduced, other pathogens and serogroups exists. This may 
have affected their diagnosing pattern and indeed, some RCS disclosed that they were 
now less mindful of presumptive meningitis cases once someone presented with febrile 
illness during meningitis season. This finding was mainly observed at districts 
employing partial case based surveillance (i.e. Gounou-Gaya, Guelengdeng and 
N’Djamena Nord).  Additionally, the lack of a displayed case definition was troubling, 
as this is a fail-safe visible reminder to the health staff of considering meningitis as a 
possible cause in persons presenting with a febrile illness and other meningeal signs.  
 
There was a universal lack of understanding regarding what persons could or should 
conduct the lumbar puncture; there was also no meningitis SOPs observed in most 
health facilities. Several RCS in the ES and PCBS districts reported that there was a 
national policy that only doctors could perform lumbar punctures, meaning they refer 
patients to district hospitals where doctors are present. Yet, in many of these health 
facilities there was no system to ensure patients with suspected meningitis could get to 
a doctor (who were generally only available at the district hospital). The average 
distance to the district hospital was 18 km (one-way) (range, 1 to 45; SD = 15.26), and 
public transportation was limited. The reported average for this distance was 62 
minutes (range, 10 to 120; SD = 33.20). This time was thought to be doubled during 
raining season. It can be assumed that sick persons could decide to go home instead of 
exerting themselves to get to the district hospital for proper diagnosis. In Moissala, the 
only district doing exclusive CBS, patients were referred directly to the district and it 
was ensured that patients arrived to hospital for the lumbar puncture procedure and 
treatment. All transport costs for patient and specimen transport in Moissala were paid 
by MSF. However, in nearly all the other districts, health facility staff reported starting 
antibiotic treatment before performing a lumbar puncture or referring the patient to the 
district hospital. While this is against protocol it could improve the likelihood of 
recovery and transmission if patients do not pursue further tests and treatment. 
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There was a problem of lack of quality clinical registers across health facilities. This was 
very concerning because the register is the primary data source for epidemiological 
information.  The MSP sparingly provided registers throughout the year (this was 
validated by CdZ). The official government monthly registers were substandard—they 
were thin paper-covered ruled notebooks containing approximately 100 pages. 
However, there were no gridlines or pre-filled fields, so the RCS write by hand gridlines 
and included variables, such as name, date of birth, sex, village, etc., resulting in 
inconsistency on data fields used across the health facilities—even within the same 
district. Also, since registers were not provided as needed (i.e. one notebook/register per 
month), health facilities purchased their own or use other designated programme 
folders. An example of the government register and a makeshift notebook register can 
be found in Figure 7.3. 
 
There was also great variation in how the register and EPI tally sheets were used. Most 
of the RCS filled in the register during the patient consultation or directly after. It 
seemed that many of the RCS or attending staff did not utilize the tally sheet 
simultaneously while receiving and registering patients and so many times this was 
done just at the point of weekly reporting (which defeats the purpose as a quality-check 
mechanism). This could be due to trying to avoid having too many data tools on oft-
cluttered desks (Figure 7.4). A more inclusive register could be offered that includes a 
tally sheet—this would better facilitate more accurate count of suspected cases. 
 
Furthermore lack of archival ability, due to flimsy or missing registers and a lack of 
satisfactory storage units (e.g. desk, cabinets to protect filled data tools from the harsh 
Chadian environment and exposure), was noted in 10 out of 21 (46%) of health facilities. 
This resulted in the disposal of worn and often illegible registers. Generally, the earliest 
register available in the health facility was the one from the previous year (2012); 
though in some health facilities with high patient volume only the current year was 
available.  
 
Finally, the ability to detect close contacts seemed very unlikely due to the burden of 
work that most RCS had to do.  Large programmes that were more of a national 
priority, like polio, malnutrition, and guinea worm, and the Expanded Programme on 
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Immunisation required specific weekly activities, which were often meant to be 
exclusive—so a low level of integration was practiced and “add-on” activities for 
meningitis and other diseases were not observed. For instance, though our visits 
occurred during malaria season, I did not observe any shared activities for malaria and 
guinea worm; however, in some health facilities there were joint activities for malaria 
and malnutrition.  
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Figure 7.3 An official government register (l) and personal notebook register (r) 
 
Figure 7.4 The Research Assistant interviewing a Responsable at his cluttered desk 
 
Bessada centre de sante, Koumra 
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Reporting of meningitis surveillance data 
 Percent of health facilities that report meningitis data on time (weekly) to the 
district  
This indicator measures the key surveillance performance indicator of timeliness. CdZ’s 
reported that 89% of total health facilities in their districts reported weekly surveillance 
data on time (n = 116). This indicator meets the 80% standard of health facilities that 
must submit reports on time to the district. 
 
 Number of trained staff in surveillance methods 
This supporting indicator was created based on literature that supports positive 
correlation between districts where surveillance-related staff receive training and more 
accurate and timely reporting of suspected cases (41). At each health facility, we asked if 
any of the current staff had ever received IDSR training. If yes, they were asked when 
the last time training was received.  
 
Forty-seven percent of RCS reported that at least one health facility staff had ever 
received some type of IDSR training (n = 10). This training was either formal or on-the-
job. Out of those ten, nine received training in 2012. Most of these trainings were 
provided at the district level and organized by the CdZ and the CASE. Staff in Moissala 
received training from the district as well as a training from MSF-France on case based 
surveillance. 
  
Figure 7.5 shows the proportion of study health facilities in each district where staff 
received training in 2012. 
 202 
Figure 7.5 Number health facilities that had staff who received surveillance training in 
2012 
 
 
Observations on health facility reporting  
 
Generally, health facilities in the same district were consistent with what day and by 
what medium they reported surveillance information. The CdZ designated which day 
that data were to be sent from the health facilities and he would usually call or visit a 
health facility if data were not reported in a timely manner. One participant reported 
faulty telephone network as a barrier to reporting on time, and two CdZs (29%) 
reported that they regularly travelled to health facilities to collect weekly data. Routine 
IDSR data forms were not available at every health facility. It appeared that many RCS 
simply retroactively tallied counts each week by reviewing diagnoses recorded in the 
register and then transmitted these counts to the CdZ by short message service (SMS).  
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This method is prone to error as handwriting was not always legible—in several 
instances the writer was not able to understand what they had written (Figure 7.6).   
 
Figure 7.6 A handwritten register that is difficult to decipher 
 
 
 
Standard MSP authorised routine reporting forms for weekly and monthly aggregate 
data and line list forms were found at most health facilities. In several instances, the 
original hand-written forms were not available at the health facility.  This was partially 
attributed to the lack of archival structures. Additionally, the CdZ generally distributed 
a limited amount of reporting forms to the health facility (due to limited photocopy 
access and/or funds)—so it was not practical to handwrite two copies of each report 
(i.e., one to keep for health facility records and one to hand off to the CdZ). This finding 
casted doubt on high rates of timely reporting across districts, it also revealed potential 
issues in the reporting chain. Given the missing forms, it was not possible to track cases 
across health levels in order to test the functionality of reporting.   
 
Three different formats for immediate case-based notification and sample collection 
forms were found at health facilities:   
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Form 1: An older version of the official MSP form, which includes two distinct 
pages; one for the case notification and one for CSF sample collection (Figure 7.7). 
This form was intended for integrated disease reporting and was issued by the SSEI. 
It included check boxes for nine other diseases. 
Form 2: The latest official MSP form included in the annex of the WHO-AFRO SOPs 
for case-based meningitis. This form included check boxes for cholera, bloody 
diarrhoea or meningitis (Figure 7.8).  
Form 3: MenAfriCar case notification form and sample collect form; these forms 
were utilized in the three districts that our studies shared as well as the MSF 
supported districts (Figure 7.9).  
 
The lack of standardized reporting formats resulted in inconsistent reporting both 
within and across districts. It also added to the confusion and work burden of health 
staff; in the Moissala district laboratory, which is supported by MSF as well as part of 
the government entities, technicians reported filling out both form 1 and form 3 and 
sending the respective forms to the national laboratory and MSF. Disparate forms were 
also observed at some district surveillance offices, indicating inconsistencies in the type 
of reported information. 
 
Health facility staff also noted that there were several other forms that needed to be 
filled out from other national programmes, namely expanded programme on 
immunisation (EPI), nutrition, and Family well-being (i.e. family planning) 
programmes. These programmes required different data collection and used different 
reporting forms that needed to be submitted at differing time points. Line lists 
containing descriptive information for individual suspected meningitis cases were not 
available at any of the health facilities. 
 
When asked, several of the RCS in the CBS districts did not understand the difference 
between the case notification form and the case investigation form.  This was 
particularly observed in Goundi, which is not a CBS district but uses forms from MSF 
and MSP. The research assistant provided real-time instructions to the RCS who stated 
they did not understand the forms. The lack of understanding of how to use 
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surveillance tools may be attributed to the fact less than half of the health facilities 
reported that their staff attended any type of IDSR training in the past 2 years (as was 
mentioned above). Accordingly, 43% of RCS requested that training and knowledge 
transfer of disease surveillance procedures be prioritised to improve reporting of 
meningitis and other priority diseases (n =9). 
 
Figure 7.7 Form 1 – Government integrated disease case notification and sample 
collection form 
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Figure 7.8 Form 2 – Government joint case notification and sample collection form for 
cholera, shigella, and meningitis 
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Figure 7.9 Form 3 – MenAfriCar case notification and specimen collection forms 
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District and national laboratories (n = 8) 
 Percent of CSF contamination at national laboratory. 
This indicator is affected by several factors including proper handling, packaging, 
storage, and transport of the CSF.  These tasks are generally completed at the district 
laboratories.   To meet this indicator less than or equal to 5% of samples should arrive to 
the laboratory in a contaminated state. Out of the 345 specimens received by the 
national laboratory in 2012, 88 (26%) of the samples were too contaminated to produce 
reliable results or determine any result at all (see Table 7.6). Thus, the target of 5% was 
not achieved. 
 
 Percent of probable bacterial meningitis cases with a known outcome recorded 
In 2012, 345 CSF samples were sent from the district to the national laboratory for 
confirmation out of the total 3,795 suspected cases reported. Out of this total, 238 
samples (169 sterile and 69 positive) had a known outcome (i.e. were in a state for the 
national laboratory to determine a conclusive result).  Hence, approximately 6% of 
probable meningitis cases had a known outcome reported.  To achieve this target 90% 
of suspected cases should have a known outcome, representing a considerable 
deficiency in the abilities to meet this indicator. 
 
 Percent of CSF specimens forwarded by the national reference laboratory for 
PCR and genotyping 
Five out of 88 eligible specimens (i.e. total CSF analysed minus contaminated and sterile 
samples), or 5.68%, were analysed using PCR methods at the national reference 
laboratory. This is a relatively low number because the laboratory currently uses gel-
based PCR, which is very time-consuming. For this reason, the national reference 
laboratory sent 59 out of 69 eligible specimens (i.e. suspected cases) to the WHO 
collaborating laboratory centre in Oslo, Norway for genotyping and confirmation. 
Hence, in total 86% of CSF samples were confirmed by PCR. This indicator thus meets 
the required 20% of specimens that should be forwarded to a reference laboratory for 
PCR and genotyping. 
 
 Percent of suspected pneumococcal meningitis cases identified 
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This indicator assesses continuing detection of all probable meningitis pathogens under 
surveillance.  As Chad has not yet introduced pneumococcal vaccine, the number of cases 
confirmed with this bacterium should not change over time, but the proportion of all 
confirmed cases that are pneumococcal should increase due to Hib and MenAfriVac® 
introductions (Hib vaccine was introduced into Chad in 2008 (201).)  The percentage of 
confirmed pneumococcal meningitis out of total positive cases was 9.52%, 4.17% and 
8.70% in 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. In 2013, this increased to 20% showing an 
expected higher detection of pneumococcal cases due to the decrease in NmA. 
 
Table 7.6 2010-2013 laboratory meningitis CSF analysis results, Chad 
 2010 2011 2012 2013** 
Suspected cases 3,058 5,960 3,795 242 
Total CSF received and analysed at 
national laboratory 
272 405 345 105 
Number (%) of probable bacterial 
meningitis cases with a known 
outcome recorded*† 
72  
(2%) 
227  
(4%) 
238 
(6%) 
87 
(4%) 
Contaminated upon receipt 5 0 88 30 
Sterile 51 107 169 67 
Positive cases 21 120 69 20 
NmA 19 114 63 3 
NmW ND 1 4 2 
Pneumo 2 5 6 12 
Hib 2 1 0 5 
NmX ND 2 3 0 
% of positive cases of total CSF 8% 30% 20% 19% 
CSF: Cerebral spinal fluid 
* A probable case is defined as suspected case with a lumbar puncture that produced CSF examined and considered for further diagnostic 
analyses for meningitis 
† Sterile samples + positive cases = probable cases with known outcome 
** The large drop in suspected cases is observed after the 2011/2012 introduction of MenAfrivac®  
Source: National reference laboratory, Chad 
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Observations at district and national laboratory 
 
Laboratory operations for confirmation of meningitis  
SOPs for meningitis diagnostic tests were observed in six of seven district labs and at 
the national laboratory. The source of the SOPs were either MSP, MSF or the 
MenAfriCar protocols.  Laboratories at the district were generally minimally equipped, 
but were purportedly capable of performing the required meningitis analysis. The 
capacity and work load of laboratories in regards to bacteriology and meningitis 
analyses varied significantly and did not depend on population.  There were several 
possible reasons for this that were observed:  
 The three district laboratories (Gounou-Gaya, Guelengdeng, and N’djamena Nord) 
that reported zero or very low numbers of analysis were the districts where 
residents received the conjugate vaccine during the December 2011 vaccination 
campaign. This is compared to Goundi, Koumra, Moissala and Moundou districts 
who received the vaccine later.  
 Moundou laboratory was on strike for three months in 2012, which may account for 
their overall “low” bacteriological analyses. 
 Moundou regional laboratory did not receive any CSF1 in 2012. 
 Goundi laboratory, privately supported by a foreign catholic organisation, had 
superior health services and received an influx of people seeking treatment. 
 There were reported meningitis outbreaks in Koumra, Goundi, and Moissala from 4 
March to 5 May 2012. 
 
Table 7.7 provides an overview of district laboratories analyses with factors that may 
influence quantity of CSF samples received. 
 
                                                        
1 In 2012, the district laboratory in Moundou sent CSF samples directly to the National level instead of 
to the Regional laboratory. It was unclear why this happened. 
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Table 7.7 Summary of CSF analysed in 2012 district health laboratories 
District MenAfriVac 
campaign(s) 
Number of 
CSF samples 
received/ 
analysed 
Number of 
CSF samples 
confirmed 
Total number 
of samples 
analysed in 
bacteriology 
lab 
Total district 
population 
reported 
Specific barriers 
reported 
Gonou-Gaya December 
2011 
0 0 382 293,583 Stock out of 
reagents and 
tests.  
Laboratory staff 
has RCS duties 
for performing 
LP and 
transporting 
CSF 
Guelengdeng December 
2011 
0 0 329 214,254 Does not receive 
feedback from 
national lab 
N’Djamena 
Nord 
December 
2011 
5/5 – all by  
cell counts 
and 
Pastorex ;  
2 serogroup 
W, 3 
negative 
24,014 166,100 Guidance on 
quality control; 
expired 
reagents; Health 
facilities treat 
before LP 
Koumra Feb-April 
2012 
38/38 – all 
by Pastorex 
13 Nm A 944 189,029 Electricity only 
from 8am – 2pm 
Goundi March 2012 170/170 – all 
by cell 
counts 
63 33,536 158,379 Stock out of 
reagents and 
tests   
Moissala April 2012 253/253 – 
Pastorex  
only 
77 253 260,145 None reported 
Mondou October 
2012 
0 0 753 393,876 Lack of 
reagents, tests, 
and 
coordination 
with health 
facilities, 3 
month strike 
RCS: Responsable du centre de sante 
LP: Lumbar puncture 
CSF: Cerebral spinal fluid 
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Quality assurance and control 
There seemed to be no uniform method for internal or external quality control. One 
district laboratory reported calibrating instruments once a week, but were unsure of 
further measures for internal quality control. Another laboratory reported using the 
control media included in the Pastorex kit to do quality control.  All district laboratories 
reported that external quality control measures were in place and referred to sending 
samples with a positive confirmation to the national laboratory, for additional analysis 
and final confirmation. As explained, the national laboratory sends more than required 
amount of samples to the external WHO reference laboratory for external confirmation, 
which is also a quality control measure; the chief laboratory technician in Chad was 
quite motivated in ensuring that the national diagnostic capability was reliable. 
 
Ability of laboratory staff to perform meningitis diagnostic activities   
For 2012, an absence of required laboratory analyses kits and reagents (i.e. “stock-out”) 
was observed at six district laboratories and the regional laboratory. Also, all district 
laboratories reported running out of essential materials or reagents for meningitis 
analyses within the past one- and three-months (See Figure 7.10).  Pastorex, which is 
very valuable for rapid diagnosis, confirmation and response activities at the peripheral 
level, was overwhelmingly lacking. This test is only supplied to the district laboratories 
from WHO via distribution from the national laboratory staff (generally, when they are 
able to conduct supervision visits). The average time reported for Pastorex stock out 
was 8.4 months (range 1 to 24 months). Moundou, the regional reference laboratory, 
reported that their supplies of Pastorex, T-I media1, and Gram stain kit had expired 
more than two years before the time of the interview. This was alarming because it 
seemed that Moundou laboratory was capable to do these tests and provide reliable 
confirmations to this region, yet was excluded from the laboratory diagnostic pathway 
of meningitis. In addition to stock-out, expired bottles of T-I were observed at several 
district laboratories. 
 
                                                        
1 Trans-Isolate (TI) medium, was developed for the transport of primary cultures of cerebrospinal 
fluids from patients with bacterial meningitis  
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Most district laboratories were using microscopes that were over a decade old.  There 
was an average of five staff at each laboratory, yet most only had one functioning 
microscope. In general, staff reported that they were confident in their ability to 
properly handle, package, and send CSF to the next laboratory level for analyses. This 
was consistently reported, though staff also reported that they lacked the necessary 
materials, such as the bio-hazard transport box supplied by the WHO, to send the 
samples. Moreover, disparate means of sending samples were observed. Moissala 
district, funded by MSF, used the World Food Programme in-country airplane to send 
all their samples to N’Djamena. They also used, as was the case with the national 
reference laboratory, an international courier service to send samples to the Oslo 
reference laboratory.   The other districts reported several sample-transport means, 
including sending the sample on the “market-bus”, giving the sample to the CdZ or 
CASE who personally transported it to N’Djamena, and  disposing the sample with a 
WHO staff member who had a vehicle. Overall, all the laboratories reported having 
some capacity to store samples in the short-term by using the T-I medium, or in 
refrigerators or freezers. 
 
Every district laboratory except Moissala reported a stock within the past year of a 
reagent essential for meningitis analysis. The most common missing reagent was 
Pastorex, with five of the district laboratories reporting stock out within the last three 
months. At the national level, the reagents necessary for PCR were not available for 
most of the year, which is why only five samples were analysed using the PCR method. 
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Figure 7.10 Districts reporting recent stock-out of required laboratory reagents and 
materials for meningitis diagnostic tests (n = 5) 
 
 
Human capacity and ability to report meningitis results 
Overall, all laboratories were well organised and kept good documentation (i.e. 
laboratory registers) of analyses completed.  There were no issues getting data for total 
amount of bacteriological tests performed and specific information about meningitis 
analyses and outcomes. None of the laboratories used computers to input data, except 
at the national laboratory where the chief technician used her personal computer to 
store laboratory data on Excel. All other laboratories used handwritten registers. The 
laboratories were typically contained within a district, regional, or national hospital 
campus, so they were generally well supported with electricity and refrigerator units.  
The exception was Koumra district, which reported electricity rations at the hospital. 
 
District and regional laboratory staff reported feeling overburdened particularly during 
the peak meningitis season.  Several district laboratories reported that during this time 
staff were committed to 24-hour availability rotas.  At the national level, shortage of 
staff was a persistent year-round issue. The responsibility of laboratory staff in regards 
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to meningitis seemed to vary greatly at the district level.  One laboratory technician 
reported performing lumbar punctures at health facilities. Several others reported 
having to go to health facilities to pick up CSF using the district hospital vehicles (e.g., 
ambulances) or personal motorbikes.   
 
There was inconsistency regarding how case-information for samples were reported. 
Several district laboratory staff stated that sample collection forms were filled out and 
given to the CdZ with the CSF sample for transport to the national level. Alternatively, 
other staff sent the CSF directly to the national laboratory with the sample collection 
form or with some other paper containing some details about the suspected case. In 
several cases, the laboratory staff provided case data to the CdZ monthly. This 
prompted several CdZs to merely report confirmed cases from district laboratories 
instead of suspected cases reported by the health facilities. 
 
Four district laboratories reported receiving training during 2012. Three different 
sponsors were reported to support the trainings, indicating no coordination between 
the organisations. Reported sponsors included WHO in collaboration with the MSP, 
CSSI for MenAfriCar, and the European Union. It is possible that the participant who 
reported being trained by an EU staff was mistaken in their understanding, because this 
was a MenAfriCar supported district. Three other districts reported receiving training 
within five years before 2012 from MSF or WHO.    
 
Several district laboratories reported not receiving feedback from the national 
laboratory on samples that were sent for confirmation. At the national level, there was 
inconsistency in who the feedback was reported to.  Sometimes the chief laboratorian 
called the chief of a district laboratory and other times results were reported from the 
national data manager to the CASE and CdZ who may or may not inform the laboratory 
focal point.  Feedback from the district laboratory to the health facility was rarely 
completed and there seemed to be confusion around which surveillance officer was 
responsible for this task. 
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District and regional offices (n = 11) 
CdZ and CASE 
 Number of trained staff in surveillance methods 
One out of the four CASE’s reported ever receiving formal training in IDSR. Four out of seven 
(57%) CdZ’s reported receiving formal training in IDSR, all were held in 2012. The trainings 
attended by CdZ’s were focused on surveillance methods at the district level, and an average of 
2.75 persons attended the training session.  Participants in addition to the CdZs included district 
laboratory responsible, district chief medical officer and district health nurses. Out of the three 
CdZ’s that did not receive training, one had not received training yet because he was hired after 
the training was complete. The WHO, UNICEF, and MSF France provided funding and some 
technical support for trainings for both health facility staff and CdZs. 
 
 Proportion of districts in which a current line graph of weekly trend analysis of 
meningitis is available 
Existence of an up-to-date disease trend line is an indication that surveillance staff continuously 
analyse the data they receive. Monitored changes in trends can provide a trigger for early 
outbreak response and control measures.  For this indicator, we first looked for the line graph 
displayed in the office of the CdZ or CASE and if it was not displayed we asked if there was a 
graph available.  100% of CdZs and 100% of CASEs made available a current line graph of 
weekly trend analysis.  This indicator thus meets the at least 80% standard. 
 
 Average length of employment of district surveillance lead 
CdZ’s had an average length of employment in that role of 63.2 months (5 years). Of the 
seven CdZ’s, three had been employed in their post for less than two years. The average 
length of employment ranged from 8 months to 12 years. 
 
Observations: District and regional surveillance offices 
 
Personnel at the district and regional level were generally highly trained nurses and 
other health staff with significant experience in managing disease surveillance and 
other disease programmes . In all the offices of the CASE and CdZ, population estimates 
and immunization parameters were available. Several staff reported lack of confidence 
in the population data and reported that other NGO’s had conducted local censuses 
reporting vastly different numbers. Chad has never conducted a demographic health 
survey (DHS), and so antiquated and politically biased census data are used. This 
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undermines the ability to calculate disease thresholds. It appeared that CdZ’s did not 
know or were not able to assess thresholds; it is likely that the line graphs were used to 
detect outbreaks. At the CASE level, aggregate data were collected and reviewed before 
reporting to the national level, though again no sophisticated analysis was performed in 
accordance to meningitis standard operating procedures. 
 
All of the CdZ’s reported wearing “multiple hats” and acted as the focal point for 
several national health programmes, namely malaria and EPI. While some larger 
districts like Moundou and Moissala had several focal points to assist the CdZ with his 
duties, other districts such as Goundi and Koumra reported feeling overburdened due 
to lack of assisting personnel. At this level, CdZ’s and CASE’s are responsible for 
providing surveillance forms to the health facilities. This was primarily a CdZ duty. 
Several CdZ’s lamented about the out of pocket costs to make these copies, which 
includes the petrol costs to go into town and then the price of the phot copies. Only the 
Goundi CdZ had a photocopy machine in (or near) his office. Other personal expenses 
used for surveillance duties included internet modems and personal laptop computers, 
which the government did not provide to any CdZ’s or CASE’s.  
 
The district and regional surveillance offices require a lot of travel due to constant 
supervision visits to health facilities as well as their role in supporting immunization 
activities, which includes mobile supplemental immunization activity campaigns. 
Though essential to their role, only 43% of CdZs had any type of vehicle accessible to 
them.  This was better amongst the CASE’s, with 75% reporting access to a vehicle.  
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7.2.4 Overall system assessment findings 
Table 7.3, which was presented in the methods section of this chapters, provided the 
definitions and scale measures used in the following section. Though each category of 
interest is captured slightly differently, all of the attributes are qualitatively assessed 
and paired with a rating. ‘1’ is the least optimal score and ‘4’ is the optimal score.  
Informativeness of system rating: Moderate (2) 
The surveillance data from the reporting system in Chad produces sufficient 
information to make public health decisions around disease characteristics. This is 
shown by a high reporting rate among the districts in the study.  The clinical data 
submitted by district/reference laboratories is however not sufficient and may not 
reflect an accurate representation of bacterial strains in Chad for bacterial meningitis.  
For these reasons, the informativeness of the system is rated as ‘moderate’. 
 
Sustainability of the current system: Not at all sustainable (1) 
All the health centre Responsable held dual job responsibilities as both primary clinician 
at the health facility and the IDSR focal point. This meant that in addition to daily 
consultation and treatment of patients and clinical management duties, the Responsable 
also did the monitoring and reporting for IDSR and other disease programmes. This 
phenomena of “wearing multiple hats” was also noted at the district level amongst the 
CdZs who were also programmatic district leads for vaccine and malaria programmes, 
which require additional responsibilities that cannot be subsumed under the disease 
surveillance focal point role. Participants reported that there is insufficient human and 
financial support to sustain the current system. Most participants cited a lack of training 
and motivation as barriers to an effective and reliable system. This issue of having a 
very limited skilled workforce was echoed on every administrative level.  In light of 
these very serious obstacles, the sustainability of the system is rated as ‘Not at all 
sustainable’. 
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Resource-intensiveness of the system: High (2) 
For optimal performance of an integrated surveillance system, human resources needs 
to be addressed in a way that provides a pool of skilled public health workers that can 
appropriately perform surveillance functions. We found that on average there was 3 
formally trained health staff per health facility.  On average, these health facilities had 
catchment areas of 18,833 populations, which translate to 0.167 health staff per 1000 
population. The WHO defines a country to be in “critical shortage” of health workers 
when it meets both of two separate conditions. These are: 1) the sum of employed 
doctors, nurses, and midwives is equal to or less than 2.28 per 1,000 population, and 2) 
fewer than 80% of births are attended by skilled health personnel (94). Based on this 
classification Chad is 13 times below the critical shortage threshold for health workers.  
 
A functional system must satisfy financial and logistical resources to a level where 
required surveillance functions can be performed.  The activities that correlate with 
investigation and response require that the RCS, CDZ, and CASE travel throughout 
their designated areas, yet access to vehicles (including motorbikes) was generally low 
(Figure 7.11). 
 
The laboratory is another system that requires continued replenishment of materials, 
reagents, and upkeep of equipment for accurate confirmation.  As described in the 
performance assessment, several of the study district laboratories experienced stock-out 
of essential tests to perform meningitis analysis. Due to the aforementioned factors, the 
rating for resource intensiveness of the current system is determined to be ‘high’.  
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Figure 7.11 Percent of study surveillance staff with access to vehicles 
 
RCS = Responsable du Centre de Sante; CDZ = Chef de Zone; CASE = Chef d’Antenne de Surveillance Épidémiologie; SSEI = Service de 
Surveillance Epidémiologique Intégrée 
 
Flexibility of the system and facility to be adapted to integrate into other systems: 
Flexible (3) 
Although Chad is organized around an integrated surveillance system, this approach 
has not been applied systematically.  At the central level, the weekly CTNLE meetings 
are well organized and allow cross sharing of disease information as well as an 
opportunity for collaboration between disease programmes and partners. On the sub-
national levels disease programmes do not demonstrate the same coordination and 
collaboration efforts. At these levels, surveillance and monitoring of certain disease 
programmes are performed separately from the surveillance and monitoring of other 
diseases.  This is antagonistic to the IDSR process and is usually an added obligation for 
the Responsible or CdZ who may be partially funded by a partner organization for only 
certain diseases. At the health facility level this is particularly evident in terms of 
completing disease surveillance forms. The integrated surveillance form is well 
understood and completed by the health facilities, but the case-based forms are often 
overlooked for some diseases.  When IDSR is not comprehensively implemented, 
different surveillance methods across disease programmes can result in unreliable data 
and redundant work tasks.   
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The weekly meetings at the central level provide a platform for cross-collaboration and 
sharing of ideas.  The public health surveillance leadership in Chad can use this 
committee to streamline surveillance components, including condensing and improving 
existing data forms, eliminating redundant processes of collecting the same data on 
multiple forms, scheduling IDSR trainings, and sharing resources (e.g. financial, human, 
equipment). In summary, the current Chadian IDSR system, which includes meningitis 
surveillance, has several important components in place and shows an opportunity for 
improvement at sub-national levels; and so I rate this as a flexible system.  
 
Simplicity and overall functioning of the system: Relatively complex (2) 
Theoretically, the meningitis surveillance system in Chad is straightforward. The data 
and specimen networks are clearly defined, and the surveillance positions at each 
administrative level have outlined roles and responsibilities. However, in practice, 
several aspects of the system are confusing and unachievable. The lack of a clear and 
feasible policy on which qualified personnel should perform lumbar punctures has 
possibly led to many missed cases, and poses a serious risk to the patient if the 
procedure is performed incorrectly or in subpar conditions.  The lack of training in 
integrated surveillance methods has also resulted in inaccurate and missing data. We 
found that several health facilities were using a surveillance method contrary to the 
district strategy.  Finally, the inconsistent financial support to laboratories and 
surveillance officials hinder a continuous, functional and reliable system.  These issues 
contribute to a relatively complex system.  
 
The performance assessment results are summarised in Table 7.8. 
 
Table 7.8 Summary of performance assessment results 
Informative 
-ness 
Sustainability Resource-
intensiveness 
Flexibility Simplicity 
Moderately 
informative 
 
2 
Some-what 
sustainable  
 
1 
High resource 
need 
 
2 
Flexible  
 
 
3 
Relatively 
complex  
 
2 
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Comparison of Chad meningitis and WHO surveillance strategies  
This assessment demonstrated some of the reasons why meningitis surveillance in Chad 
was operating in a complex and less than efficient system. The study aimed to provide 
decision makers and stakeholders with practical details and information to inform the 
transition to a more feasible and sustainable surveillance strategy to monitor the 
efficacy of MenAfriVac®.  In alignment with the WHO guidance, the assessments, such 
as this one, should facilitate a structured, transparent and evidenced-based selection 
process (202). 
 
The qualitative assessment and rating of the Chad meningitis surveillance 
aforementioned system attributes produced the spider chart in Figure 7.12. This chart 
was compared to the WHO charts, which graphically display the key features of the 
different surveillance strategies (Figure 7.13).  In combination with a high knowledge of 
the Chad context, the charts provides visual support to guide selecting a new strategy. 
As shown in Figure 7.12, the current system could protracted to a sentinel case-based 
surveillance strategy without having to considerably alter the current system. Two areas 
would need to be enhanced to achieve this transition. The first is informativeness, which 
can be improved by systematic case-based data collection as well as ensuring 
laboratories have the capacity to analyse and diagnose CSF. The second area is 
sustainability; this could be optimised by strategic selection of sentinel district and 
laboratories, and also by training and actual integration of surveillance duties across all 
disease programmes.  These findings were used to inform a three-district sentinel 
surveillance plan that Dr. Griffiths and I developed and recommended to the WHO 
Chad country office (Further described in Chapter 9). 
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Figure 7.12 Characteristics of meningitis surveillance in Chad according to WHO 
categories 
 
Figure 7.13 Chad meningitis system in relation to WHO meningitis surveillance 
strategies  
 
Adapted from Epidemic meningitis surveillance in the African meningitis belt: Deciding on the most appropriate approach, WHO (202)  
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7.3 Methodological issues and data limitations   
At health facilities, information on the number of lumbar punctures performed and the 
number of suspected cases referred to district hospital were rarely collected, and if they 
were collected it was not done in a consistent manner. This is reflected in a 0% match 
rate between CdZ data and health facility data for suspected cases (This is shown in 
Table 7.9). The discrepancy of data is also reflected in the numbers of suspected cases 
reported by the CdZs versus the number of CSF samples analysed in the district 
laboratories. In Goundi and N’Djamena Nord, there were more CSF samples analysed 
in the laboratory than reported suspected clinical cases by the CdZs. A comparison 
between number of cases reported for 2012 by the Cdzs during the study and the 
numbers that were reported to WHO is shown in Table 7.10. 
 
There are likely reasons for the inconsistencies and lack of data. Firstly, at the peripheral 
level, there was an absence of organizational structures, such as desks, cabinets, storage 
containers, waterproof folders and storage units. Secondly, it was reported during the 
dissemination meeting that some CdZs were only reporting laboratory confirmed cases 
and not all suspected cases.  There may be other issues that are still unknown.  
The data discrepancies inhibit the ability to truly assess the surveillance system using 
the epidemiological indicators recommended by the WHO, especially the data used to 
assess surveillance specificity and sensitivity. Primary data is only captured at 
peripheral and district levels; these cannot be obtained at the regional and national 
levels, which only receive aggregate data.   
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Table 7.9 Comparison of reported cases and laboratory investigations in study districts, 
2012 
 Population Number of 
suspected 
meningitis 
cases 
reported by 
Chef de 
Zones 
Number of CSF 
meningitis samples 
analysed in district 
laboratory 
Number of CSF 
meningitis 
samples sent to 
N'Djamena 
Suspected 
cases per 
100,000 
people 
Enhanced surveillance districts 
Koumra  189,029 53 38 38 28 
Goundi  158,379 141 170* 15 89 
Moundou 393,876 43 0 0 11 
Case based surveillance districts** 
Moissala  260,145 388 388 71 149 
Gounou-Gaya  293,583 NA 0 0 0 
Guelengdeng  214,254 0 0 0 0 
N’Djamena Nord 166,100 0 5* NA 0 
* Instances where the laboratory analysed more samples than were reported by the district surveillance officers. 
** Moissala is a comprehensive case-based surveillance district; Gonou-gaya, Guelengdeng, and N’Djamena Nord are partial case-based 
surveillance districts. 
 
 
Table 7.10 Reported meningitis cases by Chef de Zone, and as received by WHO from 
the Chad MoH, 2012 
 Population Chef de Zone WHO 
Koumra  189,029 53 78 
Goundi  158,379 141 121 
Moundou 393,876 43 26 
Moissala 260,145 388 345 
Gounou-Gaya  293,583 * 11 
Guelendeng  214,254 0 1 
N’Djamena Nord 166,100 0 0 
*No cases were reported from these districts 
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7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings of the subnational performance assessment of the 
Chad meningitis system. In general, staff across levels were informed and experienced 
in surveillance, but lacked supportive structures and resources to optimally conduct 
activities. Since the national vaccination with MenAfriVac®, there has been a substantial 
decrease in reported meningitis cases in Chad. As the new vaccine has been shown to be 
highly effective, this is in no doubt partly due to a real decrease in cases. However, 
three of our seven study district detected no clinical meningitis cases during 2012 and 
only a total of 15 during 2013. This is concerning, especially since the pneumococcal 
conjugate vaccine has not yet been introduced in Chad. It is likely that meningitis cases 
are occurring, but the health system and associated surveillance structures in these 
districts are too weak to detect and report cases.  
 
The assessment found particular weaknesses with regard to detection and confirmation 
across study levels. Alternatively, the strongest functions were data reporting 
[timeliness] and the analytic capacity of the national reference laboratory. Specific 
hindrances to detection and confirmation included unclear policies, missing reagents, 
and inadequate transportation to complete surveillance activities. Supportive functions 
were lacking in most districts, and most participants requested frequent training for 
staff on meningitis and IDSR procedures. Significant amounts of missing data presented 
a challenge to accurately track the number of cases detected at health facilities, the 
number of lumbar punctures performed, and the number of CSF samples sent to the 
laboratories.  
 
The challenges and gaps identified in the subnational assessment were considered in 
the overall system assessment, which found that the current system was complex and 
inefficient. Based on WHO guidance, a sentinel district case-based surveillance system 
was recommended as a feasible and optimal system for Chad meningitis surveillance 
(this is further explained in Chapter 9). 
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8 Cost analysis  
Conducting costing studies in low and middle income countries (LMIC) countries is a 
complex task.   As discussed in the background, many challenges are generated due to 
missing data such as incomplete patient disease registers, lack of accurate financial 
records, or the scarcity of record keeping for the numerous donated equipment and 
materials (113). This was the case in our study which had a primary objective of 
estimating the costs of meningitis surveillance in order to inform Chad’s decision-
making on the best strategy to implement.  
 
In this chapter I describe the procedures we employed to perform a cost analysis. 
Section 8.1 describes the techniques used to collect resource utilisation and unit cost 
data.   Section 8.2 presents the results by performance of health facilities and health 
districts and as incremental costs. Section 8.3 and 8.4 summarises the key findings of 
these results.  
 
8.1 Methods 
8.1.1 General approach  
The health sector in Chad is financed through three sources: 1) the national budget, 2) 
donor funds from NGOs and international organisations and 3) populations that 
contribute to health financing through cost recovery. Disease surveillance is publicly 
funded. We chose an all-payer perspective, which entails incorporating costs from the 
government, international partner agencies and other funding sources.  
 
Data were collected retrospectively, and resource utilisation and costs were measured 
for 20121. Economic and financial costs were estimated. Economic costs include a 
valuation of all inputs needed for the surveillance, including valuation of time, supplies, 
and equipment. Any donated items and volunteer time were valued at the market rate. 
Financial costs only included financial expenses for the surveillance activities. Due to 
                                                        
1 In the case of the Moundou regional laboratory where no meningitis activities were performed in 
2012, resource utilisation and costs from 2011 were used. 
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lack of data, it was not possible to include facility and laboratory overhead costs, such 
as building and electricity costs, of which surveillance in any case would be allocated an 
extremely small proportion. Hence, the estimates are slightly underestimating the true 
economic costs.  
 
Data were collected in local currency and all costs were converted to 2012 US$ using the 
average 2012 exchange rate of 1 US$ = 496.766 XAF.  
 
Both recurrent and capital cost were valued (Table 8.1).  A 5% discount rate was applied 
for annualising capital costs to reflect the opportunity costs of investing in capital 
equipment. This rate followed the recommendation of SurvCosts (105). Programme-
specific as well as shared costs were valued.  Shared costs included personnel, vehicles, 
and laboratory equipment.  
 
Table 8.1 Resources included in the cost analysis 
Capital items Recurrent items 
Programme vehicles Personnel (salaries, benefits, per diems, etc.)  
Equipment (e.g. refrigerator, 
computer, microscope, etc.) 
Office (supplies) 
 Transportation (vehicle operation and 
maintenance) 
 Laboratory materials and supplies 
 
Cost items were categorized according to a modified version of the recommended 
structure of IDSR core and support functions (Figure 8.1). In the study the 
‘investigation’ function was interpreted as laboratory investigation and confirmation. 
Case investigation was the only component of response included. The costs of reactive 
meningococcal vaccination campaigns were not included.  
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Figure 8.1 Framework used for categorising costs 
 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Africa (2010) (45) 
 
The data collected were used to estimate the costs per detected case and per sample 
processed in the laboratories. Additionally, to inform on efficiency of the systems of 
surveillance in place, mean costs per suspected case, per investigated case and per 
confirmed case, were also estimated. Mean costs of the current surveillance system were 
also analysed by costs per 100,000 population and per capita for each surveillance 
strategy and surveillance function. Descriptive statistics around the mean cost 
estimates, such as range and standard deviation, were calculated.  
 
The denominators for per 100,000 population and per capita were arrived from 
population data for the respective study unit. Hence, for health facilities, the 
denominator was the catchment population, for a district it was the total population in 
the district, and for a region it was the total population in the respective region. For 
costs on a national level, the total population was used in the denominator. The 
population estimates were based on those reported by the MoH (2012).  Data were 
collated and analysed using pre-designed Excel spreadsheets detailed in Section 5.2.4.   
 
8.1.2 Collection of resource utilisation data 
The unit of analysis was surveillance activities.  To estimate these costs an ingredients 
data collection approach (i.e. “bottom up” costing) was undertaken. This approach was 
selected to provide a high level of detail of the surveillance programme by capturing the 
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fundamental resources required.  Costs for surveillance activities were captured from 
self-reported data; participants were asked the mean amount of time (in minutes) they 
spent on each meningitis-related surveillance activity. This was done for each function 
to make it easier for participants to recall. Other data on resource quantities, specifically 
in the laboratories, were taken from observations and available documents, such as 
financial reports. This information was used to populate a spreadsheet of resource 
estimates.  
 
Allocation of shared costs to meningitis surveillance was made by recording what 
resource quantity was used for all disease surveillance activities, and then what 
proportion of those activities were used for meningitis surveillance, based on actual use 
of resources and estimates of staff workload for each category of resources. If the latter 
was difficult to estimate by respondents, a tracing ratio based on the number of core 
diseases that are part of the surveillance system, was used. 
 
The ingredient exercise was facilitated by examining the processes of each activity and 
delineating the resources.  The step-by-step procedures were already included in the 
health facility level-specific questionnaires (as explained in Section 5.2.4). During the 
interviews, staff at health facilities, in the district health offices and in the laboratories 
were asked to describe step-by-step procedures of their meningitis surveillance 
activities, to approximate the time spent and frequency of each activity, distance 
travelled to complete certain activities, and equipment and supplies used.  Table 8.2 
describes each study instrument and the specific resource utilisation data collected at 
each study site. 
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Table 8.2 Resource utilisation by data source  
Study instrument Resource utilisation data 
Health facility 
questionnaire 
- Health facility funding source or method 
- Age and size (i.e. number of beds) of  facility 
- Donated items and donor source 
- Number of employees, role, and salary, length of employment 
- Distance to health facility for staff and surrounding villages 
- Number of days patient stayed  
- Frequency of surveillance activities  
- Time spent on surveillance activities 
- Materials and mode of communication used for surveillance activities 
- Availability of vehicle/ mode of transportation for patients 
- Volunteer activities 
- Staff training (duration, payment, funder) 
- Frequency of, time spent on, and materials needed for surveillance-related 
meetings 
- Frequency and length of times of IEC activities, if applicable 
- Patient transport costs, if possible 
- Specimen transport costs, if possible 
- Funding source for case-based surveillance, if applicable 
District/regional 
surveillance 
office 
questionnaire 
- Employer information 
- Personal qualifications and role of interviewee 
- Length of employment 
- Number of focal points that share responsibilities at the district or regional 
level 
- Office space 
- Training received and given 
- Frequency of, time spent on, and materials needed for meetings 
- Frequency of and time spent on  surveillance activities  
- Surveillance supervision activities, frequency and processes 
- Frequency of meningitis and IDSR surveillance activities 
- Details of active surveillance activities 
- Other major roles and activities (for other disease programmes)  
- Personal costs associated with meningitis surveillance (E.g. patient transport, 
payment of photo copying surveillance forms) 
- Transportation information (E.g. vehicle rented, permanent vehicle at 
disposal) 
- Vehicle information 
- Equipment and materials used for meningitis surveillance activities 
Laboratory 
questionnaire 
- Number of meningitis cases analysed in 2012 
- Number of employees, role, and salary 
- Time spent on meningitis-related activities 
- Types of analysis performed at the laboratory and CSF analysed by test type 
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Study instrument Resource utilisation data 
- Other laboratory activities and resources related to CSF analyses 
- Laboratory consumables and materials used for CSF analyses 
- Quantity and purpose of laboratory equipment  
- Specimen shipment costs and materials 
- Frequency and activities of internal and external quality control 
- Outstanding needs to improve each activity (collected for upgrading 
exercise) 
- Staff training (duration, payment, funder) 
- Frequency of, time spent on, and materials needed for meetings 
- Laboratory budget and process for making orders 
- Frequency of reagent and material  stock outs (i.e. to exhaust supply of a 
needed item) 
Central-level 
surveillance 
office 
questionnaire 
- Number and frequency of national feedback reports 
- State budget for the control of epidemics (E.g. planning, training) 
- Resources used and time spent for case investigation   
- Resource for coordination of IDSR-related meetings 
- Price and equipment and vehicles used for IDSR-related activities 
- Percent  of use of equipment used for meningitis surveillance  
- Funding source for equipment 
- Information on buildings used for surveillance (E.g. year of acquisition, price 
bought) 
- Time of significant staff on meningitis surveillance activities  
- Funding sources of other relevant equipment, materials, and supplies 
Technical partner/ 
funder 
questionnaire 
- Budget, expenses, and finances of institution for surveillance of meningitis in 
2012 (E.g. monitoring, evaluation, coordination, maintenance of vehicles) 
- Information of financed vehicles used in 2012 for implementation of 
surveillance of meningitis  
- Information of staff involved in disease surveillance in 2012 
- Salary of support staff for disease surveillance in 2012   
- Funding sources of other relevant equipment, materials, and supplies 
CSF: Cerebral spinal fluid   HF: Health facility 
IDSR: Integrated disease surveillance and response IEC: Information, education, and communication Collection of unit cost data   
 
 
Unit costs of identified resources involved in surveillance were identified by reviewing 
equipment and materials orders, budgets and other financial records obtained from 
government records or partner organisations. In order to calculate salary costs, we 
collected information on all staff implicated in meningitis surveillance at the health 
facilities, laboratories, and district and regional surveillance offices. Total annual salary 
costs were calculated by determining salary grade from participants reporting of years 
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worked and education, then multiplying the number of each salary category by the 
salary grade midpoints. Salary scales were obtained from the Ministry of Finances and 
Budget. 
 
Unit costs were also ascertained from organisations providing donor support across 
surveillance activities. This includes WHO, CDC, MenAfriCar, and Médecines sans 
Frontières. These estimates were cross checked with local procurement officers and 
laboratory experts. 
 
8.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis assesses the impact of structural and parameter uncertainties on 
the result. For this study, a probabilistic uncertainty analysis was undertaken in order to 
not only provide estimates of mean expected costs and effects, but also accompanying 
uncertainty ranges. A Monte-Carlo simulation was used to evaluate the effects of 
uncertainty by running a large number of and drawing distributions from uncertain 
parameters resulting in a probability distribution for the overall results (203). 
 
I ran 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations using Oracle Crystal Ball© software. Individual 
parameters were attached to a statistical distribution and repeated random samples 
were selected. The analysis generates single bars representing multiple univariate 
sensitivity analysis showing the varying effects on the meningitis surveillance activity 
costs when choosing the higher and lower values of selected parameters. I sought to 
look for ranges around the core surveillance function estimates. In each surveillance 
function (i.e. detection and confirmation, reporting, supervision and feedback and 
communication), I focus only on the variables that could have considerable uncertainty 
or are of particular interest. The limited list of uncertain variables in each function listed 
in Table 8.3 reflects the reality that most of the variables collected had fixed values or 
the intra-variable differences were incidental in the Chadian context (e.g. salaries for 
health facility staff, time for laboratory analysis, text message charges). 
 
A triangular distribution was used for all simulations. Triangular distribution is a useful 
and simple technique for describing ranges; specifically, the minimum, maximum, and 
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most expected values. It has been criticised for being a convenient-to-fit model, which is 
limited to demonstrating linear relationships that cannot reflect the dynamism of 
certain risk factors. Nonetheless, I selected this distribution because I think it is most 
appropriate given my particular parameters of interests and because it allowed me to 
illustrate a likely distribution since I do not have the data needed to determine the exact 
distribution (204) (205). 
 
Table 8.3 Assumptions used in the probabilistic uncertainty analysis  
Surveillance function Uncertainty 
parameter 
Base case Assumptions used in 
uncertainty 
Detection and 
confirmation 
Number of CSF 
analysed per year 
Range between 
facilities: 0 – 253 
Mean: 67 
25% less than and 
25% greater than the 
base case 
Reporting None N/A N/A 
Supervision and 
Feedback 
Number of CDZ 
per district 
Range: 1 – 3 CDZ 
per district 
Mean: 1.6 
One less and one 
more CDZ in  each 
district 
Communication (IEC) Number of health 
facilities per district 
Range: 8 – 27 
health facilities 
per district 
Mean: 17 
25% less than and 
25% greater than the 
base case 
 
Justification for parameter selection 
I chose a minimum and maximum around the bases case of each parameter. The 
base case in this refers to the raw data collected for each variable.  
The parameter of ‘CSF analysed’ was chosen due to several issues surrounding 
meningitis detection, which have already been discussed.  If these issues are 
resolved, there is a possibility that more CSF will be analysed in certain districts and 
less in other districts.  The assumption of 25% less than and 25% more than the base 
case (of each district) was selected as an arbitrary approach to reflect the possible 
range of probabilities for varying scenarios of the number of CSF received by each 
district laboratory that then undergo analysis. 
 
‘Number of CdZ’ was selected for the uncertainty analysis due to the varying 
number of CdZs in the study districts. Further variation may be observed once the 
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costs are extrapolated for the entire country. I adjusted this between one more or 
less than the current number of CdZs per district—which produces one to three 
CdZ’s. This is also the minimum and maximum numbers observed in the study 
districts.  
 
Likewise, ‘number of health facilities’ was selected due to the possibility of 
variation in health facilities within the country.  Twenty-five percent greater and 
less than the base case were again used as the assumptions to reflect the highest and 
lowest expected probabilities. For example, in N’djamena Nord, where there are 10 
health facilities, 25% less than the base case ( i.e. 10 health facilities) is 7.5 health 
facilities and 25% more is 12.5 health facilities. These values were used in the 
uncertainty analysis.  
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8.2 Results 
8.2.1 Activity costs analysis in study districts 
Table 8.4 presents the ten distinct surveillance activities that costs were calculated for. In 
this section, costs per detected case for each of these activities are presented. These are 
subsequently extrapolated to total cost estimates in the next section.  
 
Table 8.4 Meningitis surveillance activities used for the cost estimates 
 Activity  Responsible staff 
1 Lumbar puncture Health facility Responsable 
Physician in district hospitals 
2 Transport of CSF from health facility to 
district laboratory  
Health facility staff 
CdZ in some districts 
3 District laboratory investigation  District laboratory staff 
4 Transport of CSF from district to national 
laboratory  
CASE, CdZ, district laboratory staff 
5 National laboratory investigation National laboratory staff 
6 Transport and laboratory investigation of 
CSF in Oslo for quality control 
National laboratory staff, WHO and Oslo 
laboratory staff 
7 Surveillance case investigation/ 
Follow-up of confirmed cases 
CdZ and health facility staff 
8 Reporting and data analysis 
 
Health facility staff reports to CdZ 
CdZ reports to CASE 
CASE reports to SSEI 
9 Supervision and feedback CdZ, CASE – weekly 
National (biannually) 
National laboratory (biannually) 
10 Information, education, and communication  Health facility staff 
 
CSF: Cerebrospinal Fluid, CASE: Chef d’Antenne de Surveillance épidémiologie, CdZ: Chef de zone, SSEI: Integrated Epidemiological 
Surveillance Service 
 
 
1. Lumbar puncture 
A lumbar puncture kit and staff time are the only two resources required to perform a 
lumbar puncture. Lumbar punctures were always performed on site in 11 of the 21 
health facilities (52%). Two facilities reported that they sometimes performed LPs and 
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one facility only rarely did them. In the remaining seven facilities, patients were always 
referred to the district hospital for lumbar punctures.  
 
In the 14 facilities performing lumbar punctures, these were done by the health facility 
Responsable, who was usually a qualified nurse. According to WHO guidance, if 
possible, three tubes of CSF should be collected for microbiology, chemistry and 
cytology (206). In 11 of the 14 facilities only one tube of CSF was filled (79%), and in the 
remaining three two tubes were routinely filled. Lumbar puncture kits are distributed 
to health facilities from the national level.  The kits, pictured in Figure 8.2, used in Chad 
are manufactured by Medical Expert Group and purchased at a price of US$ 19 per kit.  
 
Figure 8.2 Contents of lumbar puncture kit1 
 
Source: WHO and CDC laboratory manual (2011) (206) 
 
 
In the 13 health facilities where lumbar punctures were performed, staff reported a 
wide variation in the time it took to complete the clinical diagnosis, the lumbar 
puncture and filling in the reporting forms (Table 8.5).  The average time for all three 
activities was 39 minutes (range, 8 to 105 minutes; SD = 28). The average of 39 minutes 
                                                        
1 The kits contain two sterile drapes, three cleaning sponges, a 20 gauge spinal needle, a 25 gauge and a 
20 gauge needle for anaesthetic infiltration, a 3cc syringe, a vial of 1% lidocaine for anaesthesia, a 
pressure manometer with tubing, four collection vials and a Band-Aid. 
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was used in the cost estimates. In the facilities where lumbar punctures were not 
performed, mean staff time spent on clinical diagnosis and completion of patient 
records was 7 (SD = 4) and 5 minutes (SD = 2.3), respectively.  
 
Table 8.5 Reported minutes of staff time used on lumbar puncture procedures 
Activity Mean Min Max 
Clinical diagnosis (n=13) 14 3 60 
Lumbar puncture (n=13) 13 4 30 
Completing forms (n=10) 11 1 30 
Total 39 8 105 
 
The average monthly salary of medical staff in primary health care facilities was 
US$ 336 and it was US$ 1,059 for physicians in district hospitals. This translates to 
salary costs per minute of US$ 0.03 and US$ 0.11.  When assuming that 52% of all 
lumbar punctures are undertaken at primary health facilities (as in the study sample) 
and the remaining 48% at district hospitals, the weighted estimated average costs of 
performing lumbar puncture amount to US$ 22 (Table 8.6).  
 
Table 8.6 Estimated costs of performing a lumbar puncture (2013 US$) 
Item Health facilities District hospitals Weighted 
average* 
Lumbar puncture kit 19 19 19 
Salary costs 1.38 4.34 2.80 
Total 21 24 22 
* When assuming 52% of lumbar punctures undertaken at primary health facilities and 48% at district hospitals. 
 
2. Transportation of CSF from health facility to district laboratory 
The following resources are needed in order to package and transport the CSF to the 
district laboratory:   
 Trans-Isolate medium 
 Mode of transportation 
 Health facility staff time 
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N. meningitidis, S. Pneumoniae and H. influenzae are demanding and fragile bacteria that 
should be examined as soon as possible after collection to increase the chance of 
isolating the clinical specimen.  Hence, it is essential to transport the CSF tube to the 
laboratory straight after the lumbar puncture.  In nine facilities, tubes were sent to the 
laboratory immediately and in two facilities this was done once per day. Procedures for 
transporting CSF were available from 11 facilities. Staff in nine facilities reported that 
they place the CSF tube in a cold box with ice packs or in a fridge with ice packs. Two 
facilities did not use ice packs.  
 
If CSF cannot be processed within one hour, it should be inoculated into Trans-Isolate 
(T-I) medium, which is a growth as well as a holding and transport medium (206). This 
was however not available in any of the facilities. Data on resources spent on 
transporting CSF to the district laboratory were available from 13 health facilities. The 
average travel time for a return trip to the district laboratory was 62 minutes (range, 10 
to 120 minutes; SD = 32) (Table 8.7). The staff member transporting the CSF was in all 
cases the same person who had performed the lumbar puncture (the health facility 
Responsable). The mode of transport was most frequently a motorbike. For the few 
facilities which were in close proximity to the laboratory, the specimens were delivered 
by walking. For the cost estimates, we assumed a mean distance of 36 km for a round 
trip on a motorbike and that the transport took 62 minutes of staff time. Mean cost 
estimates per CSF transported are summarised Table 8.8. 
 
Table 8.7 Distances and times to transport CSF to the district laboratory (n=13) 
Health facility study 
code 
Distance to district laboratory  
(one way) (km) 
Minutes of travel for 
return trip 
FAR002 6 30 
FAR003 6 60 
GUE001 35 60 
GUE002 45 120 
GON001 35 90 
GON002 5 60 
GON003 25 60 
KOU001 16 50 
KOU002 16 10 
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KOU003 7 20 
MOU001 5 120 
MOU002 38 70 
MON003 1 60 
Average 18 62 
 
 
Table 8.8 Cost estimates of transporting CSF to district laboratory 
Item 2012 US$ 
Staff time for transport 2.18 
Petrol* 1.69 
Motorbike depreciation** 1.59 
Total 5.46 
*Petrol price per litre: US$ 1.38. Distance per litre: 30 km 
**Price of motorbike from new: US$ 6,352. Assumed expected life: 4 years. 
 
3. District laboratory investigation 
At district laboratories the following three tests should be performed on CSF: 
 Cytology 
 Gram stain 
 Latex agglutination 
Regional laboratories should in addition to the above three tests also undertake culture, 
sero-grouping and antibiotic sensitivity.  However as explained in Chapter 7, Moundou 
regional laboratory lacked supplies for bacterial analysis and no CSFs had been received 
or analysed during 2012. Hence, we excluded regional laboratories from the analysis of 
current costs. However, in the extrapolations for scaling up the surveillance system, 
estimates are provided for regional laboratories using data collected at the national 
laboratory. 
Staff at the laboratories in N’djamena Nord, Guelengdeng, Gounou-Gaya, Koumra and 
Moissala were all employed by the MSP. Staff at the laboratory in Goundi were paid by 
the community fund. N’Djamena Nord, Guelendeng and Gounou-Gaya had received 
support from external donors, including UNICEF, WHO, World Vision and MSF. 
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A microscope is needed to perform cytology and gram stain. A centrifuge is also needed 
for a gram stain. Latex agglutination is performed using a Pastorex kit and no 
equipment is needed. Resources in the district laboratories used for performing the tests 
are: 
 Microscope and centrifuge 
 Laboratory supplies 
 Laboratory staff time  
Staff reported that took on average ten minutes (range, 5 to 10 minutes) to do a gram 
stain, nine minutes (range, 3 to 20 minutes) to complete cytology and 15 minutes (range, 
10 to 50 minutes) to complete the latex agglutination. Cost estimates of the three tests 
are summarised in Table 8.9. 
Total costs per test if all three procedures are performed amounts to US$ 12.77. 
 
Table 8.9 Costs of CSF laboratory analyses at district laboratories (2012 US$) 
 Unit of 
measure 
Unit costs 
(US$) 
Quantity per 
sample 
Costs per 
sample (US$) 
CYTOLOGY     
Gloves Pair 0.02 1 0.02 
Slides Each 0.12 2 0.25 
Slide covers Each 0.12 2 0.25 
Staff salary Min 0.08 9 0.74 
Microscope Capital   0.05 
Total    1.30 
GRAM STAIN     
Gloves Pair 0.02 1.00 0.02 
Gram staining kit Each 64.94 0.02 0.98 
Slides Each 0.12 3.00 0.37 
Slide covers Each 0.12 3.00 0.37 
Immersion oil (200 ml) Ml 26.10 0.00 0.02 
Staff salary Min 0.08 10.00 0.83 
Centrifuge Capital 0.08  0.03 
Microscope Capital   0.05 
Total    2.67 
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PASTOREX     
Gloves Pair 0.02 1 0.02 
Pastorex kit Each 175 0.043 7.59 
Staff salary Min 0.08 15 1.24 
Total    8.85 
Costs of all three tests    12.77 
* Purchase price of microscope: US$ 1,678. Purchase price for centrifuge: US$ 325. It was assumed that both pieces of equipment are used 20 
times per day in the laboratory. Expected life expectancy assumed as 10 years for both microscope and centrifuge. 
 
4. Transport of CSF from district to national laboratory 
A proportion of CSF samples are sent to the national reference laboratory in N’Djamena 
for laboratory confirmation.  However, due to lack of supplies in some laboratories, 
samples are also sent directly to the national reference laboratory from the health 
facilities. The following resources are needed in order to package and transport the CSF 
to the national laboratory:   
 Trans-Isolate medium 
 Triple Packaging  
 Transport means 
The proportion of samples sent to the national laboratory during 2010-2012 ranged from 
6%-9% of suspected meningitis cases (Table 8.10). In 2013, the percentage was 
considerably higher due to a substantial decrease in detected cases following 
introduction of MenAfriVac®. 
 
Table 8.10 Proportion of reported meningitis cases with CSF analysed at the national 
laboratory 
Year Number of reported 
meningitis cases 
Number of CSF 
samples received by 
the national 
laboratory 
Percentages of cases 
with CSF analysed at 
national laboratory 
2010 3,058  272  8.89 %  
2011 5,960  405  6.79 %  
2012 3,795  345  9.09 %  
2013 242  149  61.57 %  
Source: Chad National Reference Laboratory 
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All district laboratories used T-I media and triple packaging when sending the samples 
to N’djamena. The T-I tube is labelled with the identity of the patient, the name of the 
health facility, date and time of collection, and the sample number. There is no standard 
system for transporting the specimens. The district laboratories used different methods, 
depending on the distance to N’djamena. These methods are summarised in Table 8.11. 
 
Table 8.11 Methods of transport of CSF from district laboratories to the national 
laboratory 
District Packaging Transport method 
N’Djamena Nord) NA NA 
Guelengdeng NA Motorbike by health staff 
Gounougaya Triple packaging with T-I 
media 
Motorbike by health staff 
Koumra Triple packaging with T-I 
media provided by MSF 
Sends to MSF in Moissala who send it 
by courier 
Goundi Triple packaging with T-I 
media 
Uses the Koumra hospital vehicle or 
sends by market bus 
Moissala Triple packaging with T-I 
media 
MSF sends  by courier or World Food 
Programme airplane  
Mondou (Regional) Triple packaging with T-I 
media 
By market Bus, WHO or Focal Point 
takes it 
 
The Norwegian Institute of Public Health (NIPH) produces T-I and donates this for free 
to MSF in Chad. The NIPH has estimated the production costs of T-I to be US$ 3 per 
unit. The price of one box of triple packaging when procured by MSF is US$ 32. These 
are re-usable and we assumed that each box is used ten times. Hence, a unit costs of 
US$ 3.20. Due to the various methods of transport of the specimens, it is difficult to 
arrive at an average cost per sample transported. Moundou reported that they spent 
between 1,000 and 2,500 CFA (US$ 2-US$ 5) for transporting a sample on the market bus 
to N’Djamena. US$ 5 per sample was assumed, but this is a minimum costs as the other 
means of transport would be more expensive. The total transport costs per sample is 
summarised in Table 8.12. 
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Table 8.12 Costs of transporting CSF samples from district laboratories to the national 
laboratory 
 Unit costs (US$) Quantity per 
sample 
Total costs (US$) 
Triple packaging 32 0.10 3.22 
T-I media 3 1 3.00 
Transport 5.29 1 5.29 
Total   11.51 
 
5. National laboratory investigation 
When the samples arrive at the national laboratory the following tests are performed: 
 Cytology 
 Gram stain 
 Latex agglutination 
 Culture  
 Serogrouping 
In the reference laboratory in N’Djamena, confirmation and serogrouping is undertaken 
with conventional gel-based PCR and not real-time PCR. Gel-based PCR is time-
consuming and compared to real-time PCR it includes a risk of contamination. The use 
of real-time PCR have expanded rapidly in recent years, but due to the expense of the 
equipment, the laboratory in N’Djamena has not been able to introduce it. As a result, 
the laboratory sends a relatively high proportion of their samples for processing at the 
international reference laboratory in Oslo, Norway, as explained in Chapter 7. Only five 
CSFs were processed by gel-based PCR during 2012. We excluded this cost from the 
estimates of current meningitis surveillance costs. However, for the cost estimates of 
upgrading to an operational standard we estimated the costs of implementing real-time 
PCR in the national laboratory in N’Djamena.  
 
Costs of processing CSF samples at the national laboratory are summarised in Table 
8.13 and Table 8.14. 
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The cytology, gram stain and Latex agglutination tests are slightly more expensive in 
the national laboratory than in the districts due to higher salary levels of laboratory 
staff.  
 
Table 8.13 Costs of cytology, gram stain and Pastorex in the national reference 
laboratory 
 Unit of 
measure 
Unit costs 
(US$) 
Quantity 
per sample 
Costs per 
sample (US$) 
CYTOLOGY     
Gloves Pair 0.02 1 0.02 
Slides Each 0.12 2 0.25 
Slide covers Each 0.12 2 0.25 
Staff salary Min 0.11 9 0.97 
Microscope Capital   0.05 
Total    1.53 
GRAM STAIN     
Gloves Pair 0.02 1 0.02 
Gram staining kit Each 64.94 0.02 0.98 
Slides Each 0.12 3 0.37 
Slide covers Each 0.12 3 0.37 
Immersion oil (200 ml) ml 26.1 0.00075 0.02 
Staff salary Min 0.11 10 1.08 
Centrifuge Capital   0.03 
Microscope Capital   0.05 
Total    2.92 
PASTOREX     
Gloves Pair 0.015681 1 0.02 
Pastorex kit Each 175 0.04 7.59 
Staff salary Min 0.11 15 1.62 
Total    9.23 
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Table 8.14 Costs of culture and serogroup determination in the national reference 
laboratory 
 Unit of 
measure 
Unit costs 
(US$) 
Quantity 
per sample 
Costs per 
sample (US$) 
CULTURE     
Negative and contaminated CSF 
Gloves Pair 0.02 1 0.02 
Blood agar plate Each 1.29 1 1.29 
Agar chocolate plate ml 1.3 1 1.3 
BHI broth (25x10 ml) ml 0.17 1 0.17 
Pippette 1 ml Each 0.08 4 0.32 
Pippette tip Each 0.04 4 0.17 
Loops 1ul Each 0.36 3 1.09 
Loops 10ul Each 0.05 3 0.16 
Staff salary Min 0.11 20 2.16 
Total    6.66 
Positive CSF 
Gloves Pair 0.02 1 0.02 
Blood agar plate Each 1.29 1 1.29 
Agar chocolate plate Each 1.3 1 1.3 
BHI broth (25x10 ml) Ml 0.17 1 0.17 
Pipette 1 ml Each 0.08 4 0.32 
Pipette tip Each 0.04 4 0.17 
Loops 1ul Each 0.36 3 1.09 
Loops 10ul Each 0.36 3 1.09 
Pipette tip 1000ul Each 0.05 5 0.27 
Ampicilline disc Each 0.04 1 0.04 
Amoxycilline disc Each 0.04 1 0.04 
Cetotaxime disc Each 0.01 1 0.01 
Ceftriaxone disc Each 0.04 1 0.04 
Chloramphenicol disc Each 0.04 1 0.04 
Ciprofloxacine disc Each 0.04 1 0.04 
Cotrimoxazole disc Each 0.04 1 0.04 
Staff salary Min 0.11 60 6.48 
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 Unit of 
measure 
Unit costs 
(US$) 
Quantity 
per sample 
Costs per 
sample (US$) 
Total    12.42 
SEROGROUP 
DETERMINATION 
    
Gloves Pair 0.02 1 0.02 
Men A antiserum ml 4.06 1 4.06 
Men X Antiserum ml 4.34 1 4.34 
Men Y Antiserum ml 4.30 1 4.30 
Men W 135 antiserum ml 3.97 1 3.97 
Slides Each 0.12 3 0.37 
Slide covers Each 0.12 3 0.37 
Staff salary Min 0.11 30 3.24 
Microscope Capital   0.05 
Total    20.70 
* Purchase price of microscope: US$ 1,678. Purchase price for centrifuge: US$ 3625. It was assumed that both pieces of equipment are used 20 
times per day in the laboratory pieces. Expected life expectancy assumed as 10 years for both microscope and centrifuge. 
 
 
6. Transport and laboratory investigation of CSF in Oslo for quality control 
The resources needed to transport and analyse CSF from N’djamena to Oslo are: 
 Shipping materials 
 Shipping costs 
 Cost of analysis in Ouagadougou 
 Cost of analysis in Oslo 
The National Reference Laboratory sends a proportion of CSF samples to the WHO 
Multi Disease Surveillance Centre in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and after analysis in 
this laboratory, they send the samples to the Norwegian Institute of Public Health 
(NIPH) in Oslo for further confirmation. The NIPH is a WHO Collaborating Centre for 
Reference and Research on Meningococci. During 2012 the National Reference 
Laboratory sent 59 of 69 (86%) positive CSF samples to Ouagadougou and Oslo. During 
2013 15 out of 32 samples were sent (47%). The WHO covers the costs of transporting 
the samples, which is usually done by DHL. We assumed that ten samples were sent in 
each shipment. We assumed that costs of analysis in the laboratory in Ouagadougou are 
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similar to that found in the National Reference Laboratory.  The NIPH reported the 
costs of supplies for the tests they do. However, the costs of salaries and overhead costs 
are not included. Hence, the costs seen in Table 8.15 are under estimated.  
 
Table 8.15 Costs of processing a meningococcal CSF sample in Ouagadougou and Oslo 
 Unit costs 
(US$) 
Quantity per 
sample 
Total costs 
per sample 
(US$) 
Courier service to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso 152 0.10 15 
Ouagadougou laboratory analysis 20 1 20 
Courier service from Ouagadougou to Oslo 129 0.10 13 
Oslo laboratory analysis:    
Culture 3 1 3 
Meningococcal serogroup analysis 2 1 2 
Meningococcal antibiotic susceptibility by E-test 20 1 20 
Meningococcal antibiotic susceptibility by MLST 50 1 50 
TOTAL   123 
 
7. Surveillance case investigation/ follow-up of confirmed cases 
To conduct a case investigation and follow-up confirmed cases, cost of staff time, petrol 
and mode of transport must be considered. 48% of health facilities reported that they 
undertook surveillance investigations in the communities when a case was confirmed 
(n=11). When this occurred, the Responsable went to the home of the patient to brief the 
family about signs of surveillance and would often search the village for further cases. 
The case investigation duties were assumed to comprise of the health facility Responsable 
traveling to villages by motorbike. The costs associated to following up and 
investigating one confirmed case are seen in Table 8.16. 
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Table 8.16 Costs of investigating one meningitis case (2012 US$) 
 Unit costs Quantity Total costs 
CdZ salary (minute) 0.05 240 11.64 
Petrol (litre) 1.38 1 1.38 
Motorbike (hour) 1.53 1 1.53 
Total   14.55 
 
 
8. Reporting and data analysis 
Resources used for weekly reporting are staff time and text messages. As mentioned 
when the Chadian surveillance system was described, surveillance focal points report 
Meningitis cases along with the other notifiable diseases on a weekly basis. Based on 
participant responses, the estimated work attributed to reporting meningitis only lasts 
15 minutes per week for each surveillance focal point. This number will invariably vary 
according to the number of cases being reported. The estimated annual costs for each 
surveillance officer in charge at the respective levels are summarised in Table 8.17. 
 
Resources for data analysis were minimal and it was assumed that analysis and 
reporting activities were conducted together (i.e. the CdZ receives the weekly data and 
simultaneously enters the data into a spread sheet). Hence, additional costs were not 
collected for these data analysis.  
 
Table 8.17 Costs of reporting per surveillance officer at each level (2012 US$) 
 Unit of 
measure 
Quantity 
per week 
Quantity 
per year 
Unit costs Annual 
costs 
Health centre Responsable to 
CdZ: 
     
Staff time Minutes 15 780 0.05 37.85 
Text message charges Each 2 104 0.05 5.50 
Total     43.35 
CdZ to CASE:      
Staff time Minutes 15 780 0.06 46.79 
Text message charges Each 2 104 0.05 5.50 
Total     52.30 
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 Unit of 
measure 
Quantity 
per week 
Quantity 
per year 
Unit costs Annual 
costs 
CASE to SSEI:      
Staff time Minutes 15 780 0.09 73.11 
Text message charges Each 2 104 0.05 5.50 
Total     78.62 
 
 
9. Supervision  
Resources for supervision visits are: 
 Staff time 
 Petrol costs (calculated by average distance [km] per month) 
 Vehicle usage 
 
As mentioned when the Chadian surveillance system was described, supervision 
should occur at every level starting with the central to regional, district, and health 
facility; regional to district and health facility; and district to health facility.  All health 
facilities should be visited at least once per month.  However, this does not always 
happen. During 2012 one supervision visit to a number to regions was undertaken by 
three national surveillance staff. The costs of this trip are seen in Table 8.18.  At the 
subnational levels, supervision happened an average of two visits per health facility per 
month. The average amount of time spent per supervision was calculated at 84 minutes 
per week for supervision activities for the CdZ and 75 minutes per week for CASE.  The 
costs of these trips are seen in Table 8.19.  
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Table 8.18 Costs of planned supervision trips in one year by national cadre (2012 US$) 
Expense item Number 
of days 
Per diem Salary per 
day 
Total Proportion 
of 
activities 
related to 
meningitis 
Costs for 
meningitis 
surveillance 
supervision 
Laboratory 
manager 
10 64 53    1,164  50%  582  
Medical doctor 10 64 53    1,164  50%  582  
Epidemiologist 10 64 53    1,164  50%  582  
       Petrol per 
day  
     
Vehicle 10 106 169   2,752  50%     1,376  
Total          3,123 
 
 
Table 8.19 Estimated annual costs of sub-national supervision and feedback activities in 
study districts (2012 US$) 
 Unit of 
measure 
Quantity 
per yeara 
Costs per 
unitb,c 
Average 
petrol cost 
Annual 
costs 
CdZ to health facility      
Staff time Minutes 4368 0.06  262 
Motorbike Each 4368 0.03 52 183 
Total     445 
CASE to health 
facility 
     
Staff time Minutes 3900 0.09  351 
Vehicle Each 3900 0.20 52 832 
Total     1183 
a Based on an average time spent weekly  
b Based on average CdZ  and CASE salary per minute  
c Based on vehicle usage per minute 
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10. Communication (IEC) 
The inputs for communication are staff time (mainly the Responsable) and time spent 
conducting activities per week. The average time the health staff spent on IEC sessions, 
which are education sessions about seasonal diseases, including meningitis, was 57 
minutes a week (SD = 56). This time was divided across the 12 other disease, assuming 
that an equal amount of time would be spent on each disease throughout the year.  The 
unit costs of these sessions are seen in Table 8.20. 
 
Table 8.20 Communication unit cost summary (2012 US$) 
 Unit costs Quantity per 
week 
Total costs 
Responsable salary (minute) .05 4.75 .24 
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Activity costs summary 
 
Table 8.21 presents final the estimated unit costs for each distinctive surveillance 
activity. 
 
Table 8.21 Surveillance activities unit costs summary (2012 US$) 
 Activity  Unit costs   
1 Lumbar puncture per case 22 
2 Transport of CSF from health facility to district laboratory per 
sample 
5 
3 District laboratory investigation per sample 13 
4 Transport of CSF from district to national laboratory per sample 2 
5 National laboratory investigation per positive sample 47 
6 Transport of CSF to Oslo and Oslo laboratory investigation 123 
7 Surveillance investigation of a confirmed case 15 
8 Annual reporting and analysis per health facility 43 
 Annual reporting and analysis per district officer 52 
 Annual reporting and analysis per regional officer 79 
9 Annual supervision per district surveillance officer 445 
 Annual supervision per regional surveillance officer 1183 
 Annual supervision per national cadre trip 3123 
10 Coordination activities (IEC) per week .25 
 
 
  
 254 
8.2.2 Total costs of meningitis surveillance 
Costs by surveillance function 
Costs of detection and confirmation 
The number of reported cases and the number of CSF samples processed in the study 
district laboratories were combined with the unit cost estimates for calculating total 
annual costs of detection and confirmation. Missing and unreliable data did however 
cause limitations to the estimates. Importantly, when the facilities do not gather data on 
the number of suspected cases, it is not possible to derive an annual cost estimate 
because surveillance activities are not conducted that can be attributed to the 
meningitis. 
 
Table 8.22 shows estimated costs of case detection and confirmation in the seven study 
districts. As no cases were detected in Moundou, Gounou-Gaya and Guelengdeng, 
there were no costs for these activities during 2012. The higher amount of cases were 
detected in the enhanced surveillance districts of Koumra and Goundi due to the 2012 
meningococcal meningitis epidemic. Most cases were detected in the MSF supported 
district of Moissala and the costs in this district were consequently substantially higher 
than in the other districts. The costs are 24% higher in Moissala than in Goundi.  
 
This function was further stratified by case detection costs and laboratory investigation 
costs. Case investigation costs included: ‘costs of lumbar puncture’, ‘transport of CSF to 
district laboratory’, ‘costs of CSF transport to N’djamena’, and ‘costs of confirmed cases 
follow-up’. Cumulatively, case detection amounted to 45 %; the other 55% are attributed 
to laboratory investigation. Across the seven districts, the estimated average costs was 
US$ 28,780 or US$ 1,718 per 100,000 populations.  When extrapolating this to the total 
population of Chad, which is 12.6 million, total costs of detection and confirmation in 
2012 amounted to approximately US$ 217,504.  
 
Costs of data reporting (includes data analysis) 
The cost of data reporting and analysis is closely linked to the number of staff working 
on meningitis surveillance. In the regions these are the health centre Responsable, the 
CdZs and the CASEs. Estimated costs of data reporting in the seven study districts 
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amounted to US$ 11, 328 (Table 8.23). This is equivalent to US$ 676 per 100,000 
populations per year. When extrapolating this to the whole country, the estimated costs 
of data reporting is US$ 85,609. 
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Table 8.22 Estimated annual costs of meningitis case detection and confirmation in the study districts (2012 US$) 
 No. of 
CSF 
analysed 
in district 
lab. 
Costs of 
lumbar 
puncture 
Costs of 
transport 
of CSF to 
district 
lab.  
 
Costs of 
district 
lab. 
analysis 
No. of 
CSF sent 
to 
N'Djamena 
Costs of 
CSF 
transport 
to 
N'Djamena 
 
No. of 
negative 
or 
contami-
nated 
CSF at 
nat. ref. 
lab 
No. of 
positive 
CSF at 
nat. ref. 
lab 
Costs of 
negative 
and 
contami-
nated 
samples 
analysis 
Costs of 
positive 
samples 
analysis 
No. of 
samples 
send to 
Oslo 
Costs of 
transport 
and 
processin
g in Oslo 
Costs of 
confirmed 
cases 
follow-up 
 
TOTAL 
Koumra  38 845 208 487 38 437 30 8 618 356 6 800 111 3,862 
Goundi  170 3,781 928 2,179 15 173 12 3 244 140 3 316 44 7,804 
Moundou 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gounou-
Gaya  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guelenden
g  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N’Djamena 
Nord 
5 111 27 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 203 
Moissala 253 5,626 1,382 3,242 109 1,254 87 22 1,774 1,020 19 2,296 317 16,912 
Total  10,363 2,545 5,908  1,864   2,636 1,516  3,412 472 28,780 
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Table 8.23 Annual costs of data reporting in the study districts (2012 US$) 
 Health centre 
Responsable to CdZ 
CdZ to CASE CASE to SSEI Total annual costs 
 Unit costs 
(US$) 
Quantity 
(number of 
health 
facilities) 
Unit costs 
(US$) 
Quantity 
(number 
of health 
facilities) 
Unit costs 
(US$) 
Quantity 
(1/number 
of districts) 
Health 
centre 
Responsab
le to CdZ 
CdZ to 
CASE 
CASE to 
SSEI 
TOTAL 
(US$) 
 
Koumra  43 10 52 10 79 0.25 434 523 20 976 
Goundi  43 8 52 8 79 0.25 347 418 20 785 
Moundou 43 24 52 24 79 0.25 1,040 1,255 20 2,315 
Gounou-Gaya  43 27 52 27 79 0.25 1,170 1,412 20 2,602 
Guelengdeng  43 15 52 15 79 0.25 650 784 20 1,454 
N’Djamena Nord 43 10 52 10 79 0.25 434 523 20 976 
Moissala 43 23 52 23 79 0.25 997 1,203 20 2,220 
Total          11,328 
 
 258 
 
Costs of supervision and feedback 
Table 8.24 shows estimated costs of supervision and feedback in the study districts. The 
cost of supervision is also linked to the number of district and regional surveillance 
staff.  Estimated cost of supervision in the seven study districts amount to US$ 6,967. 
This is equivalent to US$ 415 per 100,000 populations per year. The national costs of 
supervision amounted to US$ 3,123 or US$ 24 per 100,000 population. The estimated 
extrapolated total cost of supervision in Chad is US$ 55,582. 
 
Table 8.24 Annual costs of subnational supervision in the study districts (2012 US$) 
 Unit cost 
(district) 
Number 
of CdZ 
Total 
district 
Unit cost 
(region) 
Number 
of CASE 
Total 
regional 
Total 
Koumra  445 2 890 1,183 .25 296 1186 
Goundi  445 1 445 1,183 .25 296 741 
Moundou 445 3 1,335 1,183 .25 296 1631 
Gounou-Gaya  445 1 445 1,183 .25 296 1186 
Guelengdeng  445 1 445 1,183 .25 296 741 
N’Djamena 
Nord 
445 1 445 1,183 .25 296 741 
Moissala 445 2 890 1,183 .25 296 741 
Total   4,895   2,072 6,967 
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Costs of Communication (IEC) 
Communication was the only support function other than ‘supervision’ that costs were 
estimated for. The other two support functions, training and coordination, were not 
estimated due to marginal attributable costs for meningitis (this is explained more in 
the discussion section). Communication costs were linked to self-reported cumulative 
staff time on these activities. The cost of IEC sessions was calculated by multiplying 
average time spent on activities per health facility across study districts, per year (Table 
8.25). The estimated cost is US$ 1,404 or US$ 84 per 100,000 population. The estimated 
extrapolated total cost of IEC activities in Chad US$ 10,610. 
 
Table 8.25 Annual costs information, education, and communication in the study 
districts (2012 US$) 
 Quantity 
(no. of HFs) 
IEC annual cost Total 
Koumra  10 12 120 
Goundi  8 12 96 
Moundou 24 12 288 
Gounou-Gaya  27 12 324 
Guelendeng  15 12 180 
N’Djamena Nord 10 12 120 
Moissala 23 12 276 
Total   1, 404 
 
Total costs of core and support surveillance activities 
Table 8.26 summarises the total costs of core and support meningitis surveillance across 
the seven study districts. Costs were hampered by zero case-reporting in three districts, 
but Moissala and Goundi reportedly spent (an average of) twice the costs of Koumra 
district, which was third in cases reported. Similarly, these districts, which are both 
externally supported, spent much more on per 100,000 population than the other 
districts.   
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Table 8.26 Estimated total costs of surveillance functions per 100,000 population in the 
study districts (2012 US$) 
 Detection and 
confirmation* 
Reporting 
and 
analysis 
Supervision 
and 
feedback 
 
Communication  
(IEC) 
Population Costs per 
100,000 
population 
Koumra  3,862 976 1,186 120 189,029 3250 
Goundi  7,804 785 741 96 158,379 5951 
Moundou 0 2,315 1631 288 393,876 1075 
Gounou-Gaya  0 2,602 741 324 293,583 1249 
Guelengdeng  0 1,454 741 180 214,254 1108 
N’Djamena Nord 203 976 741 120 166,100 1228 
Moissala 16,912 2,220 1,186 276 260,145 7916 
Total 28,780 11,328 6,967 1,404 1,675,366 2,894 
 
When adding up the estimated costs of detection, confirmation, data reporting and 
analysis, and supervision and communication, the total costs of meningitis 
surveillance in Chad was estimated at US$ 393,000. This is equivalent to US$ 2,894 per 
100,000 populations and 0.03 per capita.  Laboratory investigation (and confirmation) 
comprised 30% of the costs, case detection 25%, supervision 20%, reporting 22%, and 
communications 3%. Table 8.27 shows the costs per 100,000 of each major functional 
category. Additionally, most of the surveillance costs were attributed to core functions; 
supportive functions (i.e. supervision and communication) represented just 23% of the 
costs. Confirmation and detection, which include laboratory investigation, contributed 
more than half of the aggregated national costs. 
 
Table 8.27 National extrapolation of meningits surveillance function total costs (2012 
US$) 
   Total costs (Chad)  Costs per 
100,000 
Costs per 
person 
Confirmation and detection 217,504 2.18 0.017 
Reporting and analysis 85,608 0.86 0.007 
Supervision* 79,278 0.79 0.006 
IEC 10,610 0.11 0.001 
Total 393,000 2.18 0.03 
*includes sub-national and central supervision activities for one year 
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Table 8.28 Costs of study districts by surveillance strategy (2012 US$) 
 Total cost Mean cost 
per case 
Mean cost 
per 
100.000 
population 
No. of 
cases 
Population Costs per 
capita 
Sample ENS districts        
Koumra  6,144  162  3,250  38  189,029   
Goundi  9,426  55  5,951  170  158,379   
Moundou  4,234  0  1,075  0  393,876   
TOTAL  19,803       
Average ENS  6,601   72   3,425   69   0.00052 
Sample Partial CBS districts      
Gounou-Gaya  3,667  0  1,249  0  293,583   
Guelendeng  2,375  0  1,108  0  214,254   
N’Djamena Nord   2,040  408  1,228  5  166,100   
TOTAL  8,081       
Average partial CBS  2,694   136   1,195   2   0.00021 
Sample CBS districts       
Moissala  20,594  81  7,916  253  260,145   
Average exclusive CBS  20,594  81 7916 253  0.00163 
National extrapolation        
Total cost ENS in Chad    433,642    12,661,091   
Total cost pCBS in Chad    151,300    12,661,091   
Total cost eCBS    1,002,251    12,661,091   
 
Table 8.28  details the costs per surveillance strategy and shows that mean cost per case 
was higher in districts that implemented partial CBS but costs per capita were highest in 
Moissala, the only district with exclusive CBS. This suggests that higher investment in a 
non-passive system may improve efficiency. The ENS district had the lowest mean cost 
per case, which is expected since this is essentially a passive system. Costs per 100,000 
in Moissala were more than two and six times the costs of enhance surveillance and 
partial CBS, respectively. For all of Chad to achieve the case-based surveillance at the 
Moissala/MSF standard would require nearly triple the current investment. 
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Probabilistic uncertainty analysis 
The probabilistic uncertainty is reported in Table 8.29 and Table 8.30. The probabilistic 
distribution around the total costs shows a narrow range around the base case; even at 
the maximum value of the Monte Carlo simulation of US$ 435,521, the costs per capita 
remains .03. Since 60% of the simulations produced values less than US$ 400,000, there 
is a high probability that the calculated base case costs are useful estimates for planning 
and decision making (Figure 8.3 & Figure 8.4).    
 
Probabilistic simulation distributions are similar across the three functions and hovers 
around 15% on each side (minimum and maximum) (Figure 8.5, Figure 8.6, and Figure 
8.7.); it is slightly wider for’ supervision and feedback’ (Figure 8.6).  
 
Table 8.29 Probabilistic uncertainty analysis (2012, US$) 
Variable Results 
Total costs of meningitis surveillance in Chad Base case 392,994 
Simulation results:  
Mean 396,241 
St. Deviation 10,482 
Minimum  361,836 
Maximum 435, 521 
 
Table 8.30 Probabilistic uncertainty analysis by surveillance function (2012, US$) 
Function Cost per 
100,000 population: 
Base case value: 
Min Max 
Detection and confirmation 
UV*- Number of CSF 
analysed 
28,780 25,060 33,387 
Supervision and Feedback 
UV – Number of CDZs 
per district 
10,088 8,262 11,849 
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Communication (IEC) 
UV – Number of health 
facilities per district 
1,404 1,180 1,622 
* UV = uncertainty variable 
 
In conclusion, the sensitivity analysis confirms that the estimated values per function 
and for the total costs of meningitis surveillance in Chad can be considered reliable in 
the context of this evaluation. The findings of this probabilistic analysis suggest that the 
impact of varying the selected parameters is minimal on the total costs (This is 
illustrated in the following disribution charts in Figure 8.3 thru Figure 8.7).
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Figure 8.3 Probability distribution of simulation results for total costs of meningitis surveillance in Chad (2012) 
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Figure 8.4 Cumulative frequency of simulation results for total costs of meningitis surveillance in Chad (2012) 
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Figure 8.5 Probability distribution of simulation results for detection and confirmation costs 
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Figure 8.6 Probability distribution of simulation results for supervision and feedback costs 
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Figure 8.7 Probability distribution of simulation results for information, education, and communication costs 
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System efficiency 
The study also aimed to calculate the efficiency of the current system based on 
estimated costs. The intended method, was to use the total aggregate costs of 
surveillance US$ 393,000 and calculate the national costs per case of suspected, 
investigated, and confirmed meningitis cases in 2012.  Unfortunately, the 
inconsistency between data sources presented a challenge to accurately calculating 
these indicators at the national level. Four district laboratories (N’djamena Nord, 
Koumra, Goundi, and Moissala) reported cases in 2012 and these figures were used as 
the best available denominators to calculate the efficiency indicators.   
 
To determine the estimated costs per suspected (or detected) case, the estimated costs 
for case detection, reporting and analysis, and IEC activities was calculated. The total 
costs for laboratory investigation in these districts was used to estimate investigated 
and confirmed cases, these district totals of these costs are provided in Table 8.31. The 
following efficiency indicators were calculated: 
 US$ 34 per suspected meningitis case 
 US$ 35 per investigated meningitis case 
 US$ 100 per confirmed meningitis case 
 
Table 8.31 Summary of reporting district laboratories costs for efficiency indicators, n = 
4 (2012, $US) 
Total CSF 
received and 
analysed 
Total CSF 
confirmed 
Total 
surveillance costs 
(US$, 2012) 
Total laboratory 
investigation 
Total case 
detection, 
reporting, and 
IEC 
466 158 38,204 15,830 18,520 
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8.3 Comparison of Chad surveillance costs with other cost study 
results 
The purpose of conducting this cost-analysis for CDSS was to aid decision makers in 
Chad determine the cost of the current surveillance system. The cost analysis performed 
for this study is primarily intended to guide management and inform budget 
development. While some surveillance cost studies have been undertaken since the 
WHO guidelines were published, the evidence is still scarce. Still, the available studies 
show similar findings, which are summarised in Table 8.32. 
 
In 2012, the annual costs for meningitis in Chad was approximately US$ 393,000 
(US$ 2,894 per 100,000 populations [US$ 0.03 per capita]). Lukwago et al. (101) reported 
total annual IDSR costs for Burkina Faso, Eritrea, and Mali at US$ 690,957, $476,208, and 
US$ 270,360, respectively. The costs for Chad are largely conflated with IDSR but also 
include laboratory analysis for meningitis—the Lukwago study does not include 
laboratory or treatment costs.  The surveillance costs spent per capita recorded in the 
present study were similar to Mali and Burkina Faso. In Chad, laboratory analysis was 
the largest cost driver, amounting to 30% of total costs. This was followed closely by 
supervision, which was 25% of the costs. This was a similar finding in Niger where 
laboratory investigation accounted for 51% of costs. However, in most of the other 
studies, ‘personnel’ was generally the largest cost driver. This is also true for Chad, 
though in the above analysis surveillance functions and activities include salary costs.  
 
Several studies also reported similar challenges to estimate costs accurately due to 
missing data and difficulties in allocating shared costs to IDSR specific activities (101, 
207). Also, Toscano et al. reported the challenge of quantifying specific surveillance 
costs since they are shared across other programmes and encompass a range of 
activities (106). 
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Table 8.32 Comparison of present study results to other CDSS cost evaluations 
Study description Country/countries Findings 
Cost analysis of meningitis 
surveillance (Present 
study) 
Chad .03 costs per capita 
Largest cost driver: laboratory 
investigation and surveillance 
Cost analysis of meningitis 
surveillance (207) 
Niger .012 per capita 
Largest drivers: laboratory 
investigation and personnel costs 
Cost analysis of IDSR 
(105) 
Burkina Faso, 
Eritrea, Mali 
Mali: 0.02 per capita 
Burkina Faso: 0.04 per capita 
Eritrea: 0.16 per capita 
Largest cost driver: Personnel  
Cost associated with 
meningococcal disease 
outbreak (104) 
Colombia Total costs of surveillance: $3,935 
Cost per 100,000 for disease 
surveillance = 0.04  
Largest cost driver: personnel costs 
Cost analysis of integrated 
vaccine preventable 
disease surveillance (106) 
Costa Rica Total annual cost: US$ 420, 000 
Largest cost drivers: Laboratory and 
personnel 
 
 
Of the few studies that assess the cost of CDSS, most do not provide unit cost or cost 
per unit. The Niger study stratified costs proportions and examined the allocation of 
spending by surveillance function similar to what we did in Chad, but did not calculate 
unit costs beyond cost per suspected case and mean cost per case. My analysis provides 
an interesting insight to the unit costs of surveillance activities. The basis of this 
information could be used to conduct more ambitious analysis, such as a cost-
effectiveness analysis.  Moreover, the ability to separate unit costs for each activity is 
very useful to forecast budgets for disease programmes and can be used to optimise 
task sharing.   
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8.4 Contributions and limitations of the cost analysis to CDSS 
evaluations 
This study adds to the existing literature on the costing of disease surveillance, which is 
limited. Even among these few studies, this study is unique in that it provides unit costs 
for surveillance activities. This study, together with the Niger study, is expected to 
contribute to the understanding of the costs of meningitis surveillance in the countries 
along the African Meningitis Belt. The cost analysis offers a first snapshot of the nature 
of costs incurred in performing case-based and enhanced meningitis surveillance. It 
outlines the resources and activities needed at each administrative level and highlights 
the main cost drivers by surveillance function and activity.  
 
The study sample includes the range of facilities and surveillance offices involved in 
meningitis surveillance. This range is key to understanding differential costs incurred 
by different types of facilities. The multiple breakdown of costs across surveillance 
functions and activities presented with relevant performance results provide insight to 
how investments in specific activities, for example ‘specimen transport’, can be 
increased to improve surveillance system indicators, such as number of ‘Percent of 
probable bacterial meningitis cases with a known outcome recorded’. Equipping policymakers 
with crucial financial information can allow for the selection of an appropriate 
surveillance strategies in terms of economic feasibility, long-term sustainability, and 
compliance with existing standards. The analysis in this thesis focused on activity-
focused costing and stratification, while this did not include a costs per administrative 
level, the activity costs could be designated to the appropriate level and estimated 
accordingly, in a later step. Finally, the findings from the Chad and Niger studies will 
provide a tool to calculate meningitis surveillance costs of other countries through a 
user-friendly spreadsheet. 
 
Particular risks in both over- and under- estimating have also been highlighted 
throughout. The risk of under-estimating is due to the lack of data in several of the 
districts and the risk of over-estimating when using the Moissala and Goundi suspected 
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case numbers for the national extrapolation—as mentioned their numbers were high 
because they experienced a meningitis outbreak at the time of the study collection 
period. With the perceived efficacy of the new conjugate vaccine it is speculated that 
average number of suspected cases should be less (though they should not be zero for 
reasons already mentioned). Without the availability of surveillance sensitivity 
indicators for expected suspected cases, it will be difficult to include predicted cases in 
a baseline budget.  
 
Some of the cost estimates may not be accurate due to the difficulty in isolating 
meningitis activities from other IDSR activities. The estimated allocations made to 
meningitis surveillance that were based on expert’s opinions may or may not be 
accurate or generalizable to other settings. This limitation is primarily a result of a 
shortcoming that is larger than the study, which is the predominance of disease-specific 
funding that focusses on narrow objectives instead of how to make improvements 
across several disease programmes or throughout the system. This also underscores the 
complexity of this type of cost analysis.  
 
Another limitation was that this study was difficult to compare to existing studies since 
additional analyses were not undertaken, such as analysis of capital versus recurrent 
costs analysis. While this was mainly due to the unit-cost focus of this analyses, missing 
data such as overhead costs also made this difficult.  Additionally, though higher level 
budget analyses are useful, the upgrading activity presented in Chapter 9 also provides 
broader categories of costs that can provide approximate estimates from actual 
surveillance activity costs (especially at the sub-national level) and can be used to 
forecasts future budgets. Finally, in addition to the aforementioned data-quality and 
availability issues another limitation of the study was that the health facilities were not 
selected randomly, which may affect the representativeness of their mean costs.  
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9 Upgraded system costs and components 
In addition to the current costs, the study also estimated the costs of upgrading the 
surveillance system to an ‘operational standard’. The operational standard relies 
heavily on improved relevant skills, established systems and adequate resources to 
perform optimal meningitis surveillance. In this chapter, several upgrading result-
scenarios are presented.  First, a breakdown of identified resources that are needed to 
upgrade the system. This is followed by an incremental costs analysis of total cost to 
upgrade the system and costs proportions per activity. The third result summarises the 
three-district pilot plan budget that was developed for Chad.  
 
9.1 Methods 
The incremental costs to improve the system were calculated in Chapter 8 and is 
defined as the additional costs needed to achieve an operational standard of meningitis 
surveillance throughout Chad. Necessary resources needed to scale up the current 
surveillance system to an upgraded standard were determined in accordance with 
technical, national, and international standards. Experts from LSHTM, the Chad 
Ministry of Health, and WHO staff also reviewed and modified resources to make 
recommendations Chad-specific. 
 
The following approach was used to create the operational standard: 
1) Define the gap between the current surveillance system and the operational 
standard by first reviewing performance findings, participant feedback, and 
national and international performance standards and then determine the 
activities needed to bring the current system up to the operational standard.   
2) Identify the needs at core function level or/and jurisdiction revealed in the 
performance assessment and through participant and subject matter expert 
interviews. 
3) Construct a feasible operational standard for meningitis surveillance in Chad. 
 275 
4) Summarise the resources needed for implementing the ideal standard in 
various scenarios. 
9.2 Results 
9.2.1 Upgraded system components 
Appendix 5 shows the components of the recommended ‘operational standard’ for 
meningitis surveillance in Chad by presenting existing activities as well as suggested 
improved activities for each health level and surveillance function: (a) the current 
surveillance activities performed, (b) the activities needed to upgrade the system to the 
operational standard and (c) the inputs needed for each activity.  
The upgrading model addresses each administrative level and organizes activities by 
core function (or support activity). This upgrade approach intends to create a path for 
comprehensive surveillance system building from foundational capabilities to 
maintenance of strong levels of functionality. This information is intended to be used to 
prepare a detailed budget for upgrading activities. 
Description of recommended upgrade activities 
Training: Training was identified as a crucial need at every administrative level and by 
each group interviewed.  Only 9 health facilities reported having had a training on 
IDSR.   IDSR is a key component of the health system; when it is functional, it can 
provide the data needed for rational decisions and resource allocation choices.  Clear 
guidelines for meningitis and other priority diseases must be given at this training.  The 
CASE and national level should have funds allocated to plan and execute such 
trainings.  The CASE should coordinate each zonal training (which includes all health 
facilities in each), and the national level should coordinate the training for the CASE 
and CdZ. IDSR training should occur periodically. In the upgrading model we 
recommend an annual training. 
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The upgrading model introduces another level of actors for meningitis surveillance, 
namely district hospital staff.  This evaluation found that lumbar punctures were not 
often being performed, and when they were performed only one tube of CSF was sent 
to the district laboratory instead of two tubes as stated in existing guidance.  District 
hospital staff should receive periodic clinical training on lumbar puncture and correct 
CSF collection methods. 
 
Additional training needs were identified by the district, regional, and national 
laboratories and includes quality assurance and control and specific tests and disease 
investigation techniques for meningitis and other priority diseases.  These trainings 
should occur periodically, but not necessarily annually. 
 
Personnel: The request for at least one additional skilled professional employee at the 
health facility was noted in most health facilities.  This was also noted in 5 of the 7 
district health offices and at the regional and national laboratories.  This person’s work 
would primarily be to provide administrative support and perform surveillance 
functions across disease programmes, for example at the health facility level they 
would review the register, fill out case forms and report to the CdZ.  They would also 
do follow-up, an activity that was missed many times, due to overburdened personnel.  
An appropriate staff member who works with the surveillance budget or national plan 
of action should correspond with regional and district leads to formulate the particulars 
of this resource. 
 
Systemized reporting system: As described in the performance evaluation, several 
weaknesses were found in the reporting system, primarily at the health facility level.  
As the main causes for this was lack of paper-based forms as well as a lack of storage 
facilities for archived information, the upgrading model recommends either purchasing 
storage structures or transitioning to a full electronic reporting system.  An 
intermediate step of purchasing storage structures, such as desks or filing cabinets 
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would be useful to organize current forms.  It may be more cost effective to begin a 
Health Management Information System (HMIS) by digitizing the entire process.    
 
At the health facility level, it is recommended that health facility managers have 
sufficient credit and functional mobile phones in order to report cases on time. This is 
because nearly all the CdZ reported that RCS submit weekly data via SMS. 
 
At the district and regional levels, laptops and mobile phones are recommended –with 
sufficient credit for both.  Also, since both CdZ’s and CASE’s reported periodically 
collecting monthly forms from health facilities, petrol allowances should be included in 
the budget as well as transport costs (e.g. maintenance of existing vehicle or cost of 
hiring a vehicle). At these levels some basic data analysis should be performed to 
review area status. 
 
Electronic reporting capability at the district laboratory level is also recommended; 
preferably a system that can notify the national laboratory when specimens are sent.  
This could be as simple as an email.  Additionally, at least one laptop, mobile phone, 
and sufficient monthly credit for each district laboratory is recommended.  
 
At all levels, including district laboratories, epidemiological data should be transmitted 
by use of duplicate forms, such as carbonless forms and carbon copies. 
 
Patient referral/transport system: The suggestion to implement a patient referral 
system at all health facilities is an essential component of the recommended district-
based surveillance strategy and is supported by the success of a similar system in the 
Moissala district.  This upgrade activity would be put in place at the health facility 
level. Each suspected meningitis case will be given complementary transport to ensure 
they reach the district hospital for lumbar puncture and treatment.  Contracts with 
specific clandomen or motorbike companies to ensure appropriate care for patients is a 
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potential method to secure a transport mechanism. A patient referral form should 
accompany each patient and a copy should stay at the health facility. 
 
Specimen transport network:  The upgrade model corrects some deviations to 
guidelines with the suggestion of a specimen transport network.  This study found the 
method of sending to district and national laboratories was haphazard due to lack of 
appropriate shipping materials. The recommended upgrade follows the WHO transport 
network guidelines, which comprise of sufficient triple packaging and T-I and an 
established transport method for shipping specimen (208). This transport system could 
be a dedicated courier service or could be a designated MSP or WHO staff 
responsibility. 
  
Supervision: While a written supervision framework exists, this study observed that it 
is not achieved due to lack of adequate resources.  The upgrade model reinforces 
existing activities by identifying inputs at each level to carry out scheduled supervision 
visits.   
 
Monitoring and evaluation of district data: This upgrading model introduces 
monitoring and evaluation of district data at the regional (i.e. CASE) level.  
Measurements of surveillance quality, such as timeliness and completeness of 
reporting, analysis of data, outbreak response and case fatality rate, are necessary for 
taking action on the findings. Regular evaluation and feedback of district results will 
encourage motivation of high surveillance performance. This can be done as part of 
supervision to the district level or as a separate activity, where all CdZs meet the CASE 
to review data.  
 
Feedback: Adequate feedback was missing at all levels in different surveillance areas.  
The upgrade model includes notification of results from the highest level of 
confirmation (national laboratory) to the primary level of health facility and patient.  
This should be done in a timely manner.  Feedback also includes review of 
 279 
epidemiological data.  Finally, the national level must provide feedback to all levels in a 
periodic medium such as a monthly bulletin or by posting national summary reports 
online. This allows for situational awareness by disease for all appropriate health 
personnel. 
 
Lab reagents and RT-PCR: Laboratory capacity, in terms of staff and equipment for 
meningitis surveillance has already been established. However, stock-out of reagents 
and rapid diagnostic kits at the district and regional level prevented necessary 
meningitis analysis. The upgrade model recommends sufficient supplies and regents 
for each test. At the national level, a real-time PCR machine is recommended to replace 
the current standard PCR machine. This will reduce the number of specimens sent to 
the Oslo reference laboratory. 
 
9.2.2 Incremental costs to upgrade system 
National extrapolation to an operational standard 
Due to the additional resources and higher quality of coordination and organization in 
Moissala and Goundi districts, the most consistent and accurate surveillance data were 
provided by these sites. It is likely that because both of these districts receive external 
support their surveillance system is already operating similarly to the recommended 
upgraded system detailed above. Taking the average estimated costs of these two 
districts amounts to US$ 6,934 per 100,000 populations.  If Chad were to consider a 
national operational standard for meningitis surveillance as a hybrid of these two 
districts’ systems, it could extrapolate this value to the whole country. This raises the 
annual costs of operating the meningitis surveillance system to US$ 877,898. This is 
an increase of 123% compared to the estimated costs in 2012.  
Incremental costs by activity 
In order to understand how the incremental costs would be distributed across 
surveillance activities I used the performance assessment findings of our study sites 
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and extrapolated them to illustrate the current proportion of sub-national sites (health 
facilities, district laboratories) achieving the operational standard. This then left the 
proportion of the other sub-national not achieving the operational standard, which also 
represents the amount of resources that are needed for the systems. For example, for 
(IDSR) training, only 48% of health facilities reported having any staff that received 
training in the previous two years. In order to meet the standard that all health facilities 
receive training, a 52% investment of resources should be considered.  
Table 9.1 further describes the indicators used to estimate the proportion needed to 
improve the system. Figure 9.1 illustrates the proportion of investment needed to 
upgrade the meningitis system according to the identified needs outlined in the earlier 
section.  
 
This analysis is consistent with the other results, and shows that in order to upgrade the 
current system to an operational standard, more than 100% of the current investment is 
needed for most surveillance activities.  Most of the upgrading costs would be 
attributed to activities associated with case detection and confirmation (i.e. training, 
personnel, patient referral, specimen transport, and lab materials and reagents).  
 
This analysis provides a visualisation that can help highlight the issues, but does not 
directly reflect the costs findings and budget needs. For example, Figure 9.1 shows that 
supervision, which is one of the largest cost drivers at estimated 20% of the current total 
costs, would require a near 80% increase in resources/investments based on the selected 
performance indicator.  This costs seems inflated, unless a majority of those costs were 
invested in capital inputs such as motorbikes and vehicles. Alternatively, this high cost 
estimate may reflect that the indicator used to calculate this proportion is not robust 
enough to accurately assess supervision activities. 
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Table 9.1 Description of indicators used to assess proportion needed to upgrade 
 Indicator Target 
Training Proportion of health facilities that 
received IDSR training in the last two 
years 
100% of health facilities staff 
trained in IDSR in the last two 
years 
Personnel Proportion of health facilities that meet 
standard of health personnel per 1000 
100% of health facilities have 2.28 
health personnel per 1,000 
population 
Reporting Proportion of health facilities that 
report on time 
80% (for the purpose of this 
exercise, it is increased to 100% 
since this indicator is already me in 
Chad) 
Patient 
referral/transport 
Proportion of health facilities that have 
a patient referral/transport network in 
place 
100% of health facilities with a 
patient referral/transport network 
in place 
Specimen transport Proportion of district laboratories that 
have a specimen transport network in 
place 
100% of district laboratories that 
have a specimen transport network 
in place 
Supervision Proportion of health facilities that have 
had supervision in the previous three 
months 
100% of health facilities have 
supervision in the last three 
months 
Feedback Proportion of probable cases with result 
fed-back to RCS 
100% of probable cases with result 
fed-back to RCS 
Lab reagents, 
materials, 
equipment 
Proportion of laboratories with no 
stock-out of materials or reagents in the 
previous one month 
100% of laboratories do not have 
stock-out of materials or reagents 
in the previous one month 
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Figure 9.1 Proportion of upgrading costs compared to current costs at sub-national level 
  
 
9.2.3 Pilot plan to optimize meningitis surveillance in Chad 
Following the present study, the WHO country office in Chad requested a pilot plan 
that incorporated our findings and recommendations. The resulting plan was an eight-
month, three-district case-based surveillance strategy, and we recommended that it be 
piloted in Moundou, Moissala, and Goundi districts. This is because of the regional 
laboratory, which needed support in Moundou, and because Moissala and Goundi 
were 1) high risk districts for meningitis, 2) were already operating strong surveillance 
and 3) would eventually transition from external support to government ownership. 
The plan used components of an existing proposed 18-district plan and suggested that 
three districts were more manageable. The strategy focused on alleviating the workload 
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of the Responsables at the health facility level by increasing support for integrated 
activities and by establishing specimen and patient transport systems. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned upgraded activities to address the many weaknesses 
in the system, the plan provided a detailed budget of all activities, equipment, and 
training costs. This budget is shown in Table 9.2. The unit costs for each activity were 
derived from different sources including, the current study findings, the budget 
estimates from the existing 18-district plan, and estimates from relevant experts and 
laboratory suppliers. The 2012 incidences of detected cases in Moissala and Goundi, 
which were 149 and 89 per 100,000 populations, respectively1, appeared most probable 
of what other districts would observe if surveillance performance was improved. 
Hence, the near average number of 100 suspected cases per 100,000 in each district was 
used to estimate costs of the plan.    
 
The total costs of this eight-month pilot plan was US$ 220,396.  The upfront cost of 
introducing real-time PCR (RT- PCR) is high and exclusively due to the cost of the 
equipment, which was estimated at US$ 60,0002 (27% of the upgrading costs).  Even 
with this, the plan may still be underestimated since the costs for RT-PCR per sample is 
not included since the unit costs were not calculated in the study. The plan also does 
not give an estimate for lumbar puncture training for district hospital personnel since 
these sites were not included in the study and data on number of staff were not 
available. Finally, it was assumed that this pilot plan would be coordinated by a local 
non-governmental organisation (as was done with the MenAfriCar study), in order to 
avoid adding additional responsibilities to the national surveillance staff. The costs for 
this contract is not included in the plan and it was assumed that the MSP in 
coordination with WHO would fill-in the missing inputs. The pilot plan was provided 
to the WHO-Chad in April 2014. 
                                                        
1 These are the values reported by the Chef du Zones of Moissala and Goundi (also seen in Table 7.9) 
2 As estimated by Thermo Fisher Scientific https://www.thermofisher.com/uk/en/home.html  
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Table 9.2 Budget for eight month 3-district CBS pilot plan 
 National Moundou Moissala Goundi Total (USD) 
Training      
Training workshops for RCS NA 730 1240 NAa 1,970 
Training at districts hospitals NA ? ? ? ? 
Supervision      
Supervision - CdZ to health facility NA 10063 13334 8679 32,076 
Supervision- CASE NA 197 197 197 592 
Supervision - National to sub-national 2082 NA NA NA 2,082 
Lumbar puncture and specimen transport      
Lumbar puncture kits NA 8,271 5,463 3,326 17,060 
Patient referral transport NA 7878 5203 3168 16,248 
Specimen transport to regional laboratory NA  5203 3168 8,370 
Specimen transport to national laboratory NA 7878 5203 3168 16,248 
Specimen quality assurance transport 800    800 
Communication (IEC)   3456 3312 1152 7,920 
Laboratory analysis      
Microscopes (one per lab) 1678 1678 1678 1678 6,712 
Cytologie 400 394 260 158 1,212 
Pastorex 4,000 3,939 2,601 1,584 12,124 
Gram colorisation 1,200 1,182 780 475 3,637 
Culture  6,000 5,908 NA NA 11,908 
Determination du serogroupe  8,000 7,878 NA NA 15,877 
Sensibility aux antibiotiques  2,800 2,757 NA NA 5,557 
RT-PCR machine 60,000 NA NA NA 60,000 
RT-PCR analysis ? NA NA NA  
     Total 220,396 
NA = not applicable;   ? = No previous data available 
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9.3 Discussion 
The results provided cost estimates to close resource gaps identified in the evaluation.  
Since the aim of the WPA is to inform programme budgets for better resource 
allocation, the ideal next steps, would be to use the activity and input unit costs to 
estimate the costs of each proposed upgrade component. Inputs (e.g. per diem, annual 
register, accommodation) could then be calculated by cost multipliers (e.g. number of 
districts, number of Pastorex kits) to formulate district budgets that reflect reality.  The 
WPA template for budget development shown in Appendix 5 details which expenses 
should be included in such a future budget. In lieu of calculating specific estimates for 
each proposed activity, the proportional analysis of incremental costs and the national 
extrapolation of Goundi and Moissala were estimated as proxy estimates that can be 
used to plan or advocate resources needed for improving the system.  This is a less ideal 
method, but due to data limitations it was adequate to guide stakeholders in thinking 
about needs and resource re-allocation. 
 
Even with limited data, the results of the Chad evaluation show that a poorly invested 
system is highly inefficient as noted by the high cost per detected case and potentially 
more costly in the long run. The sister-study in Niger, used a similar methodology to 
estimate incremental costs but benefited from a much stronger surveillance system and 
more available data. In contrasts to Chad, Niger spent US$ 1, 951,562 and .12 per capita 
on meningitis surveillance in 2012—four times that of Chad.  They estimated that the 
costs to upgrade the current system would only be 9% of current costs (207). The other 
costs of the system include potential harm to the population; the current Chad 
meningitis surveillance system is missing many cases of meningitis as suggested from 
the comparison of the number of cases detected in Moissala and Goundi compared to 
those in the other districts. The potential for harm is also evident in the lack of trained 
individuals to do lumbar puncture and the inability of some suspected patients to get to 
the district hospitals. 
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The 123% increase in spending for meningitis surveillance may appear steep and is 
potentially an under- or over-estimate due to the data limitations and assumptions 
already described. However, such a large estimate calls attention to the low level of 
current investments and the enormity of the task to implement a meningitis 
surveillance (and IDSR) system that is beneficial for the health workers and the 
population.  The pilot plan detailed above requires that the MSP spend 56% of its 
current annual meningitis budget on an eight-month plan operated in three districts. 
With continued support from the WHO and other partners support, this was a 
suggested starting point to test the return on investment and demonstrate how to 
strengthen particular districts to an operational standard in a feasible and sustainable 
way.  Our recommendations also urged that particular attention and resources are 
devoted to supporting district and regional laboratories and ensuring regular delivery 
of laboratory supplies. Training in performance of lumbar punctures among 
appropriate clinical personnel was also suggested as a priority.  
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10 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The essential functions of communicable disease surveillance are not contingent on 
setting.  Whether investigating the remaining polio cases in Pakistan or tracking Middle 
East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus infection around South Korea, public health 
systems must have the ability to detect and confirm new cases, report and analyse 
disease data, and respond to health events in a timely manner. This intrinsic structure 
lends itself to straightforward standard CDSS guidelines. Yet, in countries with 
underdeveloped health systems, competing factors present challenges to adopting these 
guidelines and to realising the operational potential of communicable disease 
surveillance. In such cases, in order to ensure that basic functions are performing as 
intended, evaluations must consider potentially hidden gaps and hindrances so that 
recommended corrections are appropriate and feasible. This thesis examined the 
usefulness of standard evaluation CDSS guidelines in such contexts and documented 
the outcomes of applying a novel work-process methodological approach to evaluating 
meningitis surveillance in Chad.   
 
10.1 Summary of thesis findings  
In Chapter 3, I presented the results of a systematic review of 20 CDSS evaluations in 
low- and lower-middle income countries, which found that every study used the WHO 
or CDC frameworks in some capacity to guide study design and methods.  
 
In Chapter 5, I introduced and described the new WPA approach tailored for CDSS. 
The chapter also gave an overview of the methods used to evaluate the cost and 
performance of meningitis surveillance in Chad.  
 
In Chapter 6, I described the PHSS in Chad and the theoretical logic model for the 
meningitis surveillance system, as informed by meningitis, surveillance, and laboratory 
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experts. This logic model was used as a reference to compare actual and expected 
performance. This mapping exercise revealed that the national surveillance programme 
was only nominally integrated and in reality operated through several parallel and 
redundant systems.  
 
In Chapter 7, I presented findings from five levels of analysis to assess the performance 
and operations of the meningitis surveillance and IDSR in Chad.  After describing the 
IDSR structure, the subnational analysis found that performance was weakest for case 
detection and confirmation functions at the health facility and laboratory levels. Other 
key findings at the health facility level included the lack of data archival ability and 
multiple immediate notification, and sample collection forms with differing formats. 
Another key finding was that poor adherence to CSF specimen handling and shipping 
procedures resulted in high levels of contaminated samples.  
 
At district- and regional- levels, varying population estimates and lack of demographic 
and health survey data inhibited the surveillance officers’ ability to estimate reliable 
epidemiological rates and thresholds.  Further comparison of district performance by 
surveillance strategy showed that Moissala and Goundi were the only districts that 
operated surveillance in close compliance with national and regional SOPs. Both 
districts received additional funding from non-governmental entities. Their data on 
resource costs and unit estimates were later used to inform the proposed CDSS 
operational standard. 
 
In Chapter 8, I calculated the costs for the three surveillance strategies as well as costs 
per surveillance activity. The main cost driver for meningitis surveillance in Chad was 
laboratory investigation, which accounted for 30% percent of costs. The national 
meningitis surveillance system spent an estimated $0.03 per capita. 
  
Chapter 9 presented the combined cost and performance data used in the meningitis 
surveillance operational standard recommendation. We found that the incremental cost 
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for upgrading all of Chad to this standard would require a 123% addition to the 
programme.  Subsequently, upon the request of the Ministére de la Santé Publique, a 
three-district sentinel surveillance pilot study with budget was proposed to 
demonstrate feasibility and effectiveness of suggested changes to the system before 
attempting large-scale implementation.   
 
10.2 Empirical validation of the WPA approach 
This thesis redesigned a non-public health assessment concept into a CDSS evaluation 
approach for particular use in low- and lower-middle income countries. To the extent of 
my knowledge, this was the first time the WPA approach was used in a resource-
constrained setting in the evaluation of a CDSS. This section examines the validity of 
this new approach by reviewing its merit to the present evaluation study in relation to 
the empirical literature as well as its added benefit to the existing CDSS evaluation 
frameworks.  
 
To reiterate the operationalisation of the approach: the WPA tools were customised for 
the Chad evaluation. The tools are the logic model, work-process tree, and performance 
indicators for the present evaluation. From these activities a “gold-standard” meningitis 
surveillance system for Chad was composed and approved by stakeholders. For the 
analysis stage, processes were mapped to the logic model standard, which exposed 
missing inputs, activities and needs gathered during the study. The resulting table was 
used to guide selection of the resources needed to upgrade the entire system to a 
feasible operational standard. 
 
The WPA approach as proposed in this thesis addressed several limitations of other 
CDSS evaluations. In the literature, either the CDC or WHO frameworks guided all 
surveillance system evaluations, yet studies varied widely in methods used. The 
present study tested a more structured and systematic methodology for low-resource 
settings.  Other studies have noted the need for such a structure, recommending the 
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development of a more systematic or “best practice” approach for assessing 
performance and identifying systemic challenges that impede surveillance 
implementation (98, 209). The influence of the WPA structure and rigour to the 
evaluation findings was demonstrated in several areas identified in the literature as 
lacking. 
 
10.2.1 Benefit of precise evaluation findings 
The systematic literature review provided an in-depth understanding of how IDSR is 
implemented in resource-constrained settings. Additionally, the background reading on 
bacterial meningitis gave me a foundational comprehension of clinical and laboratory 
procedures. This intense focus on formative research in addition to consulting local 
experts greatly benefitted in the development of a factual surveillance blueprint for the 
Chad context. Further, the accuracy (i.e. in regards to content and context) of our 
questions permitted participants to offer specific details about their daily experience 
performing processes versus merely “testing” the participants on standardized 
indicators and SOPs. The study deliberately took this approach as other studies noted 
that some participants feared that answering questions honestly could result in 
penalisation from Ministry of Health officials (162, 169). 
 
The study also found that reviewing how a system is supposed to work provided a level 
of education to the evaluation participants and stakeholders. It also allowed us to 
gather more nuanced reasons on why performance was weak or strong. For example, 
other evaluation studies found that disease detection suffered because health staff were 
weak in their knowledge on case definitions, or due to a lack of active case search or 
community involvement in surveillance activities (156, 159, 165). In this study, I found 
that, in addition to these issues, health facility staff often lacked understanding of the 
importance of their role within the overall disease monitoring and outbreak prevention 
strategy. In countries with limited resources, trainings are often infrequent; obtaining 
this information allows for topics to be customised and optimises training efforts to 
meet staff needs. 
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In summary, the study provided the Chadian government and other stakeholders with 
evaluation results that: 
1. Identified the gaps in surveillance functions in each district by comparing 
current surveillance activities against the evaluation logic model as a consensus 
standard; 
2. Presented district surveillance performance according to costs which, 
highlighted specific areas of investment needed for overall system 
improvement; and   
3. Provided cost estimates per surveillance function and support activity that can 
be used in all meningitis belt countries to estimate cost per 100,000 population 
of upgrading their system. 
 
These types of results are not typically obtained through traditional CDSS evaluation 
methods.  The data collected elucidates the specific needs of the Chadian meningitis 
and integrated disease surveillance systems, but also provides generalizable data that 
are useful to the similar environments in that region (e.g. countries within the 
meningitis belt ).  The unique benefit of the WPA evaluation design was affirmed by the 
quality of pertinent information that was accepted by stakeholders to improve 
meningitis surveillance and CDSS functionality. 
 
10.2.2 Value-added of including cost-analyses in CDSS evaluations 
The broader evaluation addressed my PhD aim to understand if combining financial 
and performance results, using the WPA structure, was useful in providing information 
to advocate for funding. Few studies have conducted a systematic cost-analysis 
alongside performance assessment. In this study, from the protocol development to 
pilot testing, several health economists worked alongside surveillance specialists to 
design the study. Combining the ingredient approach to the WPA methods revealed 
complementary granular techniques for identifying resource constituents of the system. 
Previous evaluation studies with cost assessments generally performed this by 
extracting and reviewing budgetary data.  These studies often had access to old budgets 
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or historical data on costs, inhibiting an appropriate comparison of the current 
evaluation (162). Lukwago et al. conducted the most thorough cost analysis and 
“examined” budget allocations to compute per capita input, but did not report on 
actual programme expenditure (101).  Such sweeping budget reviews and unstructured 
cost assessments are often used to speculate on the adequacy of funding in relation to 
the efficiency of a system. However, since the methods used were not systematic, 
decision makers may not have much confidence in such claims about funding 
sufficiency and may be concerned that additional resources could lead to resource 
wastage (210). By discounting the cost-consequence element of performance, 
surveillance programmes miss an opportunity to provide evidence to advocate for 
system improvement to policy-makers and donors.  
 
The present study demonstrates how to meaningfully consider costs in relation to 
surveillance operations and performance. The study provided reliable information on 
average cost per suspected case, average cost per analysed sample, and cost drivers of 
surveillance expenses. Several studies mentioned the need for cost estimates when 
considering reinforcing logistics and performance capacity (101, 162, 168). While the 
existing evaluation standards acknowledge the importance of CDSS costs, they do not 
provide any meaningful guidance on cost-analysis methods or on how to effectively use 
cost data (8, 31, 98).  
 
Studies such as this evaluation provide an opportunity to build a repository of cost-
estimates specifically for resource-constrained settings. While cost-data tools exist (e.g. 
WHO CHOICE), accurate estimates of most surveillance costs are currently unavailable 
(211). Understanding the economic side of surveillance systems can be quite daunting 
for epidemiologists and programme managers; fortunately, as seen in the present 
study, health economists with relevant experience can propose useful methods and 
creative solutions to improve attempts to ascertain the cost-performance dynamic of a 
given CDSS. 
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10.2.3 Collection of contextual and non-surveillance-related factors  
In our study, contextual factors were not deeply analysed or assessed. However, the 
deliberate observation, collection, and review of such information provided meaningful 
insights to help the MSP officials and stakeholders better understand district and health 
facility performance. These factors helped the study team with this question: If all 
surveillance-related factors are the same, how are some districts performing so much better than 
others? Understanding the implications of districts supported by government, private, 
and/or non-government organisations, was useful in considering recommendations for 
new strategies. Other studies endorsed the need to understand contextual factors. 
Wuhib et al. documented how the dissolution of the former Soviet Union centralised 
PHSS platform impacted the operations of the Armenian CDSS (162). Studies that did 
not consider the non-surveillance factors (e.g., social, infrastructural, political) that 
influence surveillance duties (especially for post-conflict or extremely poor countries) 
reported vast system issues and hindrances to improving surveillance (118). Evaluating 
these countries without context is an injudicious technique, which could lead to a 
distorted comparison of countries from the same part of the world but with vastly 
different circumstances. This could unintentionally alienate or embarrass local study 
participants and MoHs. Moreover, the recommendations generated may be ineffective 
to impact policies or programmes due to the unacknowledged backdrop of socio-
political and environmental challenges. Contextual information could serve as 
preliminary data for future in-depth investigations or underlying assumptions for 
optimisation models.   
 
10.2.4 Usefulness of the evidence-based recommendations for programme and 
policy improvement 
The inclusion of MSP staff and local stakeholders throughout the process ensured 
ownership or “buy-in” at the start of the evaluation and also created a direct link 
between the study and relevant decision makers. The effect of this was clearly seen 
when the finding of the dubious lumbar puncture policy was revealed in the 
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dissemination meeting; the ministry of health official granted nurses permission to do 
lumbar punctures at the meeting. I use this example not to remark on the judiciousness 
of his reaction, but to illustrate that this type of direct influence on policy is unusual 
and may have been due to factors unique to Chad; such as the relatively direct access 
researchers have to the small number of influential health officials.  Still, this sequence 
of events demonstrated the practicality and usefulness of the approach in such settings.  
 
The dissemination meeting was valuable in assessing the merit of our recommendations 
and served as an opportunity to harmonise practices and train sub-national level staff. 
Study participants validated the usefulness of the findings by discussing solutions to 
identified programme weaknesses and system bottlenecks, including the non-
distribution of latex tests to the district laboratories. Upon hearing this, the chief 
laboratory technician immediately retrieved and distributed the tests to the district 
laboratory leads at the meeting. This suggests, that this level of specificity of evaluation 
findings could be useful in countries with emerging surveillance programmes and more 
flexible administrative processes.  In contrast, other studies reported more typical 
evaluation findings that provided policy recommendations, which focused on the 
attainment of standards, performance indicators, and common top-down changes (19, 
101, 153). Mostly, this was because the recommendations aligned with the objectives of 
the study, which in Sub-Saharan Africa were typically to appraise the implementation 
of the IDSR strategy. Hence, exact programme improvements were not accentuated in 
the articles, but may have been conveyed to the MoHs.  
 
The evaluation findings resulting from the WPA approach were sufficiently specific to 
develop an evidence-based upgraded surveillance strategy for meningitis in Chad. Our 
results provided both cost and performance information, which was previously 
unknown to local decision makers and stakeholders. Information generated from 
similar approaches can be used to request specific resources to optimise parts of 
surveillance systems.  
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Further validation of this approach was obtained through ensuring face and content 
validity of study questionnaires as well as traditional vetting of concepts and methods, 
including: appraisal by other academics, surveillance practitioners, evaluation experts, 
and health economists. The approach and study finding have also been presented at 
conferences, seminars, and reviewed by applied scientists from the WHO.  Based on 
this feedback, the WPA constructs and tools have been refined.  
 
10.3 Strengths and limitations 
This was the first study to estimate the costs of meningitis surveillance in the African 
meningitis belt. The thesis demonstrated the WPA’s methodological benefits to low-
resource settings; however, the approach has several limitations that should be 
considered. The primary limitation is that it can be resource and time intensive. In this 
study, the time spent for the deeper WPA inspection of the system was still insufficient 
to cover a number of areas with the required depth, as explained in Chapter 7.  There is 
an opportunity to refine the approach for efficiency purposes. The amount of funds 
needed and expertise required for such a comprehensive evaluation are unlikely to be 
easily available in low-resource settings, and it is impractical to continually depend on 
external funding.  However, an in-depth evaluation can be conducted periodically or 
alongside other system planning activities already earmarked in the public health 
budget.  
 
Alternatively, WPA-type evaluations can be divided into smaller and more focused 
parts; this can be done by facility type (e.g. health facility or laboratory assessment) or 
by surveillance function (e.g. case detection assessment). In this way, the system parts 
can be regularly monitored and reinforced. Local evaluation and health economics 
expertise is likely to be unavailable; external evaluators should commit to working 
alongside MoH staff and local NGOs to conduct assessments with an aim to transfer 
knowledge and increase local evaluation capacity. Several studies have produced richer 
findings by performing targeted assessments of a small number of surveillance 
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functions (79, 166) or specific ancillary structures such as logistics and emergency 
preparedness (165, 168).  A precaution of conducting a truncated assessment with fewer 
study sites is that the precision of data along with the inclusion of contextual 
information may increase the ability to identify specific health facilities. It may also 
make it difficult to ensure confidentiality about study findings, especially when needs 
or complaints are shared. This problem was encountered during our study. To avoid 
this issue during the dissemination meeting, we were selective about the content of the 
aggregate data we displayed and chose generic quotes that were not incriminating.  
Thoughtful consideration around ensuring anonymity in multi-level audiences should 
be considered with this evaluation approach to ensure that punitive measures are not 
taken against a health facility or individuals and that shame is not caused. District or 
regional authorities may need specific health facility information, in such cases positive 
and negative results should be presented objectively.  
 
The WPA may not be useful for more advanced systems or for systems that have 
already benefitted from regular evaluations. One example is the Burkina Faso and Mali 
assessment to increase the country capacity of case based surveillance before the 
introduction of MenAfriVac® (155). The authors explained that both countries had 
‘strong’ existing surveillance infrastructures and in-country expertise. Hence, the study 
revealed nationwide and higher-level gaps to improve performance and provided 
progressive recommendations, such as mentorship, training and technology transfer. 
Additionally, the study relied heavily on existing reliable data an evaluation to only 
improve achievement of the performance indicators was preferable.  In Chad, such 
infrastructures, strategies, and data did not exist; further, the cost to perform a WPA-
type analysis for the entire country would have been infeasible and unrealistic.  
 
Another constraint is that the WPA approach is very dependent on access to local 
surveillance actors and relevant key partners. In Chad, we had the advantage of 
building on already established institutional links.  Additionally, I was fortunate in 
knowing several persons in key partner organisations, namely CDC and the Carter 
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Centre.  This will not always be the case in WPA appropriate settings, especially those 
recovering from or in the midst of political and social instability. In such cases, foreign 
researchers, in particular, should focus on gathering as much documented information 
on the country as possible as well as working with larger institutions, such as WHO. 
 
Finally, one modest strength, but a strength nonetheless, is the underlying assumption 
of non-linearity between evaluation processes, surveillance activities, and resource 
allocation, which was presented in this thesis. While in some ways the thesis premise 
mirrors that of the empirical operational literature, which asserts if resource gaps are 
aptly filled, the CDSS will function optimally, I also acknowledge the importance of the 
tacit institutional knowledge and contextual factors. For example, the present study 
identified barriers, such as incomplete adoption of IDSR and a narrow understanding/ 
lack of ownership of CDSS aims. These concerns were anticipated, so our health facility 
questionnaire included a Likert-type (rating) scale to measure staff perception of CDSS 
value, work burden, and budget ownership. Unfortunately, the respondents were not 
familiar with this type of rating exercise and so the answers were not included in the 
analysis. It is possible that these barriers could have been understood through a deeper 
exploration of non-linear influences or a robust social-ecological approach for 
improving CDSS performance in low resource countries. This consideration was 
beyond the scope of the PhD objectives, but such cross-disciplinary applications have 
proven beneficial in similar public health research areas (212, 213). 
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10.4 Research recommendations and policy implications 
10.4.1 Rethinking CDSS evaluations in resource-constrained settings 
CDSS evaluations are generally undertaken to improve the ability to monitor 
population health and ensure prompt and effective response system for disease 
outbreaks and other public health emergencies (214). Evaluation findings have pointed 
to systemic, targeted, and comprehensive gaps, yet numerous developing countries, 
mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, have yet to demonstrate significant improvements in 
CDSS as a result of these assessments. Though there may be several reasons for lack of 
research uptake, the findings of this thesis indicate that lack of tailoring conventional 
methods to health system maturity is a possible explanation. 
 
The concept of tailoring evaluations to meet programme needs is inherent within the 
traditional evaluation frameworks, but within a linear, indicator-driven structure.  This 
thesis contributes a field-validated approach to capturing the unique challenges of 
evaluating a surveillance system in a developing country.  It demonstrated that there 
are methodological synergies across disciplines, which can expand conventional 
evaluations. The Chad evaluation case study countered the unstated assumption that 
what is needed for CDSS evaluations was already captured by the existing frameworks. 
This PhD demonstrates that to truly understand system complexities at sub-national 
levels, we need to think towards applying different methods for different settings. 
 
The WPA approach in many ways echoes certain principles of health systems thinking 
as adapted by the WHO for health systems strengthening (210). Specifically, by 
designing evaluations (and interventions) that acknowledge and attempt to confront 
the dynamics between country priorities, donor funding, human capacity, contextual 
influences, structural elements, and other underlying characteristics of health system. 
The findings in this thesis suggest that there is an evolutionary pattern towards the use 
of certain in-depth evaluation methods in relation to the maturity, stability, and 
functionality of a given CDSS. There are several factors and processes that could be 
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coupled to certain stages of surveillance system maturity. Figure 10.1 depicts a potential 
model of such an evaluation gradient. As shown, when a health system is weaker or the 
data quality produced by that health system merits low confidence from the evaluator 
and local stakeholders, the type of methods to obtain reliable data for a CDSS 
evaluation must involve high levels of contact with the sub-national staff. Like the 
present study, and other studies found in the literature, these methods should include 
interviews and reviews of actual surveillance forms and tools.  The more robust a 
surveillance system is and the more confidence the evaluator and stakeholders have in 
the data quality is high, direct with staff is less necessary. In this case, the surveillance 
outputs can be assessed to calculate quantitative indicators and determine system 
performance. 
 
Figure 10.1 Potential model of a methods gradient for CDSS evaluation 
 
 
 
This concept of a gradient of evaluation methods blurs the hard line between ‘tree-by-
tree’ and ‘forest’, or details versus context beliefs to gaining knowledge and 
understanding of surveillance system (210). The WPA, while granular in practice, was 
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presented as an integrated component of common approaches that increases local 
participation and builds ownership while ensuring high performance of a national 
surveillance system.  As illustrated in the case study, the meningitis surveillance system 
could not be disentangled from the needs, goals, and planning of the overall integrated 
disease surveillance system—nor should it ever be.  The weaknesses that were found in 
the meningitis surveillance system actually represented broad system inadequacies that 
if strengthened could be leveraged for multiple disease programmes and initiatives (e.g. 
health facility staff training and transport needs). This view of CDSS evaluation fuses 
well with the global trend towards holistic management of systems and meaningful 
consideration of larger system-wide issues and inter-related system components (210, 
215, 216) 
 
10.4.2 Toward sustainable and reliable surveillance systems in resource-
constrained countries.  
Policy implications in Chad 
While it was still in progress the present study was presented in the autumn of 2013 at 
the 11th Annual Inter-Country Meeting on Surveillance and Response of Meningitis, Yellow 
Fever, Measles, And Cholera Epidemics in Africa.  Several regional and global surveillance 
practitioners and meningitis epidemiologists and laboratory specialists expressed 
interest in the study results and universally agreed that the study was indeed novel and 
necessary, especially in providing the unknown economic costs of meningitis 
surveillance. Several of the Chad national surveillance office attended this meeting, and 
theis feedback reinforced the Chadian MSP commitment to the study and raised the 
meningitis surveillance profile Chad. Two years later, the MenAfriNet organisation 
requested the study results. MenAfriNet is an international consortium recently 
supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, but has been operating in several 
countries for more than a decade. Its aim is to strengthen the meningitis surveillance 
network in Africa. Their work, headed by CDC and AMP, has been instrumental in 
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supporting Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Togo by enhancing epidemiology, 
laboratory, and data management capacity. 
 
I participated in the MenAfriNet mission to evaluate the suitability of adding Chad as 
one of two additional country sites. The results from our evaluation, particularly the 
detailed understanding of CBS and ES, the detailed laboratory inventory and associated 
costs, and the identification of critical gaps, allowed the team to forgo the customary 
needs assessment and surveillance evaluation. Moreover, our in-country knowledge 
and relationships expedited the mission activities. By the end of the mission, the 
consortium decided to include Chad as a MenAfriNet site and expedited its integration. 
Our suggested three-district sentinel plan was used to guide their decision of district-
selection for the first year pilot phase. During this phase, which commences in autumn 
2015, activities to enhance case detection, laboratory confirmation, and data 
management in select districts will be implemented to support meningitis disease 
burden monitoring. Another aim will be to evaluate the impact of introducing 
MenAfriVac® and PCV13 into the routine immunisation schedule. MenAfriNet 
leverages the IDSR platform in order to harmonise meningitis surveillance activities, 
including specimen transport and data transition—this will greatly influence further 
policy initiatives and the programme was personally welcomed by the Chadian 
Minister of Health.  
 
This incredible, but unexpected outcome successfully answered the thesis inquiry and 
found that robust evidence-based data provides powerful and persuasive advocacy for 
donor funding. Also, since working in low-income countries is challenging, donors can 
leverage evaluations, such as ours, to identify and fill crucial surveillance gaps. This 
real-word outcome underscores the important role of partnerships in sustaining and 
optimising surveillance (and health) systems in resource-constrained settings. The work 
of CSSI and MSF-France in collaboration with the Chad MSP provided the foundation 
for MenAfriNet to build upon. In most cases, institutional knowledge of in-country 
partner organisations is essential for any incoming intervention or new study. MSF-
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France supplied our study with high quality and fluid information, which 
supplemented our stationary evaluation data. This type of information can allow 
stakeholders to make informed decisions on where and how to improve the system as 
well as brainstorm contingency strategies based on local circumstances. 
 
Since the first aim of MenAfriNet is to improve the laboratory capacity and capability, it 
is my hope that the regional laboratory in Moundou will be reinvigorated, sufficiently 
equipped, and fully utilised to analyse specimen in the south of the country. This will 
reduce the burden at the national level and will require less specimen travel time from 
the district laboratories.  Further, Chad has started a path once travelled by countries 
like Burkina Faso. Over the past 10 years, Burkina Faso has become the sub-Saharan 
model of successful and capable laboratory services. Their surveillance data is often 
lauded as high quality, and other health programmes  have built on the strong 
surveillance foundation (217). Burkina Faso also benefits as host of the regional West 
Africa Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program, another product of 
deliberate collaborations to improve disease control and response capacity within the 
region (218).  This type of consistent and thoughtful systems strengthening can help 
Chad transition from its weak system to a higher functioning surveillance system that 
benefits from a sound understanding of the system attributes and can realistically 
attempt to achieve regional and global standards. With a new focus on improving 
quality epidemiological and laboratory data, Chad can become a confident proxy of the 
veracity of MenAfriVac® effectiveness and the success of future routine immunisation 
and vaccination campaign efforts. This is a promising venture for both Chad and the 
region. 
 
Moving forward, I hope this research encourages the MSP and international and local 
partner agencies to work on filling the gaps identified in the system in a coordinated 
manner.  There were three parallel meningitis surveillance systems identified in the 
study: Moissala (the MSF-ran district), Goundi (the private-Catholic supported district) 
and for some time Gonou-Gaya and Guelengdeng (supported by a study team at 
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LSHTM) all operated independently from the governments purview. The evaluation 
findings illustrated how multiple data streams make the system inefficient and 
increases the burden of work for staff. The findings can be used as an opportunity for 
stakeholders to collaborate in filling the system gaps together and going forward with a 
unified plan of action.   
 
Global policy implications 
 
 
The world is not lacking in institutions, policies, and global agenda items to guide and 
bolster international efforts to detect emerging and re-emerging diseases. The 
International Health Regulations (2005) are the most regarded and  internationally 
agreed rules specifically aimed at preventing and controlling the international spread of 
disease (15, 219). Still, many low-income countries continue to be unprepared to 
successfully prevent and combat disease outbreaks as seen with Ebola in West Africa 
where, at the time of this thesis, communities were still ravaged by the consequences of 
poor health-care systems and infrastructure (220). The main affected countries, Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, have many similarities to Chad. All appear on the least 
developed countries list, have weak public health systems, volatile political pasts, patchy 
infrastructures, and rank among the lowest in global development (221, 222). Many 
critics and experts note that the only way to ensure that future re-emerging and 
"As the importance of health in the global agenda grows, so does 
the responsibility to measure accurately its complex dimensions 
and to assess the effects of increasing investments on population 
health. The present bursts of political and financial will to 
improve global health has to be matched by an adequate 
response from the community of experts in constructing a firm 
foundation of metrics and evaluation." 
- Dr Christopher J. L. Murray, 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
 
 304 
emerging disease can be contained is to realise that the global chain of health systems is 
only as strong as its weakest links (223).  
 
This recognition and refocus on unique context of such countries is a promising 
direction toward prevention of future outbreaks and epidemics. There is an opportunity 
for leading world experts and organisations to examine why existing global policies are 
not effective in certain settings. I found that examining the effectiveness of globally 
accepted CDSS evaluation standards revealed that resource-constrained settings have 
specific considerations that are sometimes missed. I believe that the same logic can be 
applied to understanding why global public health laws have been inadequate in 
ensuring safe cross-border health.  Global health frameworks should be aimed at 
understanding and meeting the needs of both local and international contexts.  This 
thesis demonstrates the value of meeting countries where they are and providing a path 
to effectively scaling up health systems. 
 
10.5 Areas for future research  
This was the first study to estimate the costs of meningitis surveillance in the African 
meningitis belt. Though this study did not aim to quantify the effectiveness of the 
surveillance strategies, it provides data that programmes can use to inform future cost-
effectiveness or fiscal-impact studies. Additionally, current targeted disease strategies 
could readily integrate a cost-analysis by projecting costs of expected surveillance rates 
(E.g. number of detected cases by 100,000 population) and laboratory diagnosis 
indicators to achieve minimum global (or regional) standards of surveillance functions. 
Pairing these rates with known cost estimates while thoughtfully considering potential 
cost for sharing resources across disease programmes could directly feed programme 
budgeting.  
 
Another area for additional research is to further explore the aforementioned values 
that underlie ‘granular-when-necessary’, ‘evaluation methodology gradient’, and 
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‘systems thinking’ concepts. These concepts can potentially be incorporated in the 
design and evaluations of multi-disease and integrated surveillance systems in 
resource-constrained countries. The present study only evaluated a vertical surveillance 
system due to the focus and aim of the funders.  Future research should aim to bring 
donors on board with field-practitioner and researcher recommendations to end 
fragmented funding modalities that drive disease-specific, vertical systems and redirect 
funding toward ensuring sustainable resources for wider surveillance system 
strengthening activities.  
 
Finally, sustainable and feasible evaluations must capitalise on the wave of 
technological advancements to modernise the laborious work of collecting, cataloguing, 
and assessing population health data. Public health researchers can now transform 
ubiquitous data into predictive surveillance information that can be used to detect 
health events earlier, as was demonstrated with Google Flu to track influenza-like 
illness in the United States (224). Further, computer technology can enhance situational 
awareness from ‘timely; to ‘real-time’ leading to reduced laboratory confirmation and 
outbreak response times. Continued research on how to effectively fit these 
technologies into existing health systems and how to effectively digitise evaluation 
methods should be prioritised. 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
This thesis examined how communicable disease surveillance systems in resource-
constrained settings could be strengthened by using a work-process analytic evaluation 
approach.   This new approach acknowledged recommendations made from earlier 
CDSS evaluations and included a cost analysis of the system. The case study of 
evaluating meningitis surveillance in Chad described the practical considerations as 
well as constructive challenges of embracing such an approach in a low income 
country. The study found that this granular assessment, though painstaking, 
demonstrated value by yielding comprehensive results and providing a well-grounded 
understanding of the cost and operations of the system. This evidence was used to 
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formulate and propose an upgraded strategy to improve monitoring of meningitis and 
pre-empt challenges that may emerge following the introduction of the new serogroup 
A meningococcal conjugate vaccine. 
 
By incorporating more of a research design into a programme evaluation, I challenged 
the conventional methods of assessing a CDSS. I was able to demonstrate that a 
granular understanding of the Chadian meningitis surveillance system produced 
evaluation results that were used to change policy, attract donors, and to restructure 
and optimise meningitis surveillance operations and functionality. This research was 
instrumental in Chad policymakers rethinking and ultimately modifying certain task-
position roles for meningitis diagnosis, particularly for performing lumbar punctures 
on suspected cases.  Furthermore, it directly contributed to the selection of Chad as a 
MenAfriNet site.  
 
The findings also have relevance for policy makers in other settings. The resulting cost 
estimations have been shared with the WHO and other countries in the African 
Meningitis Belt region to assist in the process of tailoring surveillance strategies and 
estimating resources needed to accommodate the introduction of MenAfriVac© .  The 
findings highlight the value in examining how global and regional standards for 
disease control and response can be re-framed or better targeted to address the unique 
factors affecting resource-constrained contexts. Additionally, the thesis advocates an 
evaluation framework that examines how contextual factors can influence which 
methods are best to evaluate CDSS. 
 
Public health surveillance undergirds all health systems; it is also an essential indicator 
of the strength of health systems, especially in low-income countries.  In these nations, 
disease surveillance is connected to country autonomy, self-reliance, and even human 
rights. While progress has been made globally in improving disease surveillance, the 
least developed countries are sometimes tasked to take on broad strategies and polices 
that while useful, may also burden more nascent or unsteady systems.  My experience 
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in Chad showed me that that there are mutual growth opportunities for global and 
local communities to exchange ideas for improving evaluation and programme 
standards towards sustainable surveillance system strengthening in these settings. 
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11 Appendix 
Appendix 1. Study approvals 
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Appendix 2. Logic model for meningitis surveillance in Chad 
 Detect/ Laboratory 
confirmation*  
Report and analysis ** Investigation/ 
Response 
Supervision and 
Feedback 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation*** 
INPUTS      
 Relevant personnel trained on 
LP technique and transport of 
CSF and IDSR forms 
 
Regular training and supervision of 
provincial and district laboratories, 
and ensure that reagents and 
laboratory equipment are available. 
Trained CdZ on data 
analysis and IDSR 
reporting 
 Transportation to 
provide supervision 
includes Motorbikes, 
bicycles, and/or vehicles 
-Petrol 
-Supervision schedule 
 
Patient  laboratory 
confirmed laboratory 
results 
Surveillance expertise 
Support from WHO 
ACTIVITIES     
Health 
Facility 
Diagnose suspected case 
Refer patient to district hospital 
for LP (CBS) or  
Conduct LP at health facility 
(ES) 
Provide treatment 
Notify CdZ /Regularly 
send line list to CDZ  
 
If there is a case, RCS 
conducts active 
surveillance and IEC 
activities  
Inform patient of lab 
results 
 
District Pick up  CSF, send to reference 
lab with surveillance form 
Perform rapid diagnostic tests 
Send CSF to national or regional 
laboratory 
Report results to CdZ 
Notify CASE  
Regularly compile and 
send line list to CASE  
Aggregate data send to 
CASE 
Develop weekly epidemic 
curve 
If there is a case, CdZ 
supports health 
facility with active 
surveillance and IEC 
activities 
If there is an outbreak 
conduct mass 
immunisation 
Weekly surveillance 
visits to 2 to 3 health 
facilities 
Monthly meetings with 
clinicians at health 
facilities  
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 Inform lab results to 
reporting clinician at 
health facility 
campaign targeting 
the entire district 
Region Perform diagnostic tests (Regional 
reference laboratory)  
Send confirmed cases to national 
laboratory 
Regularly report 
aggregate data to national 
level  
Aggregate data send to 
SSEI  
If there is an outbreak 
RRT must support and 
evaluate affected 
district(s) surveillance 
and laboratory 
activities. 
Weekly surveillance 
visits to 2 to 3 health 
facilities 
Monitor epidemic 
trends and thresholds 
Central Perform diagnostic tests 
Report results to national 
epidemiologic surveillance team  
Ship 15% of positive specimen to 
Oslo, Norway for quality assurance 
and control (QAQC) and molecular 
analysis 
 
Regularly report 
aggregate country data to 
WHO and country 
partners  
Create weekly map 
showing the alert and 
epidemic districts 
Analyse laboratory 
results by district and for 
the country 
If there is an outbreak 
RRT must support and 
evaluate affected 
district(s) surveillance 
and laboratory 
activities.  
Biannual QAQC for 
some labs and regional 
laboratory 
Biannual surveillance 
and laboratory 
supervision visits  
Weekly surveillance 
bulletin 
Monitor the circulation, 
distribution and evolution 
of Nm serogroups and 
other pathogens. 
Monitor the antibiotic 
resistance profile of Nm. 
Monitor the circulation, 
distribution and evolution 
of Nm strains (by 
sequence-typing) 
Evaluate control 
strategies 
OUTPUTS      
 weekly line lists available at 
district  
regular feedback on samples in 
order to minimise contamination 
and handling/transportation 
laboratory results fed back in a 
timely manner  
Copies of CBS forms at 
district and central level  
 
Alert or epidemic 
districts investigated 
and documented 
within 48 hours of 
reaching threshold 
Active CBS for all 
confirmed cases of 
meningitis 
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INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES     
 80% of specimen sent to lab 
< 20% of specimen 
contaminated/ week 
10 to 20% of positive isolates are 
transported to Oslo, Norway -
WHO Collaborating Centres for 
QA/ and genotyping and sequence-
typing. 
 
80% districts reporting on 
time 
 
Mass vaccination 
campaign for all 
districts which reach 
epidemic threshold 
Continuous supportive 
supervision  
 
Feedback timeliness: 
Districts: within 48 hours 
upon reception of the 
sample(s) 
Province/Region: within 5 
days upon reception of the 
sample(s) 
National level: within 7 
days upon reception of the 
sample(s) 
Evaluate the impact of 
the conjugate 
meningitis A vaccine on 
the number of cases and 
outbreaks, on epidemic 
patterns and on 
circulating serogroups 
LONG-TERM OUTCOME     
 Prompt detection of meningitis 
cases from all health facilities  
Rapid laboratory confirmation of 
causal pathogens to inform 
epidemic control and response 
measures 
Up to date case burden and 
incidence trends for acute 
bacterial meningitis  
 
Early response and 
immediate and 
appropriate public 
health control 
measures 
implemented for 
meningitis 
outbreaks/epidemics  
Increased quality of 
surveillance due to 
regular supervision 
Estimated effectiveness 
of the meningitis A 
conjugate vaccine  
 
*’Laboratory’ activities are written in italics 
** ‘Analysis’ activities are written in italics 
*** ‘Monitoring’ activities are written in italics 
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Appendix 3. Quality indicators included in the study questionnaires 
  Indicator Numerator Denominator Target Indicator/ 
Target 
source(s) 
Data Source 
1 Percent of suspected 
meningitis cases that have a 
lumbar puncture performed 
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases that had a 
lumbar puncture performed 
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases 
90% IB-VPD, 2012  National, 
Regional, 
District 
2 Percent of lumbar punctures 
performed that were recorded  
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases that had a 
lumbar puncture performed 
that were recorded in 
database 
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases 
90% PBM Network 
- 2009; IB-
VPD, 2012 
National, 
Regional, 
District 
3 Percent of specimens of CSF 
that showed bacterial growth 
Number of suspected cases 
who received a lumbar 
puncture, that have probable 
bacterial meningitis 
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases with 
lumbar punctures 
performed 
20% PBM Network 
- 2009; IB-
VPD, 2012 
National, 
Regional, 
District 
laboratory 
4 Percent of probable bacterial 
meningitis cases with a 
known outcome recorded  
Number of probable 
bacterial meningitis cases 
with an outcome recorded  
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases with 
probable bacterial 
meningitis 
90% IB-VPD, 2012 National, 
Regional, 
District 
laboratory 
5 Percent of suspected 
pneumococcal meningitis 
cases identified  
Number of suspected 
pneumococcal meningitis 
cases identified by national, 
district or regional 
laboratory 
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases  
NA Created by 
research team 
National, 
Regional, 
District 
laboratory 
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6 Percent of CSF samples 
logged into the laboratory 
Number of CSF samples 
logged into the laboratory  
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases that 
had a lumbar 
puncture performed 
75% IB-VPD, 2012 National 
Laboratory 
7 Percent of CSF contamination Number of CSF samples 
contaminated  
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases that 
had a lumbar 
puncture performed 
≤ 5% IB-VPD, 2012 National 
Laboratory 
8 Percent of CSF specimens 
forwarded to the reference 
laboratory for PCR and 
genotyping 
Number of CSF specimens 
sent to the reference 
laboratory for PCR and 
genotyping 
Number of suspected 
meningitis cases that 
had a lumbar 
puncture performed 
80% IB-VPD, 2012 National 
Laboratory 
9 Number of months for which 
reports with results were 
made 
Number of months that a 
report with aggregated 
results was made  
Number of months in 
the specified timeline 
≥ 8 
month
s 
PBM Network 
- 2009  
National 
Laboratory 
10 Percent health facilities that 
report meningitis data on time 
to the district (weekly) 
Number health facilities that 
report meningitis data on 
time to the district (weekly) 
Total number of 
health facilities 
reporting 
80% IB-VPD, 2012; 
IDSR-2010  
Regional, 
District 
11 Proportion of complete 
surveillance reports submitted 
on time to the district 
Number of sites that 
submitted complete 
surveillance reports on time 
to the district 
Total number of 
health facilities 
reporting 
80% IDSR-2010 District, Health 
facility  
12 Proportion of cases reported 
with case-based forms or line 
lists 
Number of cases reported 
with case-based forms or 
line lists 
Total number of cases 
that occurred in the 
health facility  
80% IDSR-2010 Health facility  
13 Proportion of suspected 
meningitis outbreaks notified 
to the district level within 2 
Number of suspected 
meningitis outbreaks 
notified to the district level 
Total number of 
suspected meningitis 
outbreaks in the 
health facility  
80% IDSR-2010 District, Health 
facility  
 315 
 
days of surpassing the alert 
threshold 
within 2 days of surpassing 
the alert threshold 
14 Proportion of suspected 
meningitis outbreaks notified 
to the national level within 2 
days of surpassing the alert 
threshold 
Number of suspected 
meningitis outbreaks 
notified to the national level 
within 2 days of surpassing 
the alert threshold 
Total number of 
suspected meningitis 
outbreaks in the 
health facility  
80% IDSR-2010 National, 
District 
16 Number of trained staff in 
surveillance methods*  
Number of trained staff in 
surveillance methods 
Number of staff at the 
health facility or 
district office 
NA Created by 
research team 
District, Health 
facility  
17 Percent  of staff that know the 
case definition of meningitis*  
Number of staff can state the 
case definition of meningitis 
Number of staff at the 
health facility or 
district office 
NA Created by 
research team 
District, Health 
facility  
18 Proportion of investigated 
outbreaks with lab results 
Number of investigated 
outbreaks with lab results in 
a given time period  
Total number of 
investigated outbreaks 
that occurred in a 
given time period 
80% IDSR-2010 National, 
Regional, 
District 
19 Proportion of confirmed 
outbreaks with nationally 
recommended health response 
Number of confirmed 
outbreaks with a nationally 
recommended response 
Number of confirmed 
outbreak in the district 
80% IDSR-2010 National, 
Regional, 
District 
20 Proportion of monthly 
surveillance reports submitted 
from the district to the region 
on time for 3 consecutive 
months 
Number of districts that 
submitted meningitis 
surveillance reports on time 
to the regional level 
Total number of 
districts that report to 
the regional level 
80% IDSR-2010 National, 
Regional, 
District 
21 Proportion of monthly 
surveillance reports submitted 
from the region to the national 
Number of regions that 
submitted meningitis 
surveillance reports on time 
to the national level 
Total number of 
regions that report to 
the national level 
80% IDSR-2010 National, 
Regional, 
District 
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level on time for 3 consecutive 
months 
22 Proportion of districts in 
which a current line graph of 
weekly trend analysis of 
meningitis is available 
Number of line graphs 
available at the district level 
Number of districts 80% IDSR-2010 National, 
Regional 
23 Proportion of epidemics 
detected at the national level 
that were missed at the district 
level 
Number of epidemics 
detected by the regional or 
national level from 
analysing district specific 
data 
Total number of 
epidemics reported by 
district  
0 IDSR-2010 National 
24 Proportion of health facilities 
with available transport for 
suspected cases to referral 
hospital* 
Number of sample health 
facilities  with available 
transport for suspected cases 
to referral hospital 
Total number of 
sample health 
facilities 
NA Created by 
research team 
Health facility  
25 Percent of suspected cases, 
identified at health facility, to 
reach referral hospital* 
Number of suspected cases, 
identified at sample health 
facilities to reach referral 
hospital 
Number of suspected 
cases identified at 
sample health facility 
NA Created by 
research team 
Health facility  
26 Proportion of health facilities 
with free meningitis 
treatment*  
Number of sample health 
facilities with free meningitis 
treatment available for 
suspected cases  
Number of sample 
health facilities  
NA Created by 
research team 
Health facility  
27 Proportion of health facilities 
with meningitis treatment for 
a cost* 
Availability of purchasable 
meningitis treatment at 
sample health facilities 
Number of sample 
health facilities  
NA Created by 
research team 
Health facility  
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28 Percent  of full time staff at 
health facility* 
Number of full time staff at 
sample health facilities 
Total number of staff 
at sample health 
facilities 
NA Created by 
research team 
Health facility  
29 Average number of staff at 
health facilities* 
Number of staff at all 
sample health facilities  
Number of sample 
health facilities  
NA Created by 
research team 
Health facility  
30 Average length of 
employment of pertinent staff 
at health facility*  
Number of days of 
employment of pertinent 
staff at each sample health 
facility  
Number of pertinent 
staff at sample health 
facilities 
NA Created by 
research team 
Health facility  
31 Average length of 
employment of district 
surveillance lead* 
Number days of 
employment of sample 
district surveillance lead 
Number of sample 
district surveillance 
lead 
NA Created by 
research team 
District 
  * Denotes supportive indicators created by research team 
  IB-VPD: Invasive Bacterial Vaccine Preventable Diseases Laboratory Network 
  IDSR: Integrated disease surveillance and response 
  PBM: Paediatric bacterial meningitis 
  NA: Not applicable 
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Appendix 4. Health facility questionnaire  
Résultat de l’interview:   Complété   
 Partiellement complété (indiquer le numéro de la question ainsi que la 
raison) 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE DESTINE A LA PERSONNE RESPONSABLE DE LA SURVEILLANCE 
DE LA MENINGITE DANS UN ETABLISSEMENT DE SANTE 
Version 08 SEPT 2013 
1. Dates des visites des interviews:   
Visite 1      /     /       
Visite 2      /     /       
Visite 3      /     /      
2. Nom de l’enquêteur: ______________________________________ 
3. Région: __________________________________________________ 
4. District: __________________________________________________ 
I. INFORMATIONS GENERALES 
5. Nom de l’établissement: _____________________________________________ 
6. Type d’établissement  (Cochez toutes les cases):  
Hôpital régional  Hôpital de district Mission  
Centre de soins  Clinique    Publique  Privé 
7. Renseignements sur le répondant (répondant 1 doit être le répondant principal, ajouter des lignes 
si nécessaire) 
 Nom Poste Numéro de 
téléphone 
email 
1     
2     
3     
4     
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8. Ce centre utilise-t-il une surveillance au cas par cas ou une surveillance renforcée pour la 
méningite bactérienne? 
 Au cas par cas  
Renforcée  
9. La personne interviewée connaît-elle la différence entre la surveillance au cas par cas et la 
surveillance renforcée?  
 
Oui   Non   Ne sait pas  
S’il ne la connaît pas, donnez-lui la définition suivante: 
La surveillance renforcée est la collecte de données pour les cas suspects de méningite, les données 
agrégées sont rapportées au niveau du district de manière hebdomadaire et en suivant les lignes 
directrices de l’IDSR.  
La surveillance au cas par cas permet de collecter les informations pour chaque cas suspect de 
méningite sur un formulaire spécial incluant aussi le prélèvement du liquide cérébro-spinal (LCR) qui est 
envoyé au laboratoire pour analyse. 
10. La définition de cas de méningite est-elle visible/affichée dans l'établissement de santé?  
Oui   Non   
 
11. Demander au personnel disponible si ils connaissent et peuvent énoncer la définition d'un cas 
suspect de méningite bactérienne  
____ Nombre d'employés interrogés  
_____ Nombre d'employés qui connaissent cette définition  
 
II. CARACTERISTIQUES DE L’ETABLISSEMENT 
 
12. Qui détient les droits de propriété de l’établissement?  
 Gouvernement   Privé Mission; ajouter le type _________  
ONG; ajoutez le nom_____________  Autre, préciser  _________________  
13. L’établissement a-t-il son propre budget?  
Oui   Non 
a. Si oui, quel est le budget total de l’établissement pour 2012? __________CFA 
Si oui, demandez à voir le budget 
14. Quelles sont les sources de financement ou de revenu de l’établissement? Cocher ci-dessous 
Transfert budgétaire de collectivités locales (incluant les assemblées de district) 
Budget du gouvernement national 
Honoraires pour le service 
 Donateur (spécifier ___________) 
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 ONG (spécifier___________) 
Prime d’assurance 
 Autre, spécifier________________ 
15. L’établissement a-t-il reçu des donations en nature en 2012? Oui  Non;   Si oui, compléter le 
tableau suivant 
Type de donation Quantité 
reçue 
Valeur 
de la 
donation 
en CFA 
Source 
a. Véhicule       
b. Ordinateur       
c. Equipement de chaîne du froid       
d. Frigidaire       
e. Autre (spécifier _________)       
f. Autre (spécifier _________)       
 
16. Dans quel type de zone l’établissement est-il situé? 
 Urbain (>5.000 habitants)  Rural (<5.000 habitants) 
17. En quelle année l’établissement a-t-il ouvert? __________________ 
18. Quand ont eu lieu les derniers travaux de rénovation de l’établissement? Mois     Année     
  
19. Combien de villages sont-ils supervisés par votre établissement? _______________ 
20. Quelle est la distance entre le village le plus éloigné et l’établissement? __________km 
21. Combien de centres plus petits sont-ils soutenus, managés et supervisés par cet établissement? 
___________________________________ 
22. Combien de lits l’établissement compte-t-il? ___________________    
23. Quel est l’état des routes entre l’établissement et les villages? 
Goudronnées Gravelées Ni goudronnées ni gravelées 
24. Disponibilité des transports publics (taxi, bus)pour se rendre à l’établissement 
Mauvais Moyen Bon 
25. Y-a-t-il eu des inondations qui ont impactées le service en 2012? 
 Oui   Non  
a. Si oui, quel genre d’impact: ________________________________________________ 
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b. Combien de temps a duré l’interruption du service? _____________________ 
 
26. A quelle heure la prise en charge des patients commence et finit-elle ? 
Jour Début Fin 
Lundi   
Mardi   
Mercredi   
Jeudi   
Vendredi   
Samedi   
Dimanche   
 
27. Qui est en charge de l’utilisation des véhicules? __________________________________ 
28. Où gardez-vous les carnets d’utilisation, les registres et les carnets de dépenses? 
_____________________________ 
 
III. POPULATION 
 
29. Quelle était la population totale de la circonscription en 2012? ________________________ 
30. Combien y-a-t-il eu de naissances au sein de cette population en 2012? 
________________________ 
31. Combien y-avait-il d’enfants de moins d’un an dans cette circonscription en 2012? 
_____________________ 
32. Combien y-avait-il d’enfants de moins de cinq ans dans cette circonscription en 2012? 
___________________ 
33. Combien y-avait-il de femmes entre 15 et 49 ans dans cette circonscription en 2012? 
__________________ 
IV. EMPLOYES DE L’ETABLISSEMENT 
34. Quel est le nombre total de personnel soignant travaillant pour l’établissement? 
________________________ 
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a. Veuillez lister le personnel soignant dans le tableau ci-dessous (Pour les grandes 
structures, lister seulement le personnel impliqué dans la surveillance de la méningite) 
 
Poste/titre 
S'il vous plaît 
indiquer également 
si à temps plein ou 
à temps partiel 
Description rapide des fonctions et durée du travail au centre 
de santé 
Impliqué 
dans le 
traitement 
de la 
méningite 
et/ou de la 
surveillance? 
(oui/non) 
   
   
   
   
   
 
35. Quel est le nombre total de personnel non soignant travaillant pour l’établissement? 
___________________ 
 
a. Veuillez lister le personnel non soignant dans le tableau ci-dessous (rajouter des lignes si 
nécessaire) 
Poste 
S'il vous plaît 
indiquer également 
si à temps plein ou à 
temps partiel 
Description rapide des fonctions et durée du travail au 
centre de santé 
Impliqué dans 
le traitement 
de la 
méningite 
et/ou de la 
surveillance? 
(oui/non) 
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V. PROCEDURES POUR DIAGNOSTIQUER ET CONTRÔLER LA MENINGITE 
36. Des ponctions lombaires sont-elles habituellement réalisées sur les patients présentant des signes 
cliniques de méningite avant de commencer à traiter par antibiotiques ?  
Toujours   Souvent   Parfois   Rarement  
37. Quel type d’employé réalise les ponctions lombaires? 
(poste/titre)__________________________________ 
38. Combien de ces employés sont actuellement dans 
l’établissement?__________________________________ 
39. Combien de tubes de LCR sont normalement prélevés sur un cas suspect de 
méningite?_________________ 
40. Quand les prélèvements de LCR sont-ils livrés au laboratoire, cochez la réponse appropriée: 
Immédiatement  toutes les heures  chaque demi-journée  une fois par jour
 autre  
41. Comment les prélèvements sont-ils manipulés et stockés avant le transport vers le laboratoire? 
___________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_________ 
42. Pour un patient atteint de méningite, estimez le temps qu’il faut, en minutes, pour réaliser les 
activités suivantes:  
 Activité de surveillance de la méningite pour un 
patient 
(complétez seulement les activités appropriées) 
Minutes 
A.  Diagnostic du patient  
B.  Réalisation d’une ponction lombaire  
C.  Envoi des prélèvements au laboratoire  
D.  Test sur les prélèvements de LCR  
E.  Gestion des cas incluant le traitement  
F.  Remplir le formulaire de surveillance et/ou les 
fiches descriptives 
 
G.  Déclaration détaillée d’un cas au niveau 
régional/national 
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H.  Correspondance avec des responsables de la 
surveillance  
 
I.  Effectuer le ou les visites de suivi  
J.  Activités d’IEC avec la population  
K.  Autre, précisez: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. AMENER LES PATIENTS VERS L’ETABLISSEMENT 
43. L’établissement a-t-il une ambulance à disposition?   Oui      Non  
44. Si ce n’est pas le cas, comment transportez-vous les patients vers votre établissement? 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________ 
45. Quelle distance sépare l’établissement et les villes d’où viennent les patients?  Estimez la distance 
moyenne en km pour chaque ville concernée 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
_____________________________________________________________________________
________ 
46. Combien de temps cela prend-il en moyenne? _____________heures 
47. Si des taxis ou des bus sont utilisés pour transporter des patients, quel est en moyenne le coût du 
trajet aller/retour? 
 Taxi _______CFA  
 Bus  _______CFA  
48. Combien d’employés de cet établissement réalisent le transfert d’un patient suspecté d’avoir 
contracté une méningite?_____________ 
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49. Reçoivent-ils une rémunération symbolique pour cela? Oui  Non 
a. Si oui, de quel type? Précisez le type______________________  
b. Si oui, quel est l’équivalent monétaire en CFA? _______ 
 
VII. ORIENTATION DES PATIENTS 
50. A quelle fréquence l’établissement utilise-t-il des ressources locales (personnel/véhicules) pour 
transporter vers un hôpital de référence  des patients suspectés d’être infectés par une méningite 
bactérienne? _________________  par semaine, mois, année (encerclez la réponse appropriée) 
51. Donnez des détails 
________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________ 
a. Précisez la ou les villes d’où viennent les patients 
_________________________________________________________________________
_____ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____ 
52. Quelle distance y-a-t-il entre l’établissement et l’hôpital de référence? 
_________________________ 
a. Pour ceux qui sont amenés directement à l’hôpital de référence sans passer par 
l’établissement de santé, précisez la ou les villes d’où ils viennent 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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VIII. SUIVI 
53. Est-ce que cet établissement réalise un suivi pour chaque cas suspect de méningite bactérienne?  
Oui   Non  
a. Si oui, veuillez décrire le processus de suivi: 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
54. Combien de cas suspects de méningite ont été suivis en 2012? Demandez à voir les fiches de suivi. 
Si elles n’existent pas, demandez à voir d’autres documents _________________ 
 
55. Y-a-t-il un document qui permet de centraliser chaque suivi? Oui   Non  
 
IX. VOLONTAIRES 
56. L’établissement a-t-il des volontaires actifs dans la circonscription (comme des agents 
communaux) impliqués dans la surveillance? 
 Oui  Non  
a. Si oui, précisez où ils se trouvent. Combien y-a-t-il de volontaires actuellement actifs et 
impliqués dans la surveillance dans chaque lieu de la circonscription (total)? Complétez le 
tableau ci-dessous. Si non, allez directement à la partie VI. 
Nom du lieu 
       
Nombre de 
volontaires 
      TOTAL 
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57. En 2012, en moyenne, combien d’heures par mois un volontaire passe-t-il sur les activités de 
surveillance suivantes? Complétez le tableau ci-dessous. 
 
Activité 
Nombre d’heures 
(en moyenne par 
mois) pour un 
volontaire 
a. Détection des cas et référence au centre de santé  
b. Mobiliser la communauté et les ménages, et préconiser la 
vaccination / Activités d’IEC avec la population 
 
c. Surveillance  
d. Formation sur la surveillance  
e. Tenue de registre pour la surveillance  
f. Autre (préciser):    
g. Temps de travail d’un volontaire (toute activité confondue)  
 
58. Les volontaires reçoivent-ils une rémunération symbolique?  Oui  Non 
59. Si oui, précisez la nature et la fréquence  
Fréquence________ Type de rémunération __________  Valeur monétaire (CFA) 
__________ 
60. Combien donne-t-on aux volontaires pour les Jours d’Immunisation Nationale?  
Montant en CFA _________ 
61. Est-ce que l’introduction de la surveillance au cas par cas nécessite du temps supplémentaire pour 
les volontaires? 
a.  Oui  Non  Pas applicable 
b. Si oui, pouvez-vous donner une estimation du % de temps passé en plus : ___________% 
 ou du temps total passé en plus : _________ par mois 
 
X. VIII. FORMATION A LA SURVEILLANCE 
62. Les employés impliqués dans la surveillance de la méningite suivent-ils des formations?  
  
Oui  ____ 
Si oui, veuillez préciser: 
________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
Non ____ 
Ne sait pas ____ 
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63. Veuillez compléter le tableau ci-dessous qui détaille la formation pour la surveillance. Pour les formations non financées par l’établissement, veuillez 
indiquer où des frais ont été engagés et gérés.  
 Type de formation En 2012, 
combien 
d’employés 
ont reçu une 
formation 
dans le 
domaine 
suivant? 
Où la 
formation 
a-t-elle eu 
lieu? 
Quel mode 
de transport 
était utilisé 
pour se 
rendre à la 
formation? 
Nombre 
de 
sessions 
de 
formation 
en 2012 
L’une de 
ces 
formations 
était-elle 
tenue pour 
la première 
fois ? 
Oui=1, 
Non=2 
Quelle 
était la 
durée 
moyenne 
de la 
formation 
(en 
jours)? 
Quelle 
était 
l’allocation 
journalière 
pour la 
formation? 
Mettre ‘0’ 
si pas de 
frais 
Qui a 
organisé la 
formation? 
A.  Formation introduisant l’IDSR          
B.  Formation de rappel de l’IDSR                
C.  Autre: précisez 
_________________________
__ 
               
D.  Autre: précisez 
_________________________
__ 
               
  
E.  Formation à l’introduction de 
la surveillance au cas par cas 
               
F.  Autre formation relative à 
l’introduction de la surveillance 
au cas par cas 
Précisez:__________________
__ 
               
G.  Autre formation relative à 
l’introduction de la surveillance 
au cas par cas   
Précisez:__________________
__ 
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XI. SUPERVISION 
64. De janvier à décembre 2012, l’établissement a-t-il eu des visites de contrôle pour la surveillance? 
  
 Oui   Non  Ne sait pas 
Si oui, veuillez répondre aux questions suivantes: 
a. Qui a mené la visite de contrôle? ______________________________________ 
b. A qui cette visite de contrôle était destinée (quels employés)?   
 Personnel soignant:  Oui ___ Non ___ Ne sait pas ___ 
Technicien de laboratoire: Oui ___   Non ___ Ne sait 
pas ___ 
 
Autres:    Oui ___ Non ___ Ne sait pas ___ 
 
c. Veuillez indiquer le mois et l’année des deux dernières visites de contrôle venant d’un 
échelon national? _____________ (mois/année) ________________( mois/année) 
_____________ (mois/année) ________________( mois/année) 
65. A quelle fréquence des visites de contrôle d’autres établissements sont effectuées par les 
employés de cet établissement?  
 ______________  par semaine, mois, année (entourer la réponse appropriée) 
66. Quel véhicule est utilisé pour les visites de contrôle? Préciser le type de 
véhicule__________________ 
67. Normalement, quel est le temps de déplacement moyen pour effectuer les visites de contrôle? 
__________________ heures 
a. Quel est le temps pendant la saison des pluies? _____________ heures 
68. Si un taxi ou un bus est utilisé pour effectuer ces visites, quel est le coût d’un voyage aller-retour ? 
 Taxi_______CFA  
 Bus_______CFA  
69. Combien de personnes se déplacent-elles pour ces visites? ___________ 
70. Reçoivent-elles une rémunération symbolique pour ces visites?  Oui   Non 
a. Si oui, sous quelle forme? Préciser______________________ 
b. Si oui, quelle est la valeur monétaire en CFA? _______ 
71. Quelle est la proportion de temps consacrée à la surveillance de la méningite pendant ces 
visites?_________________________ 
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XII. REUNIONS CONSACRES A LA SURVEILLANCE 
72. A quelle fréquence les employés de cet établissement assistent-ils aux réunions  consacrés à la 
surveillance  (présentation de rapports mensuels, compte rendu, gestion despéidémies,...)?  
_________________ par semaine, mois, année (entourer la réponse appropriée) 
a. Combien de personnes dans cette structure sont concernées en moyenne  par ces 
réunions ? ____________ 
73. Quel véhicule est utilisé pour assister à ces réunions? Préciser le type de 
véhicule_______________________ 
74. Où ces réunions  ont-ils lieu (en 2012)? Préciser  _________________________ 
75. Quelle distance sépare l’établissement de l’endroit où ont lieu les réunions ?_________km 
76. Combien de temps cela prend-il pour se rendre au lieu des réunions  (temps de voyage 
seulement)? ____________heures 
77. Si un taxi ou un bus est utilisé pour se rendre à ces réunions, quel est le coût d’un voyage aller-
retour ?  
Taxi_______CFA  
 Bus_______CFA  
78. Y-a-t-il des indemnités financières pour ces réunions? 
 Oui   Non  Seulement la nuit 
a. Si oui, quel est le montant des indemnités par trajet? __________CFA 
b. Si les indemnités concernent seulement la nuit, combien de fois des indemnités ont-elles 
été versées en 2012? ______ 
c. Montant des indemnités  de nuit? _________CFA  
79. Combien de personne (en moyenne) se rendent à ses réunions?  ____________ 
80. Combien de jours durent ces réunions ? ______________ 
 
 
XIII. SYSTEME D’INFORMATION  
 
81. Qui est responsable de la mise à jour et de la gestion des formulaires de déclaration de cas/des 
formulaires d’enquête/du registre des cas ?  
 
________________________________________________________________________________
_________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________________
_________ 
 
 
82. Décrivez le processus de saisie des  données: 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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83. A qui l’établissement envoie-t-il les données sur la surveillance? (Cochez toutes les réponses qui 
s'appliquent) 
District ____ Regionale  ____  Ministère de la Santé ____  
  
OMS ____ Autre (Préciser) ______________________ 
84. A quelle fréquence les données sur la surveillance sont-elles envoyées aux autorités sanitaires ou à 
l’OMS? (Cochez toutes les réponses qui s'appliquent) 
 Hebdomadaire Mensuel Trimestriel ≥ 6 mois Autre 
a. Téléphone      
b. Fax      
c. Mail      
d. Ordinateur 
avec 
internet 
     
e. Autre      
 
85. Avez-vous des retours au niveau national sur les données que vous fournissez, par exemple sur la 
qualité des données, etc.?   
Oui   Non  Ne sait pas  
86. Les carnets et registres sont-ils vérifiés pour détecter des cas suspects de méningite? 
Oui   Non  
87. Y-a-t-il des problèmes rencontrés pour faire le lien entre les données cliniques et les données de 
laboratoire?  Oui  Non  
88. Si oui, précisez le type de problème: 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________ 
 
XIV. SURVEILLANCE ACTIVE DES CAS DE MENINGITE 
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89. Cet établissement mène-t-il une surveillance active des cas pour la méningite bactérienne ? 
Oui   Non  
Si oui, répondez aux questions suivantes: 
90. Veuillez décrire le processus de surveillance active des cas effectivement mise en œuvre dans 
votre localité: 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
91. Combien de voyages sont-ils été effectués pour la surveillance active des cas en 2012?   
_________________ 
92. Combien de fois ces voyages concernent-ils une surveillance active des cas de méningite 
bactérienne? _________________ par semaine, mois, année (entourer la réponse appropriée) 
93. Quel type de véhicule(s) est utilisé? Préciser le type de véhicule _____________ 
94. Combien de temps prend habituellement 
a. un trajet  aller-retour _____________heures 
b. une mission (hors trajet) _____________heures ou jour (entourer la réponse appropriée) 
95. Si un taxi ou un bus est utilisé, quel est le coût d’un voyage aller-retour ?  
Taxi_______CFA  
 Bus_______CFA  
96. Y-a-t-il des indemnités financières versées?  
 Oui    Non   Seulement la nuit  
a. Si oui, quel est le montant des indemnités par trajet? __________CFA 
b. Si les indemnités sont seulement pour la nuit, combien de fois des indemnités ont été 
versées en 2012? ______ 
c. Montant des indemnités  de nuit? _________CFA  
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97. Y-a-t-il d’autres coûts liés à la surveillance active de la méningite bactérienne?(Si oui, demandez-
leur de les lister ainsi que les ressources nécessaires pour chaque activité) Oui   Non 
 
 
XV. A COMPLETER PAR LES ETABLISSEMENTS QUI SUIVENT LA SURVEILLANCE AU CAS PAR CAS 
98. Pour les activités suivantes (sensibilisation, vaccination, supervision, réunions ), veuillez estimer le 
nombre de déplacements supplémentaires depuis l’introduction du vaccin MenAfrVac (donner 
une période ________________): 
A. Nombre de déplacements supplémentaires pour la sensibilisation ___________ 
Temps consacré à ces déplacements (trajets + temps sur place) : ___________ heure ou jours 
(entourer la réponse appropriée) 
B. Nombre de déplacements supplémentaires pour la vaccination _____________ 
Temps consacré à ces déplacements (trajets + temps sur place) : ___________ heure ou jours 
(entourer la réponse appropriée) 
C. Nombre de déplacements supplémentaires pour la supervision ____________ 
Temps consacré à ces déplacements (trajets + temps sur place) : ___________ heure ou jours 
(entourer la réponse appropriée) 
D. Nombre de déplacements supplémentaires pour les réunions d’immunisation 
______________ 
Temps consacré à ces déplacements (trajets + temps sur place) : ___________ heure ou jours 
(entourer la réponse appropriée) 
E. Autre déplacements supplémentaires, préciser _______________  
Temps consacré à ces déplacements (trajets + temps sur place) : ___________ heure ou jours 
(entourer la réponse appropriée) 
99. L’établissement a-t-il acheté ou obtenu des véhicules supplémentaires du fait de l’introduction de 
la surveillance au cas par cas?  Oui  Non  
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100. Quelles sont les sources principales de financement de la surveillance au cas par cas? 
Activité de surveillance au cas par cas  Source de financement 
a. Formation  
b. Mobilisation sociale ou communautaire  
c. Surveillance spécifique  
d. Autre (préciser)   
e. Autre (préciser)   
f. Autre (préciser)  
 
  
 335 
 
 
XVI. NOMBRE DE CAS DE MENINGITE ENREGISTRE 
101. Veuillez noter le nombre total de personnes suspectées d’avoir été infectées par une méningite bactérienne entre janvier et 
décembre 2012  
 Jan Fev  Mars Avril Mai Juin  Juillet Août Sep Oct Nov Dec 
A.  Nombre de cas suspects 
vu (admis par) 
l’établissement  
                 
B.  Nombre de cas suspects 
renvoyés vers un hôpital  
                 
C.  Nombre de cas suspects 
ayant subi une ponction 
lombaire / prélèvement 
de LCR  
            
D.  Nombre de cas suspects 
ayant subi une ponction 
lombaire avec une 
probable méningite 
bactérienne 
            
E.  Nombre de cas suspects 
ayant fait l’objet d’une 
investigation du cas 
            
F.  Nombre de foyers en 
2012 
            
G.  Nombre de foyers avec 
des annonces en ligne 
documentées 
            
 Nombre de cas suspects ayant subi une ponction lombaire avec confirmation par un laboratoire de: 
H.   Méningite  
 
           
I.   Grippe  
 
           
J.   Pneumonie  
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Evaluation des registres de l’établissement 
Dans les derniers 28 jours, combien a-t-on diagnostiqué de personnes atteintes de 
méningite?_____________________ 
102. Pendant 12 Mars- 8 Avril 2012,  combien a-t-on diagnostiqué de personnes atteintes de 
méningite(méningite bactérienne aigue, méningite à pneumocoque, méningite à 
méningocoque et tout autre type de méningite) Suivre les dossiers de ces personnes en incluant 
les carnets de prélèvements effectués ou le carnet de référencement du patient, les registres du 
laboratoire ainsi que les données sur la surveillance.   Veuillez lister par type de méningite. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
103. Pendant 12 Mars-8 Avril 2013, combien a-t-on diagnostiqué de personnes atteintes de 
méningite?  
Suivre les dossiers de ces personnes en incluant les carnets de prélèvements effectués ou le 
carnet de référencement du patient, les registres du laboratoire ainsi que les données sur la 
surveillance. Veuillez lister par type de méningite.  
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
______ 
 
104. Dans tous les cas de méningite diagnostiqués dans le registre de l’hôpital, combien ont été 
enregistrés sur des formulaires de surveillance individuels: 
a. Pendant 12 Mars- 8 Avril 2012 ____________________ 
b. Pendant 12 Mars- 8 Avril 2013 ___________________ 
c. Si inexistant, expliquez pourquoi: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______ 
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105. Quel est le total des autres maladies qui ont été diagnostiquées dans cet établissement en 
2012? Veuillez compléter le tableau ci-dessous et lister chaque maladie ainsi que leur nombre 
 
Maladie Nombre de cas total 
diagnostiqué par 
l’établissement 
a.   
b.   
c.   
d.   
e.   
f.   
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XVII. QUESTIONS QUALITATIVES 
 
 Tout à fait 
d’accord 
Neutre Pas du 
tout 
d’accord 
NA 
Budget     
106. Nous préparons notre budget annuel pour la 
surveillance de la méningite et les activités de l’IDSR  
       
107. Nous avons le contrôle de notre budget pour l’IDSR        
108. Les fonds que nous recevons chaque année 
correspondent à nos proposions budgétaires 
       
109. Les fonds arrivent en temps et en heure        
110. Notre travail n’est jamais gêné par le manque de 
fonds  
       
111. Nous connaissons nos dépenses pour la surveillance         
112. Nous recevons toutes les fournitures dont nous avons 
besoin en temps et en heure  
       
Logistiques pour le transport en laboratoire     
113. Le système logistique d’envoi de prélèvement vers un 
laboratoire est efficace  
       
114. L’année dernière, nous n’avons pas eu de rupture de 
stock 
       
115. Au cours de l’année passée, nous avons eu un 
système de transport fiable pour transporter les 
prélèvements vers un laboratoire  
    
116. Nous comprenons le processus pour emballer et 
envoyer les LCR vers un laboratoire  
    
117. Nous avons des fonds suffisants pour envoyer les LCR 
vers un laboratoire  
    
Ressources Humaines        
118. Nous avons assez d’employés pour mener des 
activités de surveillance de manière efficace  
       
119. Nous n’avons pas beaucoup de rotation de personnel 
(c’est-à-dire des employés qui partent et d’autres qui 
arrivent)  
    
120. Nos employés ont une bonne connaissance et sont 
formés à la surveillance  
       
121. Nos employés sont motivés        
122. Nos employés reçoivent une supervision et des 
remarques utiles 
       
Rapport        
123. Durant l’année écoulée, nous avons remis en temps et 
en heure tous nos rapports au district  
       
124. Nous recevons des retours sur nos rapports dans des 
temps acceptables  
       
-FIN DU QUESTIONNAIRE DESTINE AUX ETABLISSEMENTS DE SANTE-
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Appendix 5. Recommended upgraded meningitis surveillance activities for Chad  
Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
Health facility 
Support Activity: 
Training 
Health workers identify 
cases who meet case 
definition for meningitis 
and record in register 
Annual IDSR Training 
for Health facility  
Per Diem Cost of training for one 
staff per health facility 
per year 
   Transport  
   Accommodation  
Detection and 
Confirmation 
 Additional employee to 
support IDSR activities  
Personnel time/ salary Salary for additional 
employee 
Reporting and Analysis Weekly and monthly 
report to CDZ as part of 
IDSR zero-reporting 
Archive all paper-based 
forms 
Annual register Cost of annual register 
   Storage furniture (not 
needed if move to electronic 
system) 
Cost of storage furniture 
   Personnel time  
Detection and 
Confirmation 
 Suspected cases are 
referred to health 
facility 
Mobile phone + credit Cost of mobile phone 
and credit 
    Patient Transport fee (to 
motorbike taxi)  
Plus PT fee 
    Patient transport referral 
form 
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Weekly IEC activities as 
part of IDSR 
 Personnel time   
Investigation  Weekly active 
surveillance during 
Meningitis season  
Personnel time Personnel time for 7 (Dec 
to June) months 
   Transport Transport costs for 7 
months 
Response  Conduct Vaccination 
Campaign 
 Personnel time  
   Transport Transport costs 
   Materials (e.g. cold box) Materials 
District Hospital 
Support Activity: 
Training 
 Annual IDSR and 
lumbar puncture 
training for Clinicians 
Cost of training at each 
district hospital  
 
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Lumbar puncture 
performed on suspected 
case 
 Lumbar puncture kit Plus cost of lumbar 
puncture kit 
   Personnel time  
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Send 1 Tube of CSF to 
district laboratory 
Send two tubes of CSF 
to district laboratory 
Tube Plus 1 tube (up to 
sufficiency) 
   TI Plus cost of sufficient TI 
Reporting and Analysis  Complete case-based 
form and send to district 
laboratory 
Case-based form  Plus cost of copies? 
District Laboratory 
Support Activity:  Biannual training (or on- Personnel time Cost of outside 
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
Training site instruction) on 
QA/QC and methods  
consultant, if necessary 
    Training materials  
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform gram stain and 
cell count  
 Personnel time  
   Lab equipment  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform rapid latex test Sufficient amount of 
Latex tests  
Personnel time Plus cost of sufficient 
latex tests 
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Feedback Report results back to 
hospital/CDZ 
   
  Package CSF for transfer 
to National or Regional 
reference laboratory 
within 48 hours upon 
reception of sample 
Personnel time  
   T-I  Plus cost of sufficient TI 
   Triple packaging box Plus cost of sufficient 
Triple packaging 
   Cryotubes Plus cost of sufficient 
Cryotubes  
   Case-based form  
District Health Office (CDZ) 
Support Function: 
Training 
 Annual IDSR Training  
(1 day for CASEs and 
CDZs) 
Per Diem Cost of training for all 
CDZs  
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
   Transport  
   Accommodation  
Detection and 
Confirmation 
 Additional employee to 
support IDSR activities  
Personnel time/ salary Salary for additional 
employee 
     
Detection and 
Confirmation 
 Send prepared CSF to 
National or Regional lab 
using established 
specimen transport 
network within 48 hours 
upon reception of 
sample 
Funding for specimen 
transfer (e.g. by official 
courier) 
 
   Personnel time  
Feedback Notify patient and health 
facility of result within 48 
hours 
 Mobile phone + credit Cost of mobile phone 
and credit 
   Personnel time  
Support Activity: 
Supervision 
Weekly supervision visits   Motorbike Cost of motor bike  
    Monthly petrol allowance Sufficient petrol 
allowance 
    Sufficient motorbike 
maintenance  
   Personnel time  
Reporting and Analysis Analyse district data  Electronic analysis of 
data  
Laptop  Cost of laptop for each 
CDZ 
   Personnel time  
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
Reporting and Analysis Report weekly and 
monthly to Regional level 
Mobile phone + credit  
   Personnel time  
   Internet modem  Cost of modem  
   Monthly internet credit Cost of monthly internet 
credit 
Response  Conduct Vaccination 
Campaign 
 Personnel time  
   Transport Transport costs 
   Materials (e.g. cold box) Materials 
Regional Health Office (CASE) 
Support Activity: 
Training  
 Annual IDSR Training  
(1 day for CASEs and 
CDZs) 
Per Diem Cost of training for all 
CASEs 
   Transport  
   Accommodation  
Reporting and Analysis Analyse regional data  Electronic analysis of 
data  
Personnel time  
   Laptop  Cost of laptop for each 
CASE 
Reporting and Analysis Report weekly and 
monthly to National level 
 Personnel time  
   Mobile phone + credit Cost of mobile phone 
and credit 
   Internet modem  Cost of modem  
   Monthly internet credit Cost of monthly internet 
credit 
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
Support Activity: 
Supervision 
Weekly supervision visits  Monthly petrol allowance Sufficient petrol 
allowance 
   Vehicle  Sufficient vehicle 
maintenance  
Support Activity: 
Coordination 
 Organize annual 
training for health 
facilities and district 
hospital 
Personnel time All costs for training 
except per diem, 
accommodation, and 
transport 
   Venue costs   
   Materials   
   Food   
Response  Conduct Vaccination 
Campaign 
 Personnel time  
   Transport Transport costs 
   Materials (e.g. cold box) Materials 
National Surveillance Office (SSEI) 
Support Activity: 
Training 
 Annual training with 
partners and national 
counterparts on IDSR 
  
Support Activity: 
Coordination 
 Organize training for 
CASEs and CDZs 
Personnel time All costs for training 
except per diem, 
accommodation, and 
transport 
   Venue costs   
   Materials   
   Food   
Support Activity: Two field visits with  Personnel time (Per diem?)  
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
Supervision laboratory cadre 
   Two Vehicles  Cost of additional vehicle 
   Accommodation  
   Petrol  
   Materials  (Education, lab, 
other) 
 
Reporting and Analysis Weekly data analysis   Personnel time   
   Software  
   Hardware (laptop and desktop for relevant Personnel) 
Feedback Weekly and Monthly 
feedback of results  
Develop and distribute 
monthly national 
bulletin with IDSR 
results 
Personnel time  
   Printing  Cost for printing x each 
health facility 
   Courier fees Cost of shipping to each 
CdZ (i.e. to each district) 
Response  Support Vaccination 
Campaign 
 Personnel time  
   Transport to field Transport costs 
Regional Laboratory 
  Biannual training (or on-
site instruction) on 
QA/QC and methods  
Personnel time Cost for outside 
consultant, if necessary 
    Cost of training materials  
Detection and 
Confirmation  
Perform gram stain and 
cell count  
 Personnel time  
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
   Lab equipment  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform rapid latex test  Personnel time  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform culture test  Personnel time  
   Lab equipment  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform Serogrouping   Personnel time  
   Lab equipment  
    Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform Antibiotic 
sensitivity 
 Personnel time  
   Lab equipment  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Feedback  Report results to district 
and national laboratory 
within five days of 
sample receipt in the 
system 
  
Reporting and Analysis Weekly reporting of cases 
to CdZ 
 Case-based surveillance 
forms  
 
   Mobile phone and credit   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Send positive isolates to 
national laboratory for 
 Personnel time  
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
confirmation  
   T-I   
   Triple packaging box  
   Cryotubes  
   Case-based form  
National Laboratory 
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform gram stain and 
cell count  
 Personnel time  
   Lab equipment  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform rapid latex test  Personnel time  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform culture test  Personnel time  
   Lab equipment  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform Serogrouping   Personnel time  
   Lab equipment  
    Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform Antibiotic 
sensitivity 
 Personnel time  
   Lab equipment  
   Lab supplies and reagents   
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Perform PCR Perform real-time PCR Real time PCR machine Cost of real-time PCR 
machine  
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Level/ Function Current Activity Activities to upgrade 
system 
Inputs needed for upgrade Expenses to include in 
budget 
   Lab supplies and reagents 
and reagents  
Cost of real-time PCR 
reagents  
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Send 80% of positive 
isolates to WHO 
Collaborating Centers 
 Triple packaging box  
   Cryotubes  
   Case-based form  
Detection and 
Confirmation 
Report weekly to National 
Surveillance Office  
Electronic aggregation 
and reporting 
(presentation) 
Personnel time  
   Laptop Laptop 
   Software Software 
   Internet modem  Internet modem  
   Credit for monthly internet  Credit for monthly 
internet  
Support Activity: 
Supervision 
Two field visits per year 
with surveillance cadre 
 Personnel time (per diem?)  
   Accommodation  
   Materials  (Education, lab, 
other) 
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